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This thesis examines the question of ethics in the thought of Martin Heidegger, focusing especially on 
his earlier works. While set against the backdrop of the ongoing controversy over Heidegger’s 
associations with National Socialism and the idiosyncratic anti-Semitism of passages in the recently 
published Schwarze Hefte, the thesis is not offered as a contribution to that debate, especially as it 
relates to its biographical content. Rather, the focus is on the extent to which the “fundamental 
ontology” Heidegger develops in the 1920s makes a serious contribution towards what I have referred 
to (with a nod to Frederick Olafson), as Heidegger’s ‘ontological ground of ethics’. In doing so, I explicitly 
take up Heidegger’s later claim (in his famous Brief über den 'Humanismus) that “If the name ‘ethics,’ in 
keeping with the basic meaning of the word ἦθος, should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the 
human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the human 
being … is in itself originary ethics [ursprüngliche Ethik].” (GA9: 356). As such, the thesis looks to examine 
a web of ideas in early Heideggerian texts of the 1920s that provide a compelling case for such an 
originary ground of ethics, in the sense of a condition of possibility for moral normativity. Of course, 
such a ground cannot be understood as a traditional metaphysical foundation, for like Dasein itself, it is 
an Ab-grund, a groundless ground, a factical ground. For this ethical ground is eventually nothing other 
than Dasein itself, a being that, as thrown, “never [has] … power over [its] ownmost Being from the 
ground up,” but must rather take on the ground of its dwelling (ἦθος) in the world. 
The thesis proceeds by examining four inter-related themes in the early Heidegger that I suggest 
interweave in providing what Heidegger refers to in Sein und Zeit  (in terms of one of these themes), as 
“the existential conditions for the possibility of … morality in general, and for the possible forms which 
this may take factically.” (SZ: 286). The first chapter explores Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s notion 
of φρόνησις, as a lens through which the other three themes – Gewissen (chapter two), Eigentlichkeit 
(chapter three) and Mitsein (chapter four) – might be read most effectively for this purpose. In the light 
of Heidegger’s reading of φρόνησις as a practical skill for discerning the best way of acting in relation 








version of Aristotle’s φρόνιμος. This phronetic Dasein’s deliberative action is tailored to a desired end 
(τέλος); that for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνεκα) it acts. In this way, ethics is grounded not as a ‘science’ of 
definite knowing (επιστήμη, or as a τέχνη), but as phronetic skill and understanding. In this light, 
Heidegger’s analyses of Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit, and Mitsein are inherently phronetic, and the abyssal 
ground of ethics that emerges is thoroughly hermeneutical. In his presentation of the authentic “call” 
of conscience, Heidegger provides an account of “the ontological foundations of … the ordinary way  of 
interpreting conscience” (SZ: 314,) thereby distinguishing the ontological condition of possibility of 
conscience from its existentiell actualisation in the experience of moral normativity. His account of 
Eigentlichkeit, far from providing an egoistic (indeed Cartesian) understanding of Dasein’s ‘authentic’ 
self, can then be read as an analysis of emancipatory resoluteness. Dasein as φρόνιμος, in taking on  its 
destiny and fate (that are not of its own making), emerges as an engaged Being-in-the-world-with- 
others, “free[ed] for its world.” (SZ: 344). This then leads into an analysis of Heidegger’s account of 
Mitsein: of Dasein as Being-in-the-world-with-others. Here I build on Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation of 
Dasein as irreducibly (if paradoxically) “singular plural,” in which the I of Dasein is absolutely 
equiprimordial (or “co-originary”) with the ‘we.’ I show how this assessment is consistent with the text 
of Sein und Zeit, and how this branches into Heidegger’s account of Rede and especially Fürsorge in 
terms of Dasein’s authentic “leaping ahead,” as this is attested in freedom and responsibility as well  as 
the ethically profound opening that Heidegger allows to a certain sense of empathy. The thesis 
conclusion includes a few comments about the significance of the thesis’ findings for contemporary 












Im Dasein wird dem Menschen der langehin ungegründete 






































1 From Vom Wesen der Wahrheit im Wegmarken: 145/189. McNeill’s translation: “Dasein [is] the essential ground, long 
ungrounded, on the basis of which human beings are able to ek-sist.” 
xi  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
This thesis examines the question of ethics in the thought of Martin Heidegger. Focusing especially 
on his earlier works, within which the question emerges most thematically and vividly, it considers 
both the texts themselves and the substantial body of secondary literature dealing with them in 
order to contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate concerning this matter. 
 
The question of ethics in Heidegger (and after Heidegger) is a difficult and fraught one for a variety 
of diverse reasons in which Heidegger himself is deeply implicated. First, across the vast scope of 
his life’s work, the subject of ethics receives negligible attention, at least in any developed and 
explicit sense. Second, when it is mentioned, Heidegger typically projects a strongly dismissive and 
oppositional tone concerning the whole field of values-laden discourse and normative ethics, 
generally portraying it as a by-product of a metaphysical tradition that needs to be overcome. 
Notoriously, he remarks at one point that philosophy should refrain from “matters better left to 
the preacher,”1 and elsewhere, he even goes as far as to argue that “thinking in value is the greatest 
blasphemy imaginable against being.”2 Third, if these obstacles were not formidable enough, 
Heidegger’s own disastrous flirtations with National Socialism, and his apparently enduring, albeit 
idiosyncratic brand of anti-Semitism – the evidence for which has been significantly expanded with 
the publication of the first volumes (GA 94–96)3 of his Schwarze Hefte from 1931–1941 – have 
raised the stakes still further, rendering the whole issue of Heidegger and ethics something of a 





1 See, Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische 
Forschung (Frankfurt Am Main: Klostermann, 1985). Translated as Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological 
Interpretation of Aristotle: Initiation Into Phenomenological Research (GA 61), trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 124-25. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited with 
the abbreviation GA 61 and the number as it appears in the English translation, followed by the number/s as it 
appears in the original German texts. For example, GA 61: 124-25/164-166. 
2 “Das Denken in Werten ist hier und sonst die größte Blasphemie, die sich dem Sein gegenüber denken läßt.” Martin 
Heidegger, Brief über den 'Humanismus im Wegmarken (GA 9) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 349. 
Translated as Martin Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," in Pathmarks, ed., William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 265. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited with the abbreviation LH and the 
number/s as it appears in the English translation, followed by the number in the original German text. 
3 GA 94-96 is a collection of notebooks published in Gesamtausgabe. The volumes contain shocking explicit 
exposition of Heidegger’s anti-Semitic utterances that reignite the debate about his Nazi ideologies and their 
implications for his implicit ethical project. Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938) 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014). Hereafter, this text will be referred to as GA 94-96. 
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Yet, despite such obstacles, and perhaps even because of them, this thesis will maintain that the 
question of Heidegger’s complex relationship to ethics continues to loom large, and there is a need 
to look again at this formidable interpretive issue. While it is clear that Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology carries no prescriptive weight or normative intent, it is nonetheless suffused with ethical 
language and trajectories that point toward an ancient pedigree, especially in its evocation of 
Aristotelian ethics (albeit in importantly transformed senses, as will be seen). The task is to explore 
how these very different dimensions can be drawn together in an account of Heidegger’s 
relationship to ethics and the role played by ethical thinking in his overall project. 
 
This question of ethics in Heidegger is rich in significance not only in so far as it contributes toward 
a deeper engagement with Heideggerian thought, but also for what it reveals about the field of 
ethics as such. While both are major considerations, it is the first of these that will be the prominent 
thrust of this thesis, while the second will be a subsidiary concern to be addressed only briefly in 
the thesis conclusion. In terms of the first, the question of ethics is crucial for interpreting 
Heidegger’s account of Dasein, from the analytic of facticity in general, to the meaning of key 
existentialia in Being and Time. This matter is of direct relevance also concerning Heidegger’s 
relationship with key interlocutors in the western tradition, Aristotle and Kant perhaps chief among 
them. Further, it is also a matter that raises important methodological implications, such as the 
nature of primordiality in Heideggerian thought, and the connection between ontological analysis 
and the so-called ontic disciplines (including not only ethics but psychology and anthropology, the 
natural sciences, and theology). 
 
 
HEIDEGGER AND “ORIGINARY ETHICS” 
 
As indicated above, Heidegger’s explicit references in his voluminous works to the problem of 
ethics are few, and those that are made are often brief. However, perhaps more significantly, 
several of his comments – when isolated from their context – seem decidedly dismissive and even 
hostile. What is to be made, for example, of the two remarks cited earlier? 
 
“Thinking in value,” Heidegger writes in 1947, “is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against 
being.” Such a comment may be read as a programmatic statement of opposition to any sense of 
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moral normativity. However, when this extraordinary claim is read within the context of the 
paragraph in which it appears, it is revealed to be pointing in a very different direction. His point is 
not “to maintain that everything interpreted as ‘a value’ – ‘culture,’ ‘arts’, ‘science,’ ‘human 
dignity,’ ‘world,’ ‘God’ – is valueless … to beat the drum for the valuelessness and nullity of beings.” 
His point is rather that the discourse of ‘values’ ironically strips things of their intrinsic worth by 
subjectivising them: 
 
That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as 
an object for human estimation. But what a thing is in its being is not exhausted by its being 
an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value. Every valuing, even where 
it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be ... The bizarre effort to prove 
the objectivity of values does not know what it is doing.4 
 
A similar point might be made concerning the much earlier remark (made in 1921-22) about it 
being best for philosophy to leave ethics “to the preacher.” Here again (as he does a quarter of a 
century later,) Heidegger makes it clear that conceiving philosophy in terms of values is simply a 
way of limiting it to the level of human speculations and preferences. It is the role of preachers, he 
argues, to “make certain that people live up to ideals and so reassure themselves that they are on 
the right track by satisfying tractable rules and public norms.” But such concerns, including the 
inevitability of our “fall[ing] short of the ideal” is not to be confused with “the ontological sense of 
factical life.”5 
 
What positive sense, then, does Heidegger give to the field of ethics? Perhaps the most helpful 
comment he makes explicitly on this whole matter appears in his Letter on Humanism, an essay 
that in some important senses looks back upon his early work; to texts that will form the main 
focus of this study. Here Heidegger explicitly – albeit briefly, and with clear lines of qualification – 
affirms the notion of an “originary [or primordial] ethics [die urspriingliche Ethik].” His remarks in 
this passage, delivered from a vantage point some two decades after the publication of Being and 




4 LH: 265/349. 
5 GA 61: 124-25/164-166. 
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they deserve attention at the outset in order that their significance can be unpacked in the 
chapters that follow. Heidegger’s qualified affirmation is delivered as follows: 
 
If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ἦθος, should now say 
that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth 
of being as the primordial element of the human being, as one who eksists, is in itself 
originary ethics [ursprüngliche Ethik].6 
 
It is significant that having made such an admission (or perhaps better, concession to the language 
of ethics), Heidegger goes on to say little more about what such a conception entails other than to 
heavily qualify his assent. However, within the little he does say, there are some crucial indications 
as to his understanding of the nature of the ethical and its relation to ontology, perhaps especially 
to the fundamental ontology of his early thought. 
 
First: Heidegger is clear that he is not interested in any dismissal of the moral exigencies of his age. 
To the contrary, he insists: 
 
The desire for an ethics presses ever more ardently for fulfilment as the obvious no less 
than the hidden perplexity of human beings soars to immeasurable heights ... Who can 
disregard our predicament? Should we not safeguard and secure the existing bonds even if 
they hold human beings together ever so tenuously and merely for the present? 
Certainly.”7 
 
Heidegger’s position here – one that this thesis will show playing out similarly in his early thought 
– cannot be described as any kind of amoralism or moral nihilism. His response is rather to question 
the conflation between the response to the urgent moral “predicament” of his time, and the 
discipline of ethics as it has been traditionally conceived. Thus, the rhetorical question he poses 
immediately following the quotation above – “But does this need ever release thought from the 
task of thinking what still remains principally to be thought[?]”8 – points to the idea that ethics, 
traditionally conceived, would amount not to a response, but to a failure to respond adequately. 
 
6  LH: 271/356. 
7  LH: 268/353. 
8  LH: 268/353. 
5  
Ethics, as we understand it in the western philosophical tradition, fails to deal seriously with the 
moral challenges of his (or presumably any) time. Rather, what is required, our “task”, is nothing 
less than genuinely primordial “thinking”: i.e., originary ethics. Of course, what that amounts to, 
and what it promises to contribute, is yet to be seen. 
 
Second: Heidegger asserts that ethics is akin to other ontic traditions of thought in their collective 
failure to think deeply or seriously about the subject matter with which they purport to deal. In 
this context, he cautions that “[b]efore we attempt to determine more precisely the relationship 
between ‘ontology’ and ‘ethics,’ we must ask what ‘ontology’ and ‘ethics’ themselves are.” And 
this leads him to appeal to a primordial sense of the ethical that predates even the classical Greek 
(let alone the modern) sense of ethics as being all about moral normativity: 
 
Along with ‘logic’ and ‘physics,’ ‘ethics’ appeared for the first time in the school of Plato. 
These disciplines arose at a time when thinking was becoming ‘philosophy,’ philosophy 
ὲπιστήμη (science), and science itself a matter for schools and academic pursuits. In the 
course of a philosophy so understood, science waxed and thinking waned. Thinkers prior 
to this period knew neither a ‘logic’ nor an ‘ethics’ nor ‘physics.’ Yet their thinking was 
neither illogical nor immoral.9 
Heidegger’s point here is that profound moral concern is possible, and indeed properly and only 
so, not despite the lack of a ‘science’ of moral normativity, but because of such a lack. (The same 
is true, he suggests, for logic, physics, and other ontic disciplines). What is needed in all cases, is a 
return to the primordial question of Being, and only in this way will a truly primordial engagement 
with the ethical become possible again. What this means, he concludes shortly after, is that qua 
“thinking”, originary ethics “is not ethics in the first instance because it is ontology.”10 Here the 
extent of the qualified approval Heidegger offers for specifically ethical thinking comes into view. 
Ethics is “thinking” only if it is originary; but if originary, it is only such insofar as it is really ontology. 





9 LH: 269/354. 
10 LH: 271/356. 
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Third: originary ethics as Heidegger defines it here, is, he claims, a return to the original pre- 
Socratic sense of ἦθος as dwelling, or to put it in the more common parlance of earlier 
Heideggerian thought, it is to think the way of Being of Dasein: 
 
A saying of Heraclitus that consists of only three words says something so simply that from 
it the essence of ethos immediately comes to light ... ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαιμων. This is usually 
translated, “A man's character is his daimon.” This translation thinks in a moden way, not 
a Greek one. ἦθος means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which 
the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence 
of the human being, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear. The 
abode of the human being contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to the human 
being in his essence.11 
 
Heidegger is insistent that the notion of dwelling (that is so prominent in his thought after 1935) is 
already deeply at work in Being and Time itself in the notion there of “Being-in.” Indeed, “[t]his 
dwelling is the essence of ‘being-in-the-world,’” he insists.12 In a very direct way, this thesis takes 
up this challenge issued by Heidegger to read his early writings (including Being and Time) in light 
of this fuller sense of ἦθος as dwelling, insofar as it looks to delve into Heidegger’s analysis of the 
dwelling – the Being-in – of Dasein. 
 
Throughout his early works, Heidegger makes it clear that the fundamental structure of Dasein’s 
existence does not make provision for any metaphysically founded ethics because the ability-to- 
be of Dasein predisposes it to comprehend itself in its finitude rather than being defined by 
objective ethical norms. “The object we have taken as our theme is artificially and dogmatically 
curtailed,” he argues, “if ‘in the first instance’ we restrict ourselves to a ‘theoretical subject,’ in 
 
11 LH: 269/354. Heidegger insists that far from being a retrospective poetic linkage, the relationship between these 
two ways of speaking (these two ‘language games’, we might now say) is entirely organic: The reference in Being and 
Time (SZ: 54/79-80) to “being-in” as "dwelling" is not some etymological play. See, Martin Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit 
(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2001). Translated as: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Great Britain: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 79-80. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited 
with the abbreviation SZ and the number as it appears in the original German texts, followed by the number/s as it 
appears in the English translation. 
The same reference is made in the 1936 essay on Holderlin’s word, “Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells upon 
this earth,” is not the adornment of a thinking that rescues itself from science by means of poetry. See Martin 
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 213. 
12 LH: 272/358. 
7  
order that we may then round it out ‘on the practical side’ by tacking on an ‘ethic.’”13 In Heidegger’s 
interpretation, ethics traditionally conceived is a branch of metaphysics which grounds itself in 
what he refers to as the “metaphysics of Vorhandenheit,” according to which Dasein is seen as an 
entity that can be measured in terms of results, or production of an effect.14 Consequently: 
 
We miss a ‘positive’ content in that which is called, because we expect to be told something 
currently useful about assured possibilities of 'taking action' which are available and 
calculable. This expectation has its basis within the horizon of that way of interpreting 
which belongs to common-sense concern – a way of interpreting which forces Dasein's 
existence to be subsumed under the idea of a business procedure that can be regulated.15 
 
For Heidegger, an originary ethics is not an ‘applied discipline’ that is meant to play its part within 
an instrumental whole, a view that confuses it with an ontic or scientific discipline. As he puts it in 
1930, “philosophy is not theoretical knowledge together with applied discipline,”16 because 
Dasein’s Being “is not a kind of knowledge which one could acquire directly, like vocational and 
technical expertise, and which, like economic and professional knowledge in general, one could 
apply directly and evaluate according to its usefulness in each case.”17 
 
So, what is it to think ‘ethically’ in a primordial sense? What is it for ethics to become ‘original,’ and 
in this way to contribute to the exigencies of our time? Clearly, Heidegger is advocating the need 
for thought to return to the very sources of the ethical life in the sense of the way in which humans 
dwell within the world in the first place. An originary ethics would therefore begin on the basis of 
(and remain always within) an attentiveness to what might be called ‘Being-ethical-in-the- world.’ 
In so doing, any sense of ethics as a kind of τέχνη and θεωρία needs to give way to a mode 
 
 
13  SZ: 316/364. 
14  SZ: 129/167. 
15  SZ: 294/340. 
16 See, Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1982). Translated as Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy, 
trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum Books, 2002), 14/18. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited with 
the abbreviation GA 31 and the number as it appears in the English translations, followed by the number/s as it 
appears in the original German texts; GA 31: 14/18. 
17 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik (GA 40) (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983). Translated as 
Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (GA 40), trans. Churchil James S. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000), 9. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited with the abbreviation GA 40 and the number as it 
appears in the English translations, followed by the number/s as it appears in the original German texts: GA 40: 9/10. 
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of thinking that is rooted in a hermeneutic attentiveness to factical life as such. The knowing of 
originary ethics cannot be any kind of knowing defined by τέχνη. Indeed, the first stage toward the 
possibility of the return to primordial thinking (in ethics or any other area) is the critique of 
technology in its metaphysical roots. For Heidegger, any ethical system that mandates binding 
roles, duties and values could not be any further from originary ethics. For him, one doesn’t ‘do’ 
ethics as an abstract technical exercise that provides the individual with precise details on how to 
act to bring about good and avoid evil. Ethics cannot be thought at all in isolation from the context 
of existing (in the precise sense Heidegger uses that term in the Daseinanalytik). Originary ethics 
thereby becomes absolutely interwoven with fundamental ontology, with the “hermeneutics of 
facticity,” for it cannot be thought outside of the context of Dasein’s thrownness and temporality. 
The reference here to hermeneutics is telling, for any ethical reflection that is organically rooted 
in the ἦθος will be hermeneutic – not theoretical – in nature; or as will be explored in the following 
chapter, it will arise not out of θεωρία but φρόνησις. 
 
Fourth: all this sheds considerable light on Heidegger’s quite extreme reticence to speak about 
ethics at all, let alone to write a substantial account of the same as he records being urged by “a 
young friend” shortly after the publication of Being and Time.18 Of course, it is possible to point to 
the extraordinarily forthright passage in Being and Time (one to which I will return in what follows), 
in which Heidegger declares that Dasein's Being-guilty is “the existential condition for the 
possibility of the ‘morally’ good and for that of the ‘morally’ evil – that is, for morality in general 
and for the possible forms which this may take factically.”19 Notwithstanding the scare quotes 
around his use of the term “morally” in this sentence, it would seem that this provides us with 
every reason to expect that Heidegger would sanction the development of an approach to ethics 
that follows up on the existential analytic of Dasein that is enacted in Being and Time. Indeed, this 
would seem to be the very direction towards which Heidegger’s “young friend” is gesturing in his 
reported remark to Heidegger shortly after the publication of these words in Being and Time. 
However, any such expectation will be disappointed. True, there are a few scant passages that 
might be construed in this direction, such as his 1928 comments concerning metontology in which 
he tantalisingly opens the possibility that fundamental ontology needs to be supplemented by a 
 
18  LH: 268/353. 
19  SZ: 286/332. 
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“Metontologie” that emerges from the former’s “overturning [Umschlag],” in a “μεταβολή“ in 
which “the question of ethics may properly be raised for the first time.”20 However, what is even 
more striking than the explicit endorsement that Heidegger appears to give here to an opening to 
ethics that flows organically from the heart of his fundamental ontology, is the deafening silence 
concerning this opening in his subsequent work. If subsequent references to metontology thus 
conceived are nowhere to be found again, so too the opening to the possibility of the “proper … 
raising of the question of ethics for the first time” vanishes with it. Apart from a few isolated 
passages of this kind, Heidegger never returns to his suggestion concerning “the existential 
condition for the possibility of … morality in general” to flesh it out, and nor indeed does he again 
express such confidence in the viable possibility of the development of such an account of moral 
goodness and evil. Good and evil, it seems, are not topics about which Heidegger has much to say 
at all (a point that has hardly been lost on his many critics over the last few decades who have lined 
up to condemn his peculiar brand of anti-Semitism and flirtation with National Socialism.) 
 
However, what emerges in the Letter on Humanism are the broad lines of an account as to why 
such a development is difficult or impossible in the present moment, and why attempts to do so 
fail to live up to the requirements of a genuinely originary ethics. One of these (towards which I 
gestured earlier) is the Gestell of modern technology that has had the effect of all but closing us 
off (en-framing) entirely from the possibility of thinking primordially. However, if the essence of 
technology is metaphysics, as Heidegger insists, then a deeper understanding of the obstacles to 
an originary ethics will need to be recognised in the western tradition of metaphysics more 
generally. Of the many avenues in which Heidegger enacts his critique of this tradition, one of 
particular pertinence concerns the understanding of the purported ‘subject’ of ethical thinking. 
Seen in this light, an originary ethics is only possible on the basis of a genuine μεταβολή in which 
the metaphysical subject (however it is conceived) is replaced by Dasein. In such a movement, 
theoretical assumptions about human subjectivity and agency evaporate, and are replaced by a 
 
 
20 See, Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (Frankfurt Am Main: 
Klostermann, 1990). Translated as Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 157. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited 
with the abbreviation GA 26 and the number as it appears in the English translations, followed by the number/s as it 
appears in the original German texts: GA 26: 157/199-200. 
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summons to the factical life, to the encounter with mortality and radical temporality, and to the 
recognition that even in being oneself, one is always with others. 
 
It is testament to the radicality of the shift that Heidegger proposes here that in a sense all other 
‘bets’ are effectively off for now. What this means is that it is profoundly difficult (perhaps 
impossible) to think and to speak adequately about ethics (or, indeed, logic, physics, the soul, God 
…) at all at present, in a time in which metaphysics (and its fruits such as technology) still holds us 
in its thrall. The movement away from metaphysics towards the new beginning (as he puts it in his 
later works) will take time and patience; it is something for which we must patiently await: 
Gelassenheit rather than agency. It is not a transition that can be ‘brought about.’ It is almost as 
though, for Heidegger, we are only at the beginning of such an epochal transformation, and until 
such time as the tide has turned, all talk of ethics and normativity is premature. The obstacles to 
the development of an originary ethics are scarcely yet understood, and it is thus difficult to even 
imagine a situation in which they do not any longer block the way to originary thinking. 
 
The difficulty here, I’d suggest, is that it leaves us in a profoundly uncertain state as to what can be 
done in the present moment in order to address the moral exigencies of our time. It hardly seems 
enough to push into a deeply indefinite future the very possibility of perhaps one day being able 
to again think ethically in a practical sense! Indeed, any such suggestion seems to justify the 
accusations made by some concerning the “quietism” of the later Heidegger, a failing that allegedly 
over-corrects the equally bankrupt voluntarism of his earlier work. One scholar recently and 
viscerally summed up this reading of later Heideggerian work: 
 
At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently 
called for, when the ice caps are melting and the bird flu is spreading and the president is 
selling off our national wilderness reserves to private contractors for quick private gain, 
Heidegger apparently calls us to do – nothing. When things that matter so much are 
hanging in the balance, this frustration quickly turns to anger and disgust and even furor. 
How dare this man, who might legitimately be accused of having done nothing right himself 
at a crucial time in his own nation's history, elevate quietism to a philosophical principle? 
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Responsible people have to act, surely, and to suggest anything else is to side with the 
forces of destruction and short-sighted greed.21 
 
Of course, characterisations of early Heideggerian voluntarism and latter Heideggerian quietism 
are both misreadings, or at best highly selective readings (and insofar as this thesis focuses on the 
early thought, I will return to the theme of voluntarism in what is to come). However, I would 
suggest that the prima facie feasibility of the quietism reading points to a telling gap in Heidegger’s 
oeuvre concerning this question of ‘what now?’ Heidegger’s scant remarks on this matter, and 
indeed of ethics more generally, makes multiple readings possible. One might, for example, 
conclude that Heidegger is proposing simply to collapse ‘ethics’ back into fundamental ontology, 
so that ‘ethics’ effectively disappears even as a possibility. Alternatively, one might read him as 
indicating that something like ethics (as it is normally understood) becomes possible only once it 
has been fundamentally reoriented (its horizons clarified) through the Daseinanalytik and its being 
thoroughly ‘worked through’ in the μεταβολή mentioned earlier. Such a reading may or may not 
then be read as consistent with the quietism critique, depending on how this μεταβολή is 
conceived in terms of the ‘how’ of its emergence into the new beginning. 
 
In what follows in this thesis, however, I will argue that it is possible to read Heidegger in a sense 
that avoids both of these extremes insofar as his early work provides some key tools with which 
the understanding of the human can indeed be shifted towards a sense of factical life that is 
genuinely hospitable to something like the originary ethics towards which Heidegger points. While, 
admittedly, the explicit textual evidence for such a reading is thin (for it constitutes a portion of an 
already small number of places where Heidegger discusses the problem of ethics at all), I will 
maintain that the lines for such a reading are to be found tacitly throughout his early work. While 
it may be true that the obstacles to the development of an originary ethics are scarcely yet 
understood, and while the “new” or “other beginning” to which Heidegger points in the Beiträge22 
 
21 Ladelle McWorter, "Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection," in Heidegger and the 
Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, ed., Ladelle McWhorter and Gail Stenstad (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2009), 8. 
22 See, Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) (Frankfurt Am Main: Klostermann, 1999). 
Translated as Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela 
Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 133. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited 
with the abbreviation GA 65 and the number as it appears in the English translations, followed by the number/s as it 
appears in the original German texts: GA 65: 133/169-170. 
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is difficult to imagine, Heidegger’s early work provides sufficient clues and trajectories of thought 
to allow a substantial start in recognising the major contours of his notion of a genuinely originary 
ethics, and the demands that it would make on the one seeking to think and thus to live ethically 





METHOD AND ARGUMENT 
 
This thesis, then, will argue that Heidegger does indeed provide an account (and at times a 
compelling one) of the major lines of an originary ethics in his early work. It is in this sense that I 
will refer to Heidegger’s ‘ontological ground of ethics,’ with a nod to Frederick Olafson’s phrase, 
though adopted in a broader sense that will be detailed in what follows.23 While Heidegger 
specifically does not provide us with normative ethical theories, arguments in applied ethics, or 
even meta-ethical perspectives in any normally attested sense, his fundamental ontology does 
nonetheless provide, as he states in Being and Time, “the existential condition for the possibility of 
… morality in general.”24 As such, he implicitly draws attention to possibilities that are overlooked 
or taken for granted by conventional ethical discourses. In drawing our attention to the facticity of 
Being-in-the-world, Heidegger’s work contributes to the re-envisioning and liberation of ethics 
from the narrowness of its being cast as a instrumentalist discipline for rationally calculating best 
courses of action. In this way, ethics is thrown back into the midst of its source and context in the 
facticity of human concerns. 
 
In what follows, this thesis will explore some of the dimensions of this nascent ontological ground 
of ethics by analysing the closely inter-related concepts of Gewissen and Schuld (conscience and 
guilt/debt); Eigentlichkeit and Entschlossenheit (authenticity and resoluteness); and Mitsein 
(Being-with). While not used in the usual sense of ethical reflection, this vocabulary, as Heidegger 
 
23 See, Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). Interestingly, this phrase has also been used by Jean-Luc Nancy in his work, Jean-Luc Nancy, 
"Heidegger's "Originary Ethics"," in Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, ed., François and Pettigrew David Raffoul 
(Albany New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 67-86. 
24 SZ: 286/334. Note that I am making use of Heidegger’s words here beyond the more limited sense in which he uses 
them to refer to “Being-guilty” alone. In this sense, as I outline below, my own argument understands “the 
existential conditions for the possibility of … any morality whatsoever” to be comprised of a series of trajectories 
within Being and Time, and other early works, beyond but including conscience. 
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deploys it, contains an unmistakable ethical trajectory that is held together by a common origin 
and convergence in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s category of φρόνησις. Indeed, in what 
follows, I will propose that Heidegger’s retrieval (Wiederholung) of Aristotelian ethics, and 
φρόνησις in particular (chapter one), provides the framework within which the specifically ethical 
significance of Gewissen (chapter two), Eigentlichkeit (chapter three) and Mitsein (chapter four) 
can be appreciated. While Heidegger’s retrieval of φρόνησις has been often enough linked to the 
central issues of the Daseinanalytik, what is somewhat lacking is systematic work looking into how 
this retrieval can be understood as linking together the various quasi-ethical thematics that run 
throughout early Heideggerian thought. It is into this breach that this thesis leaps. 
 
This notion of an ‘ontological ground of ethics,’ and its relationship to ‘originary ethics,’ needs 
further comment and clarification in the context of how it operates both conceptually and 
methodologically in this thesis. Inevitably, in the case of Heidegger, the methodological “question 
of grounds” must take centre stage. This is not the place to rehearse Heidegger’s detailed analyses 
of Grund [ground/ reason/ principle/ foundation] either in its first elaboration in Vom Wesen des 
Grundes (published in 1929), nor in his more substantial (and self-critical) engagement with it in 
Der Satz vom Grund (1957). But if ethics is to be understood in terms of its ground/s, then (in the 
case of Heidegger, par excellence) it is essential that the meaning of ‘ground’ is distinguished from 
any variety of traditional metaphysical foundationalism. Herman Philipse’s description of such a 
metaphysical sense of ‘ground’ economically captures the salient characteristics: 
 
Like the epistemological foundationalist, the foundationalist in meta-ethics holds that 
moral propositions are justified only if they can be derived from more fundamental 
propositions that are also justified. This notion of justification as derivation threatens to 
lead to an infinite regress unless there are first principles of ethics that are so secure that 
further justification is not needed. One might reconstruct the history of ethical theory in 
philosophy partly as an attempt to discover secure first principles of ethics.25 
 
Such a definition is helpful in order to clarify what is not intended by my own use of the language 
of ethical ground: i.e., any foundation that ties everything back to an ultimate antecedent principle 
 
 
25 Herman Philipse, "Heidegger and Ethics," Inquiry 42, no. 3 (1999): 456. 
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that is both a self-evidently valid first principle of ethics, and one that thereby grounds all other 
values or principles that are consistent with it. There is, of course, no sense in which Heidegger can 
be understood to advocate any such sense of ground, particularly if it is construed in terms of a 
heteronomous foundation as the absolute locus of moral authority (e.g., God, a principle of natural 
law, a Platonic form, etc.) But further, it is important to note that no claim is being made here that 
Heideggerian thought provides, or even could provide, any kind of pathway towards ‘moral 
realism’ understood in the sense of stable universally applicable or ‘objective’ norms for behaviour. 
There is no revisionism afoot in this thesis according to which Heidegger is to be folded back into 
a traditional metaphysical account of ethics. There is no Heideggerian categorical imperative to be 
smuggled in; no τέχνη of utilitarian calculation to be found secreted anywhere within the pages of 
the Gesamtausgabe. 
 
Rather, the ontological ground of ethics that is being proposed here, is nothing other than finite, 
thrown Dasein itself. Dasein, as ground, can only ever be an Abgrund, an abyssal ground. It is that 
from which the possibility of ethics emerges, but it is not, as such, the guarantor of any system of 
normativity. It cannot be so, since it is not even its own ground. As thrown, Dasein is given to itself. 
Its very self emerges from the factical and “null” context of its Being. Heidegger is absolutely clear 
and forthright on this point: 
 
Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its ‘there’, but not of 
its own accord … As existent, it never comes back behind its thrownness …[A]s such, it can 
exist solely as the entity which it is; and as this entity to which it has been thus delivered 
over, it is, in its existing, the basis [Grund] of its potentiality-for-Being. Although it has not 
laid that basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it … And how is Dasein this thrown basis? 
Only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The Self, which 
as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as 
existing, it must take over Being-a-basis [Grundsein] … In being a basis – that is, in existing 
as thrown – Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before this 
basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus, ‘Being-a-basis’ means never to have power 
over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up [eigensten Sein von Grund auf] … It has been 
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released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis. Dasein is not 
itself the basis of its Being … rather, as Being-its-Self, it is the Being of its basis.26 
 
However, if any traditional notion of absolute ground is off the table, this serves to open the 
possibility of a different sense of ground, and a different sense of primordiality. Accordingly, an 
originary ethics is not an ethical system that has been grounded in a universal principle, but rather 
a thinking about Dasein in its dwelling in-the-world as the ‘ungrounded ground’ of the ἦθος. Within 
this transformed sense of ground, it is again possible to look for existential structures in Dasein’s 
factical life that provide the conditions of possibility for thinking ethically. And these are precisely 
what Heidegger provides in the Daseinanalytik in his analysis of authentic, resolute, 
guilty/indebted Dasein who is always already Dasein-with-others. It is in this sense that I share 
Olafson’s view that Heidegger’s ontological analysis of Dasein is “of fundamental importance to 
any effort to get at the ground of ethics.”27 
 
In addition to the question of ground, the meaning of primordiality similarly looms large in any 
analysis of the methodological aspects of a Heidegger’s putative “ursprüngliche Ethik.” On this 
similarly formidable issue, I venture just one brief comment via an analogy with what Heidegger 
says, in Being and Time, concerning the primordiality of Being-in; and thus of Dasein’s “dwelling.” 
He says: 
 
[I]f we inquire about Being-in as our theme, we cannot indeed consent to nullify the 
primordial character of this phenomenon by deriving it from others – that is to say, by an 
inappropriate analysis, in the sense of a dissolving or breaking up. But the fact that 
something primordial is underivable does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of 
characteristics of Being may be constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then 
existentially they are equiprimordial. The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of 
constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically 




26  SZ: 284-85/330-31. 
27 Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, 7. 
28 SZ: 131/170. 
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In a not dissimilar sense, it could be suggested that an originary ethics might emerge holistically 
not from a single blinding insight (let alone from a valid inference), but from the series of 
existentialia – Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit and Mitsein – that are at the core of the Daseinanalytik. 
Further, each of these can be framed (or seen holistically) through the lens of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical reading of φρόνησις. Of course, these existentialia that are of especially keen 
ethical relevance are not absolute founding principles of ethical life; rather, they are no more, but 
no less, than the primordial operative structures within the Daseinanalytik that condition the 
possibility of ethical thinking. In that sense, they are spoken about here as key features of the 
ontological ground for the possibility of ethics in early Heideggerian thought. 
 
One final methodological matter needs to be addressed at this point. In a work dealing with 
Heidegger’s relation to ethics, it is impossible to avoid the controversy which is often taken – quite 
wrongly, I would maintain – to have a decisive say in terms of Heidegger and the question of ethics. 
I refer here to Heidegger’s intellectual involvements with the ideology of Nazism, the record of his 
complicity with the National Socialist regime in Germany in the early 1930s, and the growing 
evidence of his idiosyncratic but undeniable anti-Semitic views. Suffice to say I reject the 
proposition that Heidegger’s deeply unfortunate affiliations and undertakings at this time 
undermines any claim concerning the importance of an ethical ground of ethics in his work. This 
line of argument has been made often over the past couple of decades in particular, (culminating 
perhaps in Emmanuel Faye’s suggestion that Heidegger’s work should be treated as a form of hate 
speech insofar as his work was pervaded by Heidegger’s Nazi ideology)29 and it has taken another 
turn since the publication of the first volumes of the Schwarze Hefte (dealing with the years 1931– 
1941) concerning Heidegger’s views about “the Jews.”30 What is the relevance of these 
controversies concerning Heidegger, Nazism and anti-Semitism for the view to be developed in this 
thesis? 
 
One might start with the observation that these matters should rightly shake our confidence that 
such a deeply flawed character has anything worthy and reliable to say about the ethical life. 
Hannah Arendt alludes to such a thought when she compared Heidegger to Thales, the Greek 
 
29 See, Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars 
of 1933-1935 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
30 GA 94–96. 
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philosopher, who became so engrossed in contemplating the heavens that he tripped into a well 
at his feet.31 In her critique of Heidegger’s political life, she euphemistically describes him as a 
person who “was served more than Plato” and as a result, “succumbed to the temptation to change 
his ‘residence’ [by] getting involved in the world of human affairs.”32 This interpretation cast 
Heidegger and Nazism into the light of tragic error especially as Arendt faults Heidegger’s 
reprehensible conduct, arguing in the words of Lawrence Vogel that his “fundamental ethics is too 
indeterminate to guide judgement – or worse yet, that it is susceptible to chauvinistic appeals.”33 
Theodore Kisiel goes further in writing of suspicions of “a form of ideological cover-up, a thinly 
veiled attempt to insulate the purity of the thought from the ‘impure’ events that are being 
dredged up from its vital infrastructure.”34 Such reservations are understandable and suspicions 
are warranted. Nonetheless, due philosophical care requires us to carefully separate Heidegger’s 
philosophy and personal biography in order to avoid sacrificing the greatness of Heideggerian 
thought on the altar of his human frailties and weaknesses. To systematically interpret the early 
Heidegger’s immense collection of works, including his engagements with Dilthey's 
Lebensphilosophie, the existentialism of Kierkegaard, Husserl's Phenomenology, Kantian and neo- 
Kantian transcendental philosophy, and Aristotelian practical philosophy through the single lens of 
Nazi propaganda is to introduce a vast systematic distortion all of its own. Furthermore, if the 
biographical details of Heidegger’s life are given undue influence in the assessment of his work, 
the threat of the genetic fallacy looms large. Heidegger’s work is what Werkmeister refers to as an 
“intellectual product,” which “should always be evaluated on its own merits, never on the basis of 
[his]…characters, actions or life.”35 “After all,” he asks, should Bertrand Russell’s philandering and 







31 Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty " New York Review of Books 17, no. 6 (21 October, 1971): pp. 50-54. 
The article was first published in the German periodical, Merkur in 1969. Reprinted in Michael Murray, Heidegger 
and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays (Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 301-2. 
32 Murray, Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays, pp. 301-2. 
33 Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile "We" Ethical Implications of Heidegger's "Being and Time" (Illonois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1994), 3. 
34 Theodore J. Kisiel, Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts, ed. Alfred Denker and Marion 
Heinz (Continuum, 2002), pp. 8-9. 
35 William Henry Werkmeister, Martin Heidegger On the Way (New York: State University of New York, 1996), 16. 
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other examples of human failings keep us from appreciating the philosophical works of their 
authors?”36 
 
One might rather look into the details of Heidegger’s work, and see within it telling trajectories 
that are reflected within Heidegger’s own life. One might, for example, interpret Heidegger’s 
consistent refusal to provide a sustained discussion of the ethical, and his insistence on the 
separation of ethics from ontology, as an indication of a deep indifference to ethics, or perhaps 
even of a positive opposition to normal civilised moral standards. But if so, then a case will need 
to be built that justifies moral condemnation of Heidegger’s work in terms of the evidence of the 
texts themselves. And as has been indicated thus far, in my judgement, it is difficult to make any 
such case in a systematic way. To the contrary, there is much in Heidegger’s work – especially in 
its early period, on which this thesis focuses – that points toward a very different conclusion. 
 
Jurgen Habermas’ remarks on this issue (albeit from some years ago) bring together both the 
biographical and the textual, and are worth quoting at length: 
 
Questionable political conduct on the part of a thinker certainly throws a shadow on his 
work. But the Heideggerian oeuvre, especially the thought in Being and Time, has attained 
a position of such eminence among the philosophical ideas of our century that it is simply 
foolish to think that the substance of the work could be discredited, more than five decades 
later, by political assessments of Heidegger's fascist commitments … The path breaking 
achievement of Being and Time consists in Heidegger’s decisive argumentative step 
towards overcoming the philosophy of consciousness. This achievement may be 





36 Werkmeister, Martin Heidegger On the Way, 16. Julian Young makes a similar point in his defence of the integrity 
of Heidegger’s work in De-Nazified Heidegger. He argues that Heidegger’s work has to be understood within the 
context by which it was written, and according to the foundational context of Heidegger’s work was that of Volk 
(People). Young claims that against the claim of Nazi origin of his work, Heidegger “affirmed the priority of the Volk 
over state, [and] that he regarded the German state as the vehicle of the German Volk, is implicit in the vocabulary 
used in the political speeches to refer to the German collectivity: the dominance of Volksgemeinschaft (community 
of the people).” See Julian Young, Heidegger Philosophy Nazism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20. 
37 Jurgen Habermas and John McCumber, "Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy from a German 
Perspective," Critical Inquiry 15, no. 2 (1989): 433. 
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It is difficult to disagree with Habermas on this point. In what follows, I engage with Heidegger’s 
work on its own merits and explore what it has to say about the nature and ground of ethics on 
that basis, even if the matter of Heidegger’s anti-Semitic learnings and complicity with the National 
Socialist regime must inevitably ‘haunt’ the analysis to come and give legitimate pause at various 




SURVEY OF THE SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Before proceeding, however, it will be useful to provide a brief survey of some major scholarly 
voices and schools of thought concerning the matter at hand which will be picked up in one way 
or another, in what follows. The debate concerning the value of Heidegger’s thought for the 
thinking of ethics is rife with fundamental (and sometimes polarised) differences of interpretation. 
At one extreme would be those who have portrayed Heideggerian thought as an ethical vacuum in 
need of stringent critique, and here I would include figures such as Emmanuel Levinas and even (if 
somewhat more equivocally) Hannah Arendt, but also more recent figures such as Emmanuel 
Faye38 and Richard Wolin,39 who have focused on Heidegger’s association with the Nazism and anti-
Semitism as providing evidence of moral bankruptcy. At the other extreme are those scholars 




38 See Faye, 2011. For deep and searching critiques of Faye’s presentation of Heideggerian thought, see Thomas 
Sheehan, "Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy?," Philosophy Today 59, no. 3 (2015): 367, and 
Patricia Cohen, "An Ethical Question: Does A Nazi Deserve a Place Among Philosophers," The New York Times Online 
(Nov. 9, 2009): C1, accessed, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/books/09philosophy.html. 
39 See, Richard Wolin, "'Over the Line': Reflections on Heidegger and National Socialism," in The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed., Richard Wolin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 315. Also see, 
Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990). 
40 As will be seen, here, Olafson makes clear that the argument of nihilism distorts the fundamental message of 
Being and Time. He argues that though Heidegger fails to explicitly develop his notion of Being-with, it is within the 
ambience of this concept that one can fully grasp the ethical implications of his work. For a further discussion on 
Olafson’s argument on the ethical character of Being and Time, see, Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A 
Study of Mitsein, pp 3-68. 
41 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, ed. Werner and Wellbery E. Hamacher (Stanford University Press, 2000). 
42 Michael Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics: Being-with in the Crossing of Heidegger's Thought (London: 
Continuum, 2006). 
43 Lawrence Hatab, Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000). 
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Hodge,44 Charles Scott,45 and Lawrence Vogel46 – who see Heidegger’s work as imbuing a deeply 
ethical trajectory, and one that is in significant critical continuity with the western tradition of  
ethics stemming from Aristotle. As will be seen in what follows, my own view might be 
characterised as fitting somewhere within this broad school of thought, for reasons that will be 
outlined. Then there are those scholars – such as Hubert Dreyfus,47 Taylor Carmen,48 William 
Blatter,49 and Saulius Geniusas,50 – who take a quite neutral view about the extent towards which 
Heidegger’s work can inform an understanding of ethics. 
 
As early as the 1930s, Levinas expressed profound mistrust of Heideggerian thought, and by 1961 
he contended that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology follows a philosophical tradition that is 
intrinsically unethical.51 Levinas conceived Heidegger’s Daseinanalytik not only as a recapitulation 
and promulgation of the theory of the autonomous self that has characterised much of the western 
tradition, but also as its deification via the extraordinary manner in which Heideggerian Being (an 
intransitive neuter concept) is prioritized over the particular interpersonal existence of human 
beings.52 
Hannah Arendt is another of the second generation of phenomenologists who offered a strong 
rejection of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in terms of its ethical implications.53 Arendt shared 





44 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
45 Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), pp. 91-210. 
46 Vogel, The Fragile "We" Ethical Implications of Heidegger's "Being and Time". 
47 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (London: The MIT 
Press, 2001). 
48 Taylor Carman, Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
49 William D. Blatter, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 28. 
50 Saulius Geniusas, "Ethics As Second Philosophy, or The Traces of The Pre-Ethical In Heidegger's Being and Time," 
Santalka, Filosofija 17 (3), no. 1822-430X (2009): pp. 62-70.51 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard. 
A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1997), 44. 
51 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard. A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1997), 
44. 
52 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Lingis Alphonso (The Hague: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969), 45. 
53 Matthew. C. Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle: Phronesis, conscience, and seeing through the 
one," European Journal of Political Theory 10, no. 2 (2011): 254. 
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importantly, despite her political theories owing much to Heidegger’s concept of worldhood,54 
Arendt considered Heideggerian though to be promoting a kind of moral decisionism. The freedom 
and dignity of human beings which Kant championed in the Grundlegung was not meant as an 
individual project, but rather as pointing to the inclusiveness of all human beings, the significance 
of which lies not in the arbitrary care-structure as Heidegger suggested, but in obedience to the 
moral law. Individual freedom, on the other hand, is possible only to the extent that other people’s 
rights and dignities are upheld.55 Further, she rejects later Heideggerian “mythologizing confusions 
as Folk and Earth as a social foundation for his isolated Selves.” 56In sum, she sees Heidegger’s 
Dasein as a being that is care-less and nonchalant, failing to provide anything like an originary 
ethics, and in fact in some ways it points in the other direction. 
 
It is interesting that American pragmatist interpretations of Heidegger on the matter of ethics have 
tended to offer a more neutral account, seeing his thought neither as intrinsically anti-ethical, but 
nor as offering much by way of positive contribution. Hubert Dreyfus suggests that the possibility 
of ethics in Being and Time is severely curtailed by the fact that Dasein can neither “interpret things 
in a radically new way” nor attempt to modify itself. While Entschlossenheit generally entails 
firmness of purpose in the act of making decisions, in Heidegger’s account, factical Dasein cannot 
have any such lucidity of choice. 57 Dasein simply interprets its facticity as what its state of affairs 







54 Arendt argues, for example, that Heidegger’s das Man is indeed a sufficient description of the modern space of 
appearance: “[Heidegger’s] phenomenological descriptions [of the worldhood of Dasein] offer most penetrating 
insights into one of the basic aspects of society, and moreover, insist that these structures are inherent in the human 
condition as such … Their limitations appear only if they are taken to cover the whole of public life.” See, Hannah 
Arendt, Essays in understanding, 1930-1954, ed. Jerome Kohn, 1st ed. (New York: New York : Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
1994), 433. Also, in The Human Condition, the traces of Heidegger’s das Man are palpable in Arendt’s 
characterisation of the public realm as the “rule of nobody.” According to her, society “expects from each of its 
members a certain kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its 
members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or achievement.” See, Hannah Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 2nd ed. (United States: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 40. 
55 Arendt, The Human Condition, 44. Also see, Hannah Arendt, "What is Existenz Philosophy," in The Phenomenology 
Reader, ed., Dermot Moran, Mooney Timothy (London: London Routledge, 2002), 355. 
56 Arendt, "What is Existenz Philosophy," 357. 
57 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (London: The MIT 
Press, 2001), 25. 
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(as in the ethical sphere), [but] rather … an empty, open, spontaneous way of being-in-the- 
world.”58 
 
According to Taylor Carman, “Heidegger’s negative characterisations of inauthenticity seem to 
remain attuned to the Romantic discourse of self-estrangement and subjective disintegration,”59 
though his positive characterisation of authenticity as forerunning resoluteness fails to elicit much 
sense of “wholeness, completion, or unified subjecthood.” In this way, a genuine openness to the 
ethical is deeply constrained. Carman adduces two reasons for this limitation. First, Dasein lacks 
the “subjective integrity envisioned by philosophers like Rousseau, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Dilthey,”60 since its immersion in everydayness (facticity), means that Dasein is “always unfinished, 
subject to error, and thus unfit to provide an ethical account of itself as a whole.”61 Second, the 
“vagueness” and formality of Heidegger’s accounts of authenticity and inauthenticity in Division II 
of Being and Time means that they cannot be the basis for any evaluative function that might 
underpin the possibility of ethical normativity. 
 
An interesting case is the view William Blattner develops in his “temporal idealist” account of early 
Heideggerian thought. According to Blattner, the whole issue of whether or not Heidegger provides 
anything like an opening to ethics is entirely moot. This is because authenticity is only ever a 
“’factical ideal’ (SZ 310) for the life of Dasein.”62 Given the fact that Dasein’s existence is always 
and essentially temporal in its constitution rather than authentic, Blatter argues that the ideal of 
authentic forerunning resoluteness, and perhaps ethics as such, is largely irrelevant in Heidegger’s 
analytic of Dasein. 
 
A final case in point here is the position put by Saulius Geniusas, who suggests instead that 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology simply provides two sharply contrasting and irreconcilable 
tendencies: i.e., the anti-ethical and the ante-ethical. The question of whether fundamental 
ontology is ultimately anti-ethical or ante-ethical can never be finally decided because these 
 
 
58 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, 321. 
59 Taylor Carman, Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 267. 
60 Carman, Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time, 267. 
61 Carman, Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time, 278. 
62 Blatter, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, 28. 
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accounts are incompatible. The irreconcilable conflict between them indicates that “moral 
regulations and moral motivations have different origins of sense: while moral motivations are 
grounded in guilt and conscience, moral regulations are grounded in the rules of das Man.”63 The 
implication of this assertion is “that one can be moral only as a split subjectivity.” Hence, “the 
phenomenological significance of the question of ethics in Being and Time composes precisely the 
disclosure of this existential and ontological conflict that qualifies the moral dimension of human 
existence.”64 Nonetheless, the very presence of the anti-ethical and ante-ethical dimensions in 
Being and Time highlights the inherent problem of the lack of ethical congruence in Heidegger’s 
works. 
 
While acknowledging (in ways explored below) aspects of these critical readings of Heidegger, the 
approach developed here is nonetheless marked by a more positive appraisal of Heidegger’s tacit 
contribution to ethical reflection. In this way, it shares most in common with a comparatively small 
but important group of scholars who have looked to rehabilitate Heidegger’s legacy in this area 
though the identification of substantial ethical trajectories within his existential analytic. For 
Frederick Olafson, Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein is key to the ethical horizons of his early work. 
Mitsein unlocks the “ground of ethics” in Heidegger insofar as our relations to others can by itself 
yield standards of right and wrong. In disregarding scientific images of the self, Heidegger draws 
our attention to the ordinary, though generally overlooked discourse of life that provides us with 
genuine principles of conduct.65 Olafson contends that this ordinary but profound ground of ethics 
is not simply “an empirical fact,” but is utterly ontological in nature, comprising “a constitutive 
element” in the mode of being of both self and others. He identifies two key aspects to the ethical 
significance of Mitsein: empathy and Fürsorge (that he translates as “caring for”.) Olafson notes 
the many loose ends in Heidegger’s account, such as the issue of just how Mitsein actually 
engenders Fürsorge, though his suggestion is that it is resoluteness itself that “pushes us into a 
caring Mitsein with others.”66 Further, Mitsein implies reciprocity, and in this mutual or cooperative 




63 Geniusas, "Ethics As Second Philosophy, or The Traces of The Pre-Ethical In Heidegger's Being and Time," 69. 
64 Geniusas, "Ethics As Second Philosophy, or The Traces of The Pre-Ethical In Heidegger's Being and Time," 69. 
65 Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, pp. 17, 22-3, 28, 35, 99-101. 
66 Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, 5. 
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it a binding character of a specifically ethical kind.”67 While he provides only a sketch of the 
possibilities, Olafson offers a tantalising glimpse of the potential for developing a fully-fledged 
account of ethical normativity on the basis of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein. 
 
Jean-Luc Nancy is another scholar who looks to develop a radical account of Heideggerian Mitsein 
with a view to showing its far-reaching ethical implications. Indeed, in what follows (especially in 
chapter four), I will discuss Nancy’s account at length, and it will play an important role in the 
development of my own interpretation of Mitsein. Of particular importance here is Nancy’s notion 
of the “being singular plural,” or otherwise put: the being-with (Mitsein) of being-there (Dasein.) 
In Nancy’s hands, Mitsein is interpreted not simply as one existentiale among others that adds an 
intersubjective element to an otherwise singular being, but as an absolutely core feature of the 
existential analytic that secures the singular and the plural as “co-originary” dimensions of what it 
means to be Dasein. 
 
The work of a lesser known Australian philosopher, Sarah Sorial, builds on Nancy’s legacy in 
interesting ways.68 In arguing for the continuity of Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s individuation 
with his account of Mitsein, Sorial sees in these both “an ethics … of responsibility for existence, 
and more specifically, for one’s own existence.”69 Indeed, Dasein’s care for itself is a source of  
ethical potency in Being and Time. For Sorial, Heidegger’s Dasein is a being that is fundamentally 
structured to be both its own mediating agency and a “subject that is open to the world and the 
other,”70 and in this way, she sees fundamental ontology as invoking not only ethics but also 
political action. If Olafson and Nancy’s focus is on Mitsein as the key ethical category in early 
Heideggerian thought, Michael Lewis focuses instead largely on ontological difference: that is, “the 




67 Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, 11. While I find Olafson’s account to be 
exceedingly helpful in many respects, I have some reservations concerning his claim that “our relation to one 
another can by itself yield standards of right and wrong,” as well as his rather sweeping claims concerning 
Heidegger’s appeals to empathy. His account of “ground” is also very sketchy in a text that makes a formidible claims 
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68 For a full discussion of Sorial position, see, Sarah Sorial, "Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, and the Question of Dasein's 
Embodiment: An Ethics of Touch and Spacing," Philosophy Today 48 (2) (2004): pp. 216-30. 
69 Sarah Sorial, "Heidegger and the Problem of Individuation: Mitsein (Being-with), Ethics and Responsibility" 
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reaching for [its own] being.”71 In a bid to offer a rejoinder to Levinas’ critical response to 
Heidegger’s prioritisation of ontology, Lewis claims that for Heidegger ontological difference is a 
principle that articulates “the uniqueness of a being ... the singularity of an entity before and 
beyond any wider horizon of meaning which might subsume it and render it comprehensible.”72 
Lewis links this to Heidegger’s evocation of the early Greek sense of ἦθος as dwelling, which itself 
refers to a relation with Being through which beings as a whole become intelligible to themselves 
in the clearing of understanding. Consequently, argues Lewis, ethics in its originary sense comes to 
mean “dwelling near to being, seeking it and responding to it.” It is on this basis that he is then 
able to work back to Mitsein, for the latter encapsulates the primary objective of fundamental 
ontology which is the ontological difference itself.”73 Dasein is being-with, because it is the place- 
holder within beings as a whole, distinguished utterly from them (unabsorbed into “the 
undifferentiated mass of beings”)74 and related to others in their uniqueness or singularity. 
However, this singularity of the other is not the Levinasian “concrete other of intersubjectivity,” 
but rather a fundamental “relation between singular possibilities, which are my own, and a nullity, 
which is neither mine nor yours.”75 
Lawrence Hatab’s approach to the question of Heidegger’s contributions to ethics is perhaps the 
most multi-faceted of these accounts that have emerged over the last couple of decades. For him, 
Heidegger provides a much needed ontological basis for ethics, for while the latter is “rich in its 
analysis of normative topics [it is] poor in attention to our being-ethical-in-the-world”.76 Arguing 
for Heidegger’s insight into the irreducible finitude of ethical life, Hatab’s examination of the 
implications of Heidegger’s contributions touch on many of the themes investigated in this thesis, 
including the Aristotelian basis of Heidegger’s thinking, the problem of subjectivity, dwelling as 
ἦθος, Mitsein and language. However, his account is also marked by a strong emphasis on moral 
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75 Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics: Being-with in the Crossing of Heidegger's Thought, 55. 
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Joanna Hodge identifies what she sees as a repressed ethical dimension in Heidegger’s writings 
within the parameters of Dasein’s relationship with others, both known and unknown. Hodge goes 
as far as to assert that “the question of ethics is the definitive, if unstated problem of Heidegger’s 
thinking.”77 In her view, Heidegger’s assumption seems to be that Being’s withdrawal makes ethical 
theory impossible, since it leads to the forgetting of Being and the loss of a sense that there is 
anything other than a domain of facts. But, to the contrary, she maintains, this withdrawal could 
also divulge the reality of human responsibility.78 
 
Similarly, Charles Scott maintains that, ethics is a primary theme in Heidegger’s work, even if in so 
doing he thoroughly questions conventional ethical assumptions. “In Heidegger we … find the 
question of ethics functioning with exceptional force”, he claims, “so forcefully that many 
commentators have confused his early work with nihilism or a stance that is indifferent to ethics.”79 
Scott locates the ethical core of early Heideggerian texts in the self-disclosure and authenticity of 
Dasein, especially in its authentic-being-towards-death.80 While this disclosive movement 
undermines any tendency toward certainty, or any inclination to absolutize ethical principles, 
Dasein’s authentic resolve calls it to assume responsibility for its own existence and to be 
concerned about its world and other people. 
 
Finally, for Lawrence Vogel, the ethical trajectory of Being and Time comes to the fore in its 
cosmopolitan orientation. Indeed, he suggests, it is only via this lens that fundamental ontology 
can be defended against “the charge of moral nihilism.”81 This cosmopolitan dimension, that flows 
from Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s Being-with, highlights that in Dasein’s “authentic 
individuality” or resolve also lurks Dasein’s “authentic community.” Fürsorge is also a major theme 
in Vogel’s reading. Heidegger’s discussion of “liberating solicitude,” he suggests, flows from 
Dasein’s authentic self-relation.82 In this relation, Heidegger emphasizes the mutual interchange or 
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81 Vogel, The Fragile "We" Ethical Implications of Heidegger's "Being and Time", 7. 
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cannot face ‘I-myself’ without acknowledging that other peoples, insofar as they are ‘existences’ 
like myself, are called to own up to themselves, too.”83 
 
There are substantial continuities between the position to be developed in this thesis and the 
overlapping approaches of this latter group of scholars. Like them, I see Heidegger as implicitly 
developing a series of trajectories that are ethically potent, though without any account of how 
they come together to provide an explicit basis for thinking about the exigencies of moral 
normativity. In my own account, however, I endeavour to show not only how these various 
trajectories emerge from Heidegger’s early texts, and interweave with the existentialia of the 
existential analytic, but also how they might be read as coming together in the context of 
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Chapter 1 
ΦΡOΝΗΣΙΣ AND HEIDEGGER’S GROUND OF ETHICS 
 
In this chapter, I want to demonstrate how the ground of ethics in the early Heidegger 
emerges from, and structured according to, his reading of Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις. 
Through a comparative analysis of Aristotle’s concept of φρόνησις and Heidegger’s 
inventive retrieval of this concept, the chapter will show that although Heidegger speaks 
forcibly against ethics traditionally conceived (as has been seen), his appropriation of 
φρόνησις implicitly establishes the major structures for a reconceived understanding of 
the ethical, starting with its ontological ‘ground’. On this basis I will also provide a concise 
anticipation of the fuller accounts to come of how Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit and Mitsein 
emerge out of key aspects of Heidegger’s retrieval of φρόνησις. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with some remarks on the importance of Aristotle 
for Heidegger in his overall project of fundamental ontology. Second, I discuss Heidegger’s 
retrieval and use of Aristotle’s concept of φρόνησις and how he understands this vis-à-vis 
Aristotle’s accounts of σοφία and ποίησης. In the third part of the chapter, I analyse some 
elements of Heidegger’s understanding of φρόνησις in connection with his account of 
conscience, which leads him to describe φρόνησις as “nothing other than conscience set in 
motion which makes an action transparent.”1 Fourth, his focus on self-knowledge as the 
defining feature of φρόνησις permits us to see how φρόνησις as conscience is linked to his 
reading of φρόνησις as authentic resoluteness. These key elements of φρόνησις as 
Heidegger employs them, provides his analysis of Dasein with a rich understanding of the 
origins of ethics. Finally, I argue that far from denying the interconnectedness of Dasein 
with others, Heidegger’s retrieval of φρόνησις as conscience and authenticity is consistent 








1 Martin Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes (Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992), pp. 55-56. 
Translated as Martin Heidegger, Plato's Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997), 39/55-56. Hereafter all references to this work will be cited as GA 19 
followed by the number as it appears in the English translation and then the corresponding page number/s 
in the Gesamtausgabe or other original German text. 
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1.1 HEIDEGGER AND THE ARISTOTELIAN LEGACY 
 
The interpretation of Heidegger’s originary ethics presented here is premised on the claim 
that any such account must take the Aristotelian background of Heideggerian thought very 
seriously. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle as a proto-phenomenologist plays a crucial part 
in the evolution of his own early thought, as he himself explains in his short piece titled, 
My Way to Phenomenology: 
 
The clearer it became to me that the increasing familiarity with phenomenological 
seeing was fruitful for the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing, the less I could 
separate myself from Aristotle and other Greek thinkers. Of course, I could not 
immediately see what decisive consequences my renewed occupation with 
Aristotle was to have.2 
 
Few would doubt that Aristotle was a massive influence on the young Heidegger, even if 
Heidegger’s explicit engagements with him are comparatively few.3 In Being and Time, 
Heidegger acknowledges his debt to Aristotle by describing him as the first philosopher to 
effectively articulate a “systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being-with-one- 
another.”4 At another point, he tells us that “the question touched upon here [concerning 
his fundamental ontology] sustained the avid research of Plato and Aristotle, only to 
subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation.”5 In his History of the Concept of 
 
2 Martin Heidegger, “Mein Weg In Die Phänomenologie” in Zur Sache Des Denkens (GA 14) (Franfurt Am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007), pp. 97-98. Translated as Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. 
Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 78. Hereafter all references to this work will be cited as 
GA 14 followed by the number as it appears in the English translation and then the corresponding page 
number/s in the Gesamtausgabe or other original German text. 
3 Thomas Sheehan has noted that Heidegger “published only one essay entirely devoted to Aristotle … and 
even there the theme is not explicitly the influence of the Stagirite on Heidegger.” Further, “in Sein und 
Zeit, where Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page, the nature of the influence is 
concealed behind the language of Lebensphilosophie.” See Thomas J. Sheehan, "Heidegger, Aristotle and 
Phenomenology," Philosophy Today 19, no. 2 (1975): 87. It should be noted, however, that (as a 
prerequisite to secure a chair at Marburg) Heidegger did publish an entire work on Aristotle and submitted 
it to Natorp and Misch. The text of this course was to be published but it was later lost and the only 
remaining copy, discovered in the closet of Gadamer, was again lost during the bombing of Leipzig. But a 
few years later, the text submitted to Misch was uncovered together with other relatively old texts of 
Heidegger’s works which were put together and published to mark the centenary of Heidegger’s birth, in 
1989. See, Franco Volpi, "In whose name?: Heidegger and 'practical philosophy'," European Journal of 
Political Theory 6, no. 1 (2007): pp. 33-34. Also see, Franco Volpi, "Being and Time: A Translation of the 
Nicomachean Ethics? ," in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, ed., Theodore 
Kisiel and John Van Buren (State University of New York Press: New York, 1994), pp. 195-211. 
4 SZ: 138/179. 
5 SZ: 2/21. 
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Time lectures, he remarks that “phenomenology radicalised in its ownmost possibility is 
nothing but the questioning of Plato and Aristotle brought back to life: the repetition, the 
retaking of the beginning of our scientific philosophy.”6 Heidegger’s comment that Aristotle 
played a pivotal role in the evolution of his thought and that he “could not immediately 
see what decisive consequences [his] renewed preoccupation with Aristotle was to have,” 
supports Walter Brogan’s description of Aristotle as the “hidden interlocutor”7 in 
Heidegger’s early writings. More importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, one can also 
justifiably claim that being the focal point of his early career, Heidegger’s work on Aristotle 
played a significant role in the evolution of his thinking about the ontological ground of 
ethics. 
 
Those most deeply familiar with Heidegger’s work have attested to the depth of Aristotle’s 
influence on Heidegger. Hans Georg Gadamer, for instance, praised the inherent 
profundity of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation and the new philosophical vista it 
unveils, noting that this was because it was no simple exegesis. “In Heidegger’s lectures,” 
he recalled, “we were often so personally touched that we no longer knew whether he was 
speaking of his own concern or that of Aristotle,” and that “no one would doubt that the 
basic purpose of Heidegger’s preoccupation with Aristotle was a critical and destructive 
one.”8 
 
Beyond Heidegger’s own students, the view that Heidegger’s revolutionary interpretation 
of Aristotle constituted a formative influence in the development of his own thought is 
widely attested in the scholarly literature.9 Walter Brogan suggests that Heidegger’s 
 
 
6 Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschite des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann Klostermann, 1979), pp. 184-185. Translated as Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of 
Time (Prolegomena), trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 
136. Hereafter all references to this work will be cited as GA 20 followed by the number as it appears in the 
English translation and then the corresponding page number/s in the Gesamtausgabe or other original 
German text. 
7 Walter A. Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being (New York: State University of New 
York, 2005), 2. 
8 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics trans. David E. Linge (London: University of California 
Press, 1976), pp. 200-01. 
9 Franco Volpi goes further, seeing Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation as genuinely important in its own 
right. He maintains that Heidegger’s work “is the most significant philosophical confrontation with Aristotle 
in our century” in which he retrieves for “us a sense for the problems that Aristotle first set forth.” Volpi 
suggests that Heidegger’s questioning of the traditional notion of truth, which was set in motion by 
Husserl’s phenomenology, facilitated his strong ontological reconfiguration of some of the key texts of 
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purpose in reading Aristotle was “to uncover der Sinn von Dasein,” that is, “the various 
categories that constitute the way of being which in some manner always already is in 
relationship to being.”10 According to Brogan, Heidegger frames his readings of Aristotle 
“in the context of the overcoming of a certain kind of dualistic Platonism, to which he 
argues Aristotle is responding.”11 Further, “Heidegger not only reads Aristotle as a 
phenomenological thinker, but also derives his own unique sense of phenomenology from 
his dialogue with Aristotle.”12 Similarly, in his classic work, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, Theodore Kisiel highlights the importance of both the Nicomachean Ethics and 
Metaphysics for Heidegger. In his reading of Aristotle’s account of the various modes of 
truth in Nicomachean Ethics VI, Kisiel suggests that “Heidegger thought he also found an 
original experience of the καιρός paralleling that of primitive Christianity.”13 And in this 
retrieval of Aristotle, Heidegger saw φρόνησις as a tangible sign of his phenomenological 
project that endeavours not only to rethink being and temporality, but thinking itself and 
human existence as well.14 Van Buren goes further to suggest that Heidegger couched his 
fundamental ontology on Aristotle’s own endeavour in the Nicomachean Ethics to conceive 
ethics as the categorical explication of the sense of being which Heidegger takes up and 
radicalises.15 Further, “Heidegger actually modelled his destruction of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics … on Aristotle’s own attempt in the Nicomachean Ethics to destroy Plato’s 
science of a separate, universal, and timeless idea of the Good.” For him, Heidegger learned 
from this vantage point of Aristotle’s practical philosophy, “how to reinscribe the Greek 
question about being from out of its ground question in his own new beginning.”16 
 
There have been some dissenting views on this matter. Back in 1989, Robert Bernasconi 
suggested that regardless of the incontestable influence of Aristotle on Heidegger, the 
 
 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy especially his Nicomachean Ethics. See Volpi, "Being and Time: A Translation 
of the Nicomachean Ethics? ," 195. 
10 Walter Brogan, "The Place of Aristotle in the Development of Heidegger’s Phenomenology " (New York: 
State University of New York Press), 215. 
11 Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being, xii. 
12 Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being, xii. 
13 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995), 229. 
14 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, 267. 
15 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), pp. 220-34. 
16 Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, 226. 
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academic venture of discerning the nature of this influence seemed like “a somewhat 
reckless undertaking.”17 Given that many of the key sources of Heidegger’s retrieval of 
Aristotle were still unavailable, any claim about the nature of Heidegger’s re-inscription of 
Aristotle in his works of the 1920s leading up to Being and Time can therefore be only 
tentative and provisional.18 While Bernasconi’s caveat is well taken on the basis of the 
unavailability of the evidence of Heidegger’s courses on Aristotle at the time he wrote, over 
two decades later we are much better placed to appreciate the inherent links between 
Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and his own thought. The publication of the full set of 
Heidegger’s early lecture courses in the Gesamtausgabe are crucial here. For a holistic 
understanding of Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle, we need, as Volpi contends “to look 
above all to the courses that Heidegger held in his first period of teaching in Freiburg 
(1919–23), when he developed the ‘phenomenological interpretation’ of Aristotle that was 
to become decisive for him.”19 The growing availability of these courses and those following 
has made possible the rapid rise in scholars’ interest over the past two decades concerning 
the influence of Aristotle on the evolution of Heidegger’s thought. 
 
A more recent objection to the proposal to read Heidegger through an Aristotelian lens has 
been put forward by Panagiotis Thanassas. Thanassas is of the view that regardless of the 
prominence of Heidegger’s texts on Aristotle, Heidegger “certainly seeks more the distance 
from the Aristotelian texts than the proximity to them.”20 Thanassas claims that although 
one can easily perceive a synergy between Heidegger and Aristotelian thought, Heidegger’s 
work is not only anti-Aristotelian, it has also released itself from this confrontation. As he 
puts it, “[Heidegger’s] interpretation [of Aristotle], as any interpretation, delimits a field of 
tensions between the poles of proximity and distance. An interpretation is successful to 
the extent that it balances efficiently between these two poles.”21 According to Thanassas, 
while Heidegger frequently attributed his early undertakings in philosophy to Aristotelian 
influence, the publication of all his early Freiburg lectures faults this self-description. To 
 
 
17 Robert Bernasconi, "Heidegger's Destruction of Phronesis," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 1 
(1990): 130. 
18 Bernasconi, "Heidegger's Destruction of Phronesis," 130. 
19 Volpi, "In whose name?: Heidegger and 'practical philosophy'," 32. 
20 Panagiotis Thanassas, "Phronesis Vs Sophia: On Heidegger's Ambivalent Aristotelianism," The Review of 
Metaphysics 66, no. 1 (1 September, 2012): 41. 
21 Thanassas, "Phronesis Vs Sophia: On Heidegger's Ambivalent Aristotelianism," 41. 
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the contrary, rather than being determined by Aristotelian philosophy, Heidegger’s early 
philosophical formation was occasioned by a relentless “quest for an ‘authentic’ life, and 
especially by a phenomenological approach to religiosity, in a quest for an originality 
experienced within the communities of early Christianity.”22 For Thanassas, Heidegger not 
only fails to appropriate Aristotle in his early works, but he saw the whole of Greek 
“philosophical tradition, especially in its Aristotelian … version, as an obstacle to be 
overcome in order to formulate what Heidegger refers to as a road to an original Christian 
theology – free from the Greek elements.”23 
Thanassas’ reading of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation is not without merit, but his 
conclusions are questionable. Heidegger’s Aristotle reading is, of course, a radical one. As 
Brogan puts it, it “aims to show the greatness of Aristotle, not because he gave birth to 
metaphysics, which is not untrue, but because he preserves … an echo of originary Greek 
thinking.”24 What Heidegger recovers from Aristotle is an originary sense of truth, and 
factical life that for him had been covered over by the western metaphysical tradition. In 
short, while Thanasas is right to point out the radical (even violent) nature of Heidegger’s 
use of Aristotle, this does not undermine the case for the importance of Aristotle for the 
development of his own thought. 
 
In what follows, I will trace the significance of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotelian φρόνησις 
for his thinking concerning ethics in substantial agreement with Franco Volpi’s reading.25 
Accordingly, this chapter will carefully investigate Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
especially the section on φρόνησις, in order to show how Heidegger explicitly takes up the 
analysis of φρόνησις and uses the structure of the concept as a linchpin for the 
development of his own thoughts on conscience, authenticity and Mitsein. In essence, 
Heidegger reads Aristotelian φρόνησις as a way of accessing factical being. Although 
Heidegger never fully outlined an account of the relation between fundamental ontology 
and ethics, this chapter will illustrate how Heidegger’s reading of φρόνησις is pivotal for 
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understanding the structure of his ontology of finite contingency that is at the core of his 
account of the practical concrete life of Dasein. Of particular importance here are 
Heidegger’s Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, a summer semester course he 
taught in 1924, and his Winter Semester Course on Plato’s Sophist that contains a 
comprehensive interpretation of Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
 
I maintain that it is only through careful attention to the Aristotelian context that 
Heidegger’s concepts of conscience, authenticity and Mitsein can be properly understood 
to constitute an ontological ground for ethics. Such an ethics brackets out systems of moral 
norms to conceive of the ethical within an “ontological horizon” in terms of “the movement 




1.2 READING HEIDEGGER READING ARISTOTLE 
ON ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
 
In his reading of Aristotle, Heidegger came to believe that by the virtue of his thought on 
the originary nature of life in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle developed a 
comprehensive phenomenology of the being-in-the-truth of Dasein. 
 
1.2.1 : Orientation to Heidegger’s Reading 
 
It is important to note that Heidegger’s reading of Nicomachean Ethics is both through the 
lens of phenomenology and a reaction to (and refinement of) Plato’s science of a distinct, 
universal and timeless conception of the Good.27 For Heidegger, unlike Plato’s approach 
that is driven by the universal and timeless idea of the Good, Aristotle instead highlights 
the originary nature of life.28 This nature is not, as John van Buren puts it, “something 
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magnificent and beyond.”29 It is rather the reality of history whereby the life that is 
channelled towards the good manifests itself not under the rule of the single king or ruler, 
but in a highly distinct manner that shows a great variety of historically changing principles 
of action.30 
 
According to Heidegger, Aristotle recognises and makes a distinction between five modes 
“in virtue of which the soul possesses truth”: φρόνησις, τέχνη, σοφία, επιστήμη and νους.31 
He states further that these modes through which truth is disclosed to the world relate to 
various sorts of activities. For instance, σοφία and επιστήμη have to do with only those 
activities that cannot be otherwise, while τέχνη and φρόνησις always deal with those 
human actions that can be otherwise. And while τέχνη deals with ποίησης, φρόνησις is 
concerned with πράξης.32 According to Aristotle, these different manners of disclosing 
human actions can only be delineated by the virtue of the objects they recognise and make 
transparent. 
 
The phenomenological lens of Heidegger’s reading is also crucial in his lecture courses on 
Aristotle between 1919 and 1925.33 However, this is no neutral reading, for as Thanasas’ 
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critique made clear, it is achieved via crucial changes of both sense and terminology. Most 
obvious is the change from five modes of truth that can be possessed by the soul, to the 
different modes of uncovering the truth of Dasein.34 The interpretation of the Aristotelian 
modes of truth becomes for Heidegger a way of uncovering the ontological capacity and 
the “most genuine possibility of Dasein and to preserve them as uncovered.”35 This is a 
matter of active and creative retrieval; not exegesis in any usual sense. As such, Heidegger 
is looking to determine the mode through which the fundamental uncovering movement 
of life (in the form of ποίησης, πρᾶξις, θεωρία) and their corresponding disposition (τέχνη, 
φρόνησις and σοφία) can arrive at truth. For Heidegger, therefore, Aristotle’s ethics 
constitutes the thematization of the ontological structure of being-in-the-world. He 
suggests that we can learn from Aristotle that “[d]isclosure … is itself a mode of Being … of 
the beings we call human Dasein,” and that Aristotle “conceives of this mode of [human] 
Being as αληθεύην;” which means disclosive uncovering.36 What Heidegger discovers in the 
Nicomachean Ethics is the major component of what was to become his ontology of Dasein. 
In other words, the specific viewpoint through which Heidegger retrieves the fundamental 
elements of Aristotle’s practical philosophy is his keynote interest in the Being of human 
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beings. This is a retrieval that is also a denial. As Volpi puts it, Heidegger assigns Aristotle’s 
practical philosophy “an ontological character while simultaneously depriving it of the 
value of human action.”37 Heidegger is quite open about this move, explicitly noting at one 
point that it will be necessary to provisionally set aside the “specific problem of ethics,”38 
so as to secure the ontology of Dasein. 
 
[I] f [ethics] should be neglected … this does not mean that what is subject to the 
normative determination must be investigated so that the norm can be fitted to 
what it is supposed to determine normatively. Rather, the claim is much more a 
matter of principle. The sense of the norm and normative lawfulness cannot be 
established as long as one does not envision what type of being is meant by a 
normatively determined and determinable being. The possibility of normativity 
cannot be explained without being investigated as normativity for something and, 
that means, without the “for what” being investigated in terms of its structure of 
being.39 
This is a crucial statement, I would suggest, of Heidegger’s whole approach to the question 
of ethics. The point is not that moral normativity is disregarded; rather that there is no 
point in arguing about such norms unless we first understand for whom these norms are 
to apply. This is the context of Heidegger’s disengagement from matters of explicit 
normative concern: not that such concerns are unimportant, but that they can only 
proceed on the basis of an understanding of the ontological ground within which they are 
rooted. This ground is accessed only through, and as, the analysis of Dasein.And so we see 
Heidegger’s sidelining of Aristotle’s keynote emphasis on living well, a silence that is 
echoed throughout Heidegger’s earlier and later works. Two decades later, Heidegger 
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makes essentially the same point when, in the Letter on Humanism, he refers to the 
existential analytic as an “originary ethcs” that “is not ethics in the first instance, because 
it is ontology.” 40 
 
Heidegger’s sidelining of the normative is also seen in his focus on Books VI and X of the 
Nicomachean Ethics thereby disregarding Books I and V where Aristotle discusses the 
ethical mean and the extreme, in addition to the virtues of courage, generosity, 
magnificence, kindness, benevolence, sincerity and justice.41 Of course, such inattention 
for ethics in its practical application, is grist to the mill of the numerous relentless critiques 
of Heidegger’s privileging of ontology over ethics.42 
Nevertheless, there are also fundamental correspondences or conceptual correlations 
between Heidegger and Aristotle which provide an insight into how Heidegger 
characterises Dasein’s ontological structures of being-in-the-world. Relevant to our 
purpose in this chapter are those conceptual correlations which reflect in the significant 
connections between the concepts and terminologies Heidegger uses in his early works 
and the concepts and terminologies Aristotle employs in his Nicomachean Ethics. The 
discussion to come will be limited to the different conceptual correlations between 
Aristotle and Heidegger that will aid the elucidation of how and why Heidegger came to 
describe Dasein and its fundamental features as an ontologically interpreted version of 
Aristotelian φρόνησις. These correlations will disclose how Heidegger retrieves Aristotle’s 
various modes of being and finally settles with φρόνησις which he describes as the 
concrete relation or encounter that properly characterises Dasein’s factical interactions 
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The conceptual correlations are basically the modes of the Being of beings Heidegger 
differentiated in Being and Time as Zuhandenheit, Vorhandenheit and Dasein; and the 
Aristotelian concepts of ποίησης, θεωρία and πρᾶξις. These correlations can be 





Heidegger Modes of Being-in- 
the-world 
Vorhandenheit Zuhandenheit Dasein 
Aristotle The disclosive 
movements of life 
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In what follows, I will unpack these fundamental conceptual correspondences and the 
nomenclatural parallelism between Aristotle and Heidegger with a view to the 
development of Heidegger’s accounts of Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit and Mitsein. To this end, 
and in due course, the interpretation of Aristotle’s φρόνησις will come to take centre stage. 
 
1.2.2 : Heidegger’s Translation of Aristotle’s Θεωρία and Ποίησις 
 
Before considering the keynote matter of Heidegger’s retrieval of φρόνησις, it will first be 
helpful to consider the other two sets of thematic pairs or correlated themes. The first is 
Aristotle’s θεωρία and the corresponding σοφία and Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit. In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines θεωρία as the virtue that takes up the best part of 
us, in such a way that the ενέργεια of that part in line with its own ἀρετή must be 
εὐδαιμονία.43 According to Aristotle, θεωρία is the best part of us because being part of 
 
43 According to Aristotle, "If happiness (εὐδαιμονία) consists in activity (ἐνέργεια) in accordance with virtue 
(ἀρετὴν), it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the 
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the ψυχή, θεωρία showcases being as much as it is needed, and the purpose towards which 
the activity of θεωρία is directed is not something different from the activity of 
contemplation itself.44 Aristotle sees θεωρία as the contemplation of kinds of knowledge 
that we already possess, and for him, the corresponding mode of disposition of θεωρία, 
σοφία, surpasses practical ἀρετή because σοφία is the knowledge of being qua being, “the 
first philosophy” which is directed towards the first, eternal, universal and necessary 
principle.45 
Heidegger’s implied connection to Aristotle’s θεωρία and σοφία (its corresponding type of 
knowing) is affirmed in his early works where Heidegger informs us that when Dasein takes 
up the uncovering attitude of θεωρία, it assumes the mode of Being of Vorhandenheit, in 
this way existing in indifference and isolation. For Heidegger, such a mode has nothing in 
common with Dasein’s existence because it involves an ontological distortion: Dasein is 
placed alongside its world.46 In Heidegger’s view, “there is no such thing as the ‘side-by- 
side-ness’ of an entity called Dasein with another entity called ‘world.’” Rather than living 
alongside its world, Dasein exists by encountering and relating to entities with its world, 
and as such the truth of Dasein is determined by the possibility of discourse on the varying 
degrees of encounters it has with entities in its world. “Dasein is essentially an entity with 
Being-with, it can explicitly discover those which it encounters environmentally, it can 
know them, it can avail itself of them, it can have the ‘world.’”47 
The second conceptual correlation between Aristotle and Heidegger can be seen in the 
correspondence between Heidegger’s Zuhandenheit and Aristotle’s ποίησις. In Book VI of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between σοφία and ποίησις which has its 
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corresponding mode of knowing as τέχνη. For Aristotle, these two modes of truth are 
underpinned by what he calls ενέργεια and γένεσης.48 Accordingly, though not itself a 
practical science, σοφία, which has the activity of contemplation, regulates the order of 
human activity, while τέχνη or craft engenders a kind of coming into being. Furthermore, 
Aristotle suggests that coming-into-being takes place during production, and as such, τέχνη 
is the quality of the product and not of the producer.49 As a universal knowledge, Aristotle 
claims that in σοφία, the wise person is thought to be able to know all things without 
needing to know each thing individually; to know things difficult to know; to be more 
accurate; to be more capable of teaching the causes; to pursue knowledge for its own sake; 
and to set the order rather than being set in order.50 However, the skills in craft or ποίησις 
is a capacity rather than an activity or virtue like σοφία and it belongs to a “know-how” 
which can be put to good or bad use.51 
 
According to Heidegger, in its everyday mode of Being-in-the-world, Dasein does not 
encounter entities as things present-at-hand (vorhanden), but as equipment ready-to-hand 
(zuhanden), and as such, this ready-to-hand equipment is to be used rather than being 
brought under a theoretical scrutiny. For Heidegger, useful things which have meaning for 
Dasein are revealed in their handiness, and these handy things are not properties of things; 
rather they disclose the existence within Dasein’s world of relations and connections.52 In 
Heidegger’s view, ποίησης signifies an uncovering attitude of production and 
manipulation, a disposition which is assumed with the sole aim of production. Further, this 
is only possible insofar as the relations are part of the world. As he puts it, “[t]he derivative 
form ‘worldly’ will … apply terminologically to a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein, 
never to a kind which belongs to entities present-at-hand ‘in’ the world.”53 What Heidegger 
suggests here is that like Aristotle’s τέχνη, Dasein’s everydayness is often linked to work 
and “that which is to be produced at the time” or in each case is thus primarily taking care 
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equipment is encountered.”54 In other words, for Heidegger, taking care is like τέχνη for 
Aristotle, a mode of truth that differentiates Dasein from other beings. For Heidegger, as 
for Aristotle, ποίησης as τέχνη signifies that the everydayness of Dasein is work-related and 
thus a function of the mode of Zuhandenheit.55 
 
1.2.3 : Aristotle’s Φρόνησις and Heidegger’s Characterisation of the Mode of 
Being of Dasein as ‘to–be’ 
 
The third fundamental conceptual correlation between Aristotle and Heidegger emerges 
in Heidegger’s elaborate discussion of Aristotle’s concept of φρόνησις and his 
characterisation of the manner of the Being of the authentic Dasein. This is the one that is 
of particular interest for the argument of this thesis. But before exploring the Heideggerian 
interpretation of Aristotelian φρόνησις, it will first be helpful to examine Aristotle’s treatise 
on φρόνησις in its own right. 
 
At the beginning of NE VI 3, Aristotle delineates φρόνησις along with επιστήμη, τέχνη, and 
σοφία. As opposed to σοφία and τέχνη, which disclose that which cannot be otherwise, 
Aristotle suggests that human action cannot simply be disclosed through technical 
application of truth discovered by theory and science. In other words, for Aristotle, there 
is a particular mode of human thinking that commences from the beginning at πρᾶξις.56 
While elaborating the different types of behaviours or habits that are required to be 
cultivated in order to live a good life, Aristotle develops a model of the φρόνιμος, arguing 
that the agent of this virtue is the one who is consistently able to skilfully find the best way 
of acting. The relationship between Heidegger’s “Dasein” and Aristotle’s “φρόνιμος” is 
crucial for what is to come. 
 
While explaining φρόνησις within the context of the dianoetic virtues, Aristotle claims that 
there are two types of realities that people encounter in their daily lives. The first are those 
realities that appear unchangeable, for example, the rising of the sun. The second kind of 
realities are those that are always changing, such as human affairs. In Aristotle’s view, for 
one to engage these different realities one is required to talk about both the realities 
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experienced and one’s own disposition towards them. Aristotle calls the account-rendering 
comportment that is linked to those things that cannot vary, epistēmonikon or “scientific” 
or systematic; whereas that connected with what can change is called λογιστικον or 
“approximating.”57 He argues that approximation or estimation is inevitable for those 
human realities that vary or change because of the lack of the absolute ability to stop and 
fix what is changing. The reality here is that one intentionally makes effort to determine 
what constantly changes, but always falls short of this expectation. However, both 
capacities of comportment are ways of giving-account (λογον εχηον). In other words, both 
capacities suggest a discursive production where one constantly produces good discourse 
and deliberates well.58 
After surveying the fundamental differences between φρόνησις, επιστήμη, τέχνη and 
σοφία in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle turns his attention to the main characteristics of 
φρόνησις. Φρόνησις is situated within the capacity of accountable disposition to what 
changes, and therefore can be categorised as an approximation and not as scientific. It is 
within this approximating disposition that one arrives at the distinction between making 
and acting (ποίησης and πρᾶξις). In Aristotle’s view, the difference here lies at the τελος, 
and its correlations with both activities. This correlation brings to fore the distinguishing 
factor between τέχνη and φρόνησις. As Aristotle writes, “while making [ποίησης] aims at 
an end [τελος] distinct from the act of making, action cannot; for good action itself is its 
end.”59 In other words, what τέχνη brings into existence is something that is already 
independent of the making. For example, the activity of constructing a well-designed 
cupboard built by a carpenter ceases to go on when the activity itself stops.60 In πρᾶξις, 
however, the situation is different. What πρᾶξις launches into existence is nothing outside 
its own existence. The end in action (πρᾶξις) is nothing other than its own activity and the 
end here remains inalienable or indistinguishable from the action itself. Aristotle stresses 
that every action (e.g., planting, playing, marrying), is tailored or aims towards what is good 




57 NE: 1141a1-1141b/1801-1802. 
58 NE: 1141b/1802. 
59 NE: 1140b4-5/1800. 




benefit of the one acting; action makes reference to oneself and relates to an agent.61 For 
Aristotle, given the fact that πρᾶξις starts and ends with the agent, the τελος and αρχη of 
action is the same.62 Thus, while τέχνη denotes making and producing things, φρόνησις is 
associated with human action. Once the end is accomplished in τέχνη, the making of the 
action ceases. With τέχνη, the end, once accomplished, brings the making to a cessation. 
But, φρόνησις deals with action and not production. In other words, the φρόνιμος is an 
open-ended person who is constantly kept in focus while the discussion is ongoing. 
 
Aristotle similarly distinguishes φρόνησις and επιστήμη insofar as the way of encountering 
the world in επιστήμη cannot sufficiently encapsulate the way human beings encounter 
the world through φρόνησις. If επιστήμη captures reality through demonstration, which is 
the perception of first principles through νους, φρόνησις discloses things through πρᾶξις. 
His suggestion is that “to deliberate [φρόνησις] and to calculate [επιστήμη] are the same 
thing, but no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise.” Thus, given that “the 
calculative is one part of the faculty which possesses reason, “[w]e must, then, learn what 
is the best state of each of these two parts; for this is the virtue of each,” that is related to 
its own proper activity or function.”63 For Aristotle, φρόνησις takes place as a result of the 
collaboration between two faculties: reason and desire. He remarks that “since virtue of 
character is a state involving choice, and choice is a deliberative desire, the reasoning must 
be true and the desire correct, if the choice is to be good, and the desire must pursue what 
reason asserts.”64 
Aristotle remarks further that the uniqueness of every action is measured by the particular 
context in which it is applied. In other words, what the φρόνιμος does in any given 
circumstance depends significantly on the context of the action. Thus, in φρόνησις, the 
exactitude of the desire and true deliberation work together in order for action to take 
place. In De Anima, Aristotle emphasizes that “that which is the object of [desire] is the 
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of action.”65 So desire is not limited to the principles of λογος; it has its own access to 
reality. As opposed to επιστήμη, which deals exclusively with the eternal and necessary 
truth, phronetic deliberation is the hermeneutic thrust of every practical act of thinking. 
 
Deliberation, for Aristotle, has two basic aspects. First, the outcome of deliberation is 
choice, and choice indeed is deliberative desire.66 Second, deliberation places special 
emphasis on the particular over the universal, which means that φρόνησις is “concerned 
with human affairs, namely, with what we can deliberate about.”67 The focus of φρόνησις 
is on actions in their specific concrete context.68 The φρόνιμος is “able to deliberate well 
about what is good and useful for him [sic], not in some single area, (for instance what is 
good for his health or strength), but what is advantageous in terms of living well as a 
whole.”69 The φρόνιμος is concerned with how to live the “good life” by discerning and 
deliberating on how the good life could be achieved. 
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of φρόνησις takes up the first part 
of his Plato’s Sophist and Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: 
Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation.70 He begins both texts by discussing the real object 
of φρόνησις, the essential characteristics of φρόνησις as disclosure, its limit and how it 
relates to Dasein’s possibilities. Heidegger suggests that because Aristotle endeavours to 
“grasp and to grasp ever more sharply what [the disclosure of the truth of Being] ordinarily 
means,”71 Aristotle’s φρόνησις retraces itself back to the phenomenology of Being. 
Φρόνησις therefore belongs to the proper mode of the being of Dasein.72 The reason for 
this, he argues, is because φρόνησις is a mode of disclosure, and it is ontologically 
ascertained as discourse and πρᾶξις.73 What it discloses is the right and proper way to be 
Dasein. As Daniel Smith puts it, as a disclosure, φρόνησις considers Dasein in its wholeness 
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as a being; it guides Dasein against any inclination to hide or “cover its wholeness through 
technical and theoretical excesses.”74 
 
The status of φρόνησις as a mode of disclosure is consistent with its belonging to the 
dianotic virtues which falls under the arena of αλήθεωειν. As such, Heidegger suggests, it 
involves “taking entities that are meant in each case and as such, into true safekeeping as 
disclosed.”75 But such a reading of Aristotelian φρόνησις is highly suggestive of Heidegger’s 
own characterisation of the Being of Dasein as “a to–be [Zu–sein].”76 Dasein is a being that 
is understood in action. Quoting the Nicomachean Ethics, Heidegger suggests that Dasein’s 
whole life is “πρακτική μετά λόγου” –characterised in actions.77 Thus, the proper way to 
understand human Dasein as ethical is not via the lens of theoretical moral principles, but 
through understanding it as a deliberating and acting being. As a phronetic being, 
Heidegger’s Dasein is its own point of departure. It is fundamentally concerned not with 
abstract principles but with the task of deciding among a range of factical possibilities.78 
 
A significant moment in Heidegger’s retrieval of Dasein’s fundamental manner of being as 
‘to–be’ through Aristotle’s φρόνησις is evident in his deconstruction of σοφία. For him, 
φρόνησις and σοφία are “the concrete ways of actualising the truthful safe-keeping-of- 
Being [Seinsverwahrung],” and “on account of the authentic movement which is available 
to σοφία, the Being of life must be seen exclusively in the pure temporalizing of σοφία as 
such.”79 Gadamer remarked in Truth and Method that he was astonished by the pre- 
eminence Heidegger accords to σοφία over φρόνησις as a mode of temporalizing that 
defines Dasein’s mode of life.80 However, it must be pointed out that in the 
aforementioned statements Heidegger was not only trying to retrieve the fundamental 
characteristics of Dasein as ‘to–be’ from Aristotle’s practical philosophy, but also to 
exemplify how Aristotle has been taken over by the tradition. As a result, Heidegger’s 
intention here is to first locate σοφία within the temporal context provided by the factical 
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movement in order to show that σοφία possesses a temporal structure. But Heidegger also 
goes further to hierarchically displace σοφία by saying that it is simply an “unconcerned, 
time-possessing,” that shows itself in “purely observational dealings.”81 But when Dasein is 
understood and interpreted within a concrete historical context, this is accomplished in 
Aristotle’s other concrete actualisation of the truthful safe-keeping of Being, φρόνησις. 
Unlike the detached observational approach of σοφία, φρόνησις is a determination of life’s 
πρᾶξις, and this is because it reveals “the way of truthfully safe-keeping the full moment 
of [Dasein’s] insight.”82 In Heidegger’s view, φρόνησις reveals the truth of Dasein and it 
does this by uncovering the ‘how’ of Dasein’s actions.83 In short, through its disclosive 
movement, φρόνησις furnishes us with a critical insight into Dasein’s facticity. 
 
Later, in Being and Time, Heidegger reappropriates and modifies this Aristotelian focus on 
the pre-eminence of action. Just like Aristotle’s φρόνιμος who is determined by the 
possibility of disclosure, Heidegger claims that Dasein does not understand itself on the 
basis of itself but from the openness of Being by virtue of which it always finds itself 
grounded.84 Just as Aristotle would see every human action as presupposed by determinate 
contingent circumstances, Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world sees Dasein as a being within an 
ineluctably contingent context.85 Dasein qua φρόνιμος is deeply engaged in examining its 
situation with care and solicitude. In this way, φρόνησις brings to the fore the ground for 
the comportment of human life; it reveals or discloses how one can go about his/her 
business. As such, as φρόνιμος, Dasein is caught up in web of relations where, as Van Buren 
puts it, its dwelling “with things and other persons involves the care, mood, understanding, 
interpretation, and language of the whole human being.”86 So, in the mode of πρᾶξις, 
Dasein lives in its world as a factical being; a being that lives ‘from out of’ its 
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world.87 Also, in keeping with Aristotle’s practical philosophy, Heidegger contends that 
Dasein “lets itself to be seen,” and “is taken explicitly, as unveiled, into truthful 
safekeeping.”88 Daniel Smith captures this sense well in maintaining that Heidegger’s aim 
in interpreting Aristotle is to show “how Aristotle thought about the movement of 
disclosure, that is, movement of ἀλήθεια, and how such movements are inseparable from 
the being-there that is Dasein.”89 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein as φρόνιμος needs also to be understood in terms of 
Dasein’s web of relations according to which it is “already dispersed [zerstreut] in manifold 
ways of taking care of things.”90 For Heidegger, ‘care’ constitutes the fundamental 
structure that underlies each and every particular human existence.91 ‘To take care’ is to 
live a life of action or πρᾶξις and this human action generally constitutes the fundamental 
framework of the Being of Dasein. Translating the Greek, ὀρέγω (’reaching out,’) Heidegger 
retranslates ‘care’ (Sorge) as ‘being-towards,’ which for him encapsulates what Smith calls 
“the fundamental movement of life … the movement of the repeated actualisation of 
Dasein’s fundamental potential, an openness to being-out-toward-and-meaningfully- 
involved-with-the-world.”92 ‘Care’ for Heidegger, as Volpi suggests, is “the root of the 
practical structure of the existence of Dasein.”93 Understood within a practical perspective, 
care presents Dasein as possessing “the practical structure as a being of “having-to-be,” a 
being whose being “is not realised in the stability of Being and pure act, but is, in its 
finitude, a potentiality-for-being [Seinkonnen] which projects ahead of itself.”94 
 
In sum, it is therefore plausible to view Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein’s way of 
Being as a depth retrieval and translation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. However, 
Heidegger’s retrieval of φρόνησις changes its sense in powerful ways. This is because, in 
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his reading of Aristotle’s NE VI, Heidegger markedly changed the nature, function and 
conditions of φρόνησις from having a practical and normative orientation to a something 
fundamentally ontological in character. This ontological retrieval appears to have emptied 
out φρόνησις of its orientation towards the good, even to the extent that one is left 
wondering, with Francisco Gonzalez, whether the two varied ways of looking at φρόνησις 
are ultimately compatible. Gonzalez suggests that Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s ethics 
is so radical as to be a distortion. According to him, although Heidegger’s appropriation of 
φρόνησις, ἀρετή, τέχνη, and εὐδαιμονία could be seen as the elucidation of the different 
modes of uncovering the truth of Dasein’s Being, these concepts, “emerge from 
Heidegger’s transformations with the ghostly remnant of an ethical connotation … one that 
is a complete inversion and perversion of their ethical meaning in Aristotle.”95 This 
challenge is a formidable one. Does it make sense for φρόνησις to be converted into an 
ontological principle according to which its normative sense drops out entirely? Is there 
any ethics left in Heidegger, or was Levinas eventually justified in his critique of 
Heideggerian totalisation? 
 
In what follows, I propose to address this serious concern by exploring several key elements 
of φρόνησις as Heidegger employs them, elements which together provide Heidegger’s 
analysis of Dasein with a rich phenomenological foundation for the understanding of 
ethics. Accordingly, I track the way in which Heidegger’s radical appropriation of φρόνησις 
relates to his accounts, in the Daseinanalytik, of conscience, authentic resoluteness and (in 
a less explicit sense) Being-with others. In doing so, I will highlight a few basic features of 
these accounts, thereby preparing the way for the more detailed discussions of each of 
these three themes to come in subsequent chapters. Heidegger’s deployment of φρόνησις 
is crucial in all three cases, and it is through such an analysis that it is possible to discern 
the implicit ontological ground for ethics that emerges in early Heideggerian thought, even 
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1.3 ΦΡOΝΗΣΙΣ AS GEWISSEN (CONSCIENCE) 
 
I turn first to Heidegger’s phronetic account of conscience. Within the process of describing 
φρόνησις as a mode of truth that lies more in πρᾶξις than in λογος,96 Heidegger identified 
φρόνησις with conscience. Φρόνησις, Heidegger notes, “is nothing other than conscience 
set in motion [das in Bewegung gesetzte Gewissen] which makes an action transparent.”97 
According to him, as conscience, φρόνησις is a mode of unconcealment and its primary end 
is purely the “observational understandings” which “brings into truthful safekeeping the 
being … [which] is in the manner that it necessarily and always is what it is.”98 Also, as 
conscience, Heidegger suggests that φρόνησις emphasises the Being-true of oneself and 
“brings into truthful safekeeping the-toward-which of the dealings of human life.” This 
dealing as he tells us, is “πρᾶξις, action with itself in the how of the dealing that does not 
produce, but rather in each case only precisely acts.”99 
 
While drawing on his reading of Nicomachean Ethics VI, Heidegger compares τέχνη and 
φρόνησις as conscience. Invoking Nicomachean Ethics,100 where Aristotle points out that 
“φρόνησις is an ἀρετή but not a τέχνη,” he claims that given its failures, τέχνη influences 
development and improvement but obeys the laws of all or nothing.101 He argues further 
that while that which τέχνη produces is able to be completely forgotten because of the 
inherent capacity of the ‘know-how’ of τέχνη to be lost, with respect to φρόνησις on the 
contrary, “there is no possibility of falling into forgetting.”102 Φρόνησις cannot be forgotten 
because it is not just a logical disposition, like τέχνη, that can be acquired as a skill and can 
then be forgotten. Rather, “φρόνησις is new on each occasion,” and being similar to 
conscience”103 φρόνησις directs us towards the truth that is connected to practical things, 
things that are always concrete, particular and new. 
 
To understand why φρόνησις as conscience cannot be forgotten, Heidegger insists that the 
voice of conscience does not summon individuals in the form of activity, but rather 
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manifests itself in the process of the authentic-being-oneself of an individual. In this 
process of becoming an authentic individual, Heidegger suggests (in line with Aristotle) that 
the φρόνιμος is “able to deliberate finely about things that are good and beneficial to 
himself [sic], not about some restricted area … but about what sorts of things promote 
living well in general.”104 Therefore, as opposed to τέχνη, which produces a finished 
product that is located beyond the being that performs the action, φρόνησις seen as 
conscience is concerned with Dasein’s inescapable Being. In other words, φρόνησις as 
conscience is synonymous with self-knowledge which is “the gravest of all knowledge, since 
it is concerned with human existence itself.”105 Also in contrast to the existence of the 
separate and independent objects which τέχνη produces, Heidegger claims that φρόνησις 
as conscience provokes the deep structure of Dasein where it sees itself as concerned with 
its own as Being-possibility. He reiterates that, while the ἀρχή of τέχνη is located outside 
the being that performs the action, and σοφία “deals with the highest beings,” the being 
which τέχνη and σοφία produce “are not ones that concern [human beings] in their 
existence. Rather, “[w]hat concerns Dasein is Dasein itself… namely, εὐδαιμονία … And for 
this, φρόνησις provides direction. It is supposed to render Dasein transparent in the 
accomplishment of those actions” which lead it to the good life.106 
It must be noted that the self-knowledge and transparency to which φρόνησις as 
conscience appeals is not to be understood dualistically. Tamininiaux makes this point well 
in maintaining that we should not interpret Heidegger as intending “a sense of good in 
opposition to bad, of justice in relation to injustice, but as the power each time renewed 
that the singular Dasein has of being revealed to itself as a whole and authentically.”107 
Further, φρόνησις as conscience is not to be understood as an introspective posture 
towards the possibilities of life, for what Heidegger has in mind is far from an independent 
subject contemplating who it should become. Rather, as Weidenfeld puts it, φρόνησις as 
conscience unveils “the concrete possibilities of being in a situation with regard to a self- 
understanding.”108 In other words, φρόνησις involves paying attention to experiences 
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which disclose Dasein’s understanding of living well, not from the theoretical or subjective 
perspective, but from a pre-theoretical and pre-subjective level. This experience, for 
Heidegger, is “one that is related to the πρᾶξις, that is, in the experiential or concrete life 
experiences of the individual Dasein.”109 The τέλος of πρᾶξις, the goal of action, is the 
“action itself, and specifically it is the εθπραχια, acting well.”110 The concern or the goal of 
action is not necessarily the accomplishment of a concrete or specific task (hence, ποίησις), 
but rather it is of acting well, that is, in making sure that “the action comes to pass in the 
correct way, so that it attains its end in what it can be.”111 Acting well for Heidegger entails 
making sure that the action itself is in harmony with the self-understanding of the agent 
where the agent does not just have the clearer picture of the directed action of the good, 
but must also have a clear comprehension of the concrete situation into which he/she is 
thrown, and from which he/she must act. Thus, in a manner similar to Aristotle’s practical 
syllogism, Heidegger remarks that φρόνησις involves two premises. The first premise is the 
good towards which an action is directed and the second is that the “circumstances and 
the situation of the action are such and such.”112 
Heidegger’s description of φρόνησις as an experience that unveils the concrete situation 
of Dasein parallels his interpretation of conscience in Being and Time as the voice that 
summons Dasein to its “authentic potentiality-of-being a self.”113 He begins his description 
of conscience in Being and Time by clarifying that, like φρόνησις, “[c]onscience gives us 
‘something’ to understand; it discloses.”114 Further, he notes that on a more general level, 
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conscience brings about disclosure and that which conscience discloses is our “ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being [eigenstes Seinkönnen].”115 
 
As Pedersen points out, Heidegger understands the term ‘own’ (eigen) or ‘ownmost’ 
(eigenste) in two significant senses.116 On one hand, ‘eigen’ can imply or mean something 
‘proper’ in the sense of appropriate. That is why in his description of Dasein, Heidegger 
suggests that the proper way to be Dasein is to exist authentically and this “authentic 
[eigentliches] potentiality-for-Being is attested by the [voice of] conscience.”117 On the 
other hand, in his understanding of conscience as the ‘ownmost potentiality for being,” 
Heidegger also claims that conscience summons or calls us back to understand ourselves 
not according to the dictates of our dominant everydayness but for us to own ourselves in 
the manner that is quite appropriate to our own proper mode of Being: 
 
In the call of conscience, what is it that is talked about, in other words, to what is 
the appeal made? Manifestly Dasein itself. This answer is as incontestable as it is 
indefinite. If the call has so vague a target, then it might at most remain an occasion 
for Dasein to pay attention to itself. But it is essential to Dasein that along with the 
disclosedness of its world it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always 
understands itself. The call reaches Dasein in this understanding of itself which it 
always has, and which is concernful in an everyday, average manner.118 
 
Rather than understanding φρόνησις as conscience in light of modern subjectivity, 
according to which self-presencing is privileged, Heidegger’s take on φρόνησις is deeply 
factical in nature, showcasing Dasein as a radically finite being who comes out of 
concealment by defying the voice of its everydayness and owning up to itself by capturing 
the manifold determinations of its existence. William McNeill makes this point well: 
 
‘[C]onscience’ here does not belong to an already existing subject; it does not refer 
to the activity of an individual who ‘has’ ‘conscience,’ but rather to the full unfolding 
as the coming into full (finite, concrete) presence of the finite action itself. It is the 
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event of presencing itself that cannot be forgotten, for insofar as we are, we always 
already ‘stand in’ this very event.119 
 
According to McNeill, what is crucial in Heidegger’s connection of φρόνησις with 
conscience is that φρόνησις constitutes the “truth which is related to Dasein itself.”120 
Similarly, for Smith, φρόνησις is “a mode of comportment in and toward the world, a way 
of orienting oneself and thus of caring-seeing-knowing.”121 Φρόνησις as conscience is an 
instant individuation which furnishes us with the motivation for actions in the face of the 
possibilities of factical life. Understood as the “truth of Dasein,” the truth unveiled by 
φρόνησις is the for-the-sake-of-which that orients one to view oneself as an issue for 
oneself. It repeatedly summons the individual. The voice is manifested not in the activity 
of the individual, but in the mode of finite individuation where the truth of the Being of 
Dasein unfolds in its originary character. 
 
Heidegger insists that in its core formulation conscience is “revealed as a call [Ruf], and this 
calling appears as a mode of discourse.”122 When conscience calls, it summons us towards 
the mode through which we can make sense of the possibilities of factical life. It is in its 
readiness to pay heed to the summoning of the voice of conscience which happens through 
the disposition of wanting-to-have-a-conscience (Gewissen-haben-wollen) and of 
resoluteness, that Dasein is able to accomplish the existential task of its authentic 
realisation. When conscience calls, it discloses and discourses what Weidenfield describes 
as “our ability to articulate the structure of our world, and expresses how its significance 
hangs together meaningfully, though this need not be expressed explicitly.”123 In line with 
Aristotle, Heidegger claims that φρόνησις, seen as the practical knowledge which 
characterises the apparent circle of πρᾶξις, can only be actualised in living well. And living 
well is Dasein’s ability to always heed the call of conscience which provokes the deeper 
structure of Dasein which is its potentiality-to-be.124 
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Since conscience is the centre point that properly manifests Dasein’s potentiality for Being, 
or rather the originary practical determination of Dasein, one can then argue that for 
Heidegger, conscience is integral to the ontological formulation of φρόνησις. As Volpi aptly 
puts it, “[t]he passages from the Nicomachean Ethics which arouses the Heideggerian 
exclamation to the effect that φρόνησις is Gewissen furnishes … both the occasion and the 
motive for an ontologizing operation.”125 As per Aristotle’s φρόνησις, conscience is the 
truth which reveals the apparent sphere where πρᾶξις can be realised as living well. 
Φρόνησις as conscience is fundamentally and inseparably connected to the facticity of 
Dasein and (to look ahead somewhat to the following section), Dasein’s “ownmost 
potentiality of Being-its-Self.”126 
Of course, qua factical, φρόνησις as conscience is to be sharply distinguished from any 
notion of free-floating volition. Conscience, as Weidenfeld neatly puts it, is for Heidegger 
“only a matter of taking over what our background has opened up.”127 Conscience informs 
the capacity for openness; it is “the resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, in 
terms of the heritage that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over.”128 The call of conscience is 
“an abrupt arousal” that “reaches him who wants to be brought back.”129 As a thrown 
Being, Dasein always listens to the voice of its everydayness. However, in most cases, this 
everydayness silences its own inner promptings. Conscience summons Dasein back to 
itself; it is the voice that lets Dasein see what is new in every situation and then leaves it 
with a deep, uncanny sense of responsibility. Conscience does not exhort Dasein to 
perform a particular action, or to refrain from doing something in the way of deontological 
prescription. Rather, it is calling back to nothing more, and nothing less, than authentic 
resoluteness, which (as will be seen in the following chapter) is the very condition of 
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1.4 ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ AS EIGENTLICHKEIT (AUTHENTICITY) 
 
If φρόνησις as the call of conscience reveals Dasein’s proper form as a being of disclosure, 
then its “readiness to be called” points to Dasein’s choice of self, that is, its authenticity, or 
in its fuller form, its authentic resoluteness. By attending to the voice which reminds Dasein 
of its finitude, Dasein (as a phronetic being) projects itself upon possibilities of its Being by 
taking over a basis for itself.130 As Heidegger puts it, in φρόνησις, “states of affairs are 
grasped … as they show themselves.”131 For him, what Aristotle shows us is that φρόνησις 
aims to foster a “genuine resoluteness toward something venturing the action itself,”132 an 
“acting resolutely” in accord with right desire.133 Heidegger links conscience to authentic 
resolve, as follows: 
 
Our understanding of the appeal [of conscience] unveils itself as our wanting to 
have a conscience [Gewissenhaben-wollen]. But in this phenomenon lies that 
existentiell choosing which we seek – the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one’s- 
Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call “resoluteness.”134 
 
Φρόνησις as conscience is a disposition which discloses the truth of Dasein as a being of 
action, and the mode of bringing this “disclosive appropriation” of that action is Dasein’s 
authentic resoluteness. But, if according to Heidegger, φρόνησις, which is the deliberation 
that leads to proper action, inherently involves authentic choice, and if action inherently 
carries both a form of disclosure and decision,135 then how does φρόνησις translated as 
conscience (which involves having the capacity to disclose practical situations), also 
operate as an authentic resoluteness where Dasein acts on the insight provided by its 
factical situation? Heidegger provides a clue for answering this question when he informs 
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modification of the ‘they.’”136 The significance of this clue will be fleshed out in what 
follows. 
 
In his elaboration of the features of φρόνησις as conscience, Heidegger identifies φρόνησις 
as the highest mode of human knowledge. Φρόνησις is a disclosure whose proper form is 
the unveiling of Dasein’s authentic Being according to which, through an existentiell 
modification, Dasein calls its own Self back to its concrete possibilities. As Christopher Long 
points out, this highlights Dasein as “a self-referential and self-reflective” being. As 
φρόνιμος, Dasein’s Being is essentially decisional and this decisionality is a testament to its 
ontological decisiveness.137 
 
But how does φρόνησις make Dasein an essentially decisional Being? Heidegger addresses 
this question in his discussion of Aristotle’s προαίρεσις which he translates (in his summer 
1924 lecture course on Aristotle) as “Being-resolved (Entschlossensein).” Heidegger 
differentiates here between προαίρεσις and δόξα. While δόξα is an opinion or view in 
general, προαίρεσις is to have to resolve or decide on something. Heidegger claims that a 
προαίρεσις “is concerned with the πρακτον [an action to be done], that which is decisive 
for taking care [Besorgen] of something at the moment;”138 it means “committing oneself 
to, and deciding for something.” Προαιρεσις, Heidegger maintains, “aims at συμφέρον, 
namely something which, if undertaken, will be to my advantage in taking care of some 
matter that I might take in hand.”139 
What emerges here is a clear link between resoluteness and discourse. Deliberation, 
decision and resolution are structured according to discourse, since, “[t]here is no 
προαίρεσις, no being-resolved for living things that do not speak. Speaking belongs to 
προαίρεσις.”140 Φρόνιμος aims at proper deliberation, the deliberation of both the overall 
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possibilities from the Being of Dasein and the deliberation of the concrete possibilities of 
Dasein’s situation.141 But deliberation is “a discursive seeking” and thus “a bringing-to- 
language of what is συμφέρον: 
 
In this bringing–to–language of what is συμφέρον, of the world as it is concretely 
there, the world is authentically brought into the ‘there.’ The ‘now’ and ‘here’ of 
human existence [Sein] becomes explicit in a particular deliberation, and through 
this deliberation the human being is – in modern terms – in the concrete situation, 
in the authentic καιρός. In this πρᾶξις, λέγειν as λογιζεστηαι, the Being of the 
human being has the world there, in such a way that I am in the world here and 
now in a particular situation.142 
 
Heidegger clearly holds that Dasein orients itself within προαίρεσις and through this 
deliberative process Dasein gains access to its disclosure as Being-in-the-world. This 
‘deliberative-bringing-to-language’ with oneself, the taking counsel with oneself, frames 
φρόνησις as a circumspective self-debate.143 Φρόνησις is accomplished through 
communication.144 Deliberation is a mode of πρᾶξις, understood here as the “asserting of 
something as something … and insofar as I assert something about something, the 
asserting has taken apart the being of spoken.”145 For Heidegger then, πρᾶξις is essentially 
an emphatic declaration that articulates the Being of Dasein. Therefore, in line with 
Aristotle’s practical syllogism, he suggests that through πρᾶξις Dasein’s actions are 
disclosed and carefully enunciated for the sake of which the action is carried out. This 
properness of every action of the φρόνιμος lies in self-debate (conscience) and resolution 
(decision).146 In hearing the voice of conscience, Dasein comprehends itself as care (Sorge) 
and comports itself in accordance to the dictates of the call.147 The call of conscience 
summons at every moment, and this summons involves a form of deliberation that comes 
to light in authentic resolution.148 This call initiates the self-return of Dasein; it 
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communicates both the origin and τέλος of every action. As Frank Schalow puts it, the call 
“yields the avenue for disclosure through listening to the more discreet intimations of 
care.”149 
 
Heidegger’s use of the term Entschlossenheit suggests that his reading of φρόνησις 
assumes a powerful convergence of freedom and truth. When translated literally, Being- 
resolved means ‘revealing’ or ‘unlockedness’, thereby indicating a freeing up to speak the 
most primordial truth of who we are.150 This Being-resolved is utterly different from the 
Kantian conception of freedom as the autonomous self-determination of will guided by the 
moral law. Rather, for Heidegger, the φρόνιμος is understood in its capacity as the 
“existentiell mode of ‘holding for the true’ on the dynamic advent of truth as concealing- 
revealing.”151 Being resolved, as Taylor Carman puts it, means for Heidegger, a “confident 
awareness of what one is about, which is a kind of certainty, or more precisely a non- 
cognitive being-certain about oneself.”152 In Being-resolved, φρόνησις summons Dasein to 
its ownmost possibility of being and "exacts of it that it should be this potentiality 
authentically,"153 in the context of its thrown condition. 
 
While critically examining Aristotle’s φρόνησις in his 1925 Sophist lectures, Heidegger first 
highlights the truth character of both the intellectual (ἐπιστήμη) and deliberative (τέχνη) 
modes. 154 According to him, neither is capable of assuming the good life, which he followed 
Aristotle in calling εὐδαιμονία, and which he describes as a genuine or authentic and 
properly developed possibility of unconcealment.155 Φρόνησις, he argues, has the sense of 
authentic possibility of uncovering or unconcealment, and in this way, it completes or 
assumes the status of εὐδαιμονία in the form of self-elucidation. This is contrasted to τέχνη 
which does not.156 Like τέχνη, φρόνησις entails deliberation; but unlike τέχνη, φρόνησις is 
 
 
149 Frank Schalow, "The Topography of Heidegger's Concept of Conscience," American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly LXIX, no. 2 (1995): 264. 
150 SZ: 297/273. 
151 Schalow, "The Topography of Heidegger's Concept of Conscience," 265. 
152 Carman, Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time, pp. 297-8. 
153 SZ: 354/307. 
154  GA 19: 39/55–56. 
155  GA 19: 33/46–47. 
156 Thanassas suggests that interpreting φρόνησις as a mode of unconcealment or self–elucidation modifies 
φρόνησις into a kind of theory of which human beings are the “acting subjects.” According to him, this is a 
somewhat “moral neutralization” of φρόνησις” which “will be followed by a theoretical neutralisation of 
60  
Dasein with πρᾶξις. Rather than understanding itself as an entity whose aim is only to be 
exteriorly used, Dasein is a being whose aim is to decide or deliberate amongst multifarious 
possibilities concerning what it does with its own Being. 
 
Heidegger’s point is clear: Dasein as φρόνιμος is a being that uncovers its own self- 
reference in a practical sense. As a mode of unconcealment, φρόνησις plays the originary 
role of opening human beings to become transparent to themselves.157 Φρόνησις gives 
credence or guarantees the “for which and how” of the dealings that concern human life, 
dealings which entail actions with the character of πρᾶξις rather than being merely 
productive in the manner of ποίησις. Also while disclosing the link between φρόνησις and 
deliberation, Heidegger maintains that φρόνησις is an inclination that brings to light the 
very being that performs the action, and deliberation is the particular manner of bringing 
about the “disclosive appropriation of that action.”158 The whole process of acting or 
functioning entails making choices and taking decisions, and these arefundamental 
conditions that are directly related to Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit as “forerunning 
resoluteness” (vorlaufende Entsschlossenheit).159 Φρόνησις upholds the truth which makes 
action transparent in itself, and through deliberation φρόνησις shapes the self-knowledge 
or the ability to understand our own actions. 
 
However, while it is important to note the finely textured nature of Heidegger’s retrieval 
of Aristotle in this link he makes between φρόνησις and deliberation, it is also crucial to 
highlight the aforementioned way in which Heidegger’s account significantly departs from 
the thrust of Aristotle’s text in its evacuation of any sense of concrete normativity. Aristotle 
describes the φρόνιμος as “ποια προς το εθ ζεν ολος:” that is, as an individual who 
deliberates well especially in the midst of things that provide for a good life and shared by 
all.160 However, Heidegger modifies this to “the one who deliberates in the right way … 
regarding ‘what is conducive to the right mode of being of Dasein as such and as a 
whole.’”161 Furthermore, whereas Aristotle describes φρόνησις as an “ἀλήθεια disposition 
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relative to action and concerning the things that are good for human beings [τα ανθρωπινα 
αγαθα],”162 Heidegger interprets φρόνησις here as “a disposition of human Dasein such 
that in it I have at my disposal my own transparency.”163 Heidegger describes the essential 
element of φρόνησις as the moment of truth of “transparency” through a genuine 
deliberation. Understood in this sense, φρόνησις signifies not adherence to pre-defined 
norms of action, but an instant of accurate deliberation which entails “the correct 
openness of resolve [Entschlossenheit] as the transparency of the action.”164 To the extent 
that φρόνησις possesses no specific τέλος of action, its genuineness is entirely a function 
of deliberative action as such: self-transparency and resolution alone. 165 The τέλος of any 
action is the action itself which makes Dasein a being of authentic resolution. 
 
If Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις is shot through with a normative sense, Heidegger’s 
retrieval stops well short of the same. In his hands, φρόνησις is the mode of uncovering 
that provides the ground of ethics in the authentic resoluteness of Dasein. But as to how 




1.5 ΦΡOΝΗΣΙΣ AS MITSEIN (BEING-WITH-OTHERS) 
 
Unlike the two previous categories, Heidegger does not explicitly link φρόνησις to Mitsein. 
However, there is clearly a fundamental connection between the two, a connection that is 
implicit in early Heidegger’s thought and is consistent with his otherwise enacted Aristotle 
retrieval. As such, like his retrieval of φρόνησις as conscience and authentic resoluteness, 
I propose that Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein provides another essential angle on the way 
his early work provides a ground for ethics. 
 
Mitsein stands as one of the most striking but enigmatic of the existentialia, one that calls 
for much fuller development and incorporation into the other segments of this complex 
work. The retrieval of φρόνησις as conscience and authentic resoluteness, does not in itself 
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account for how individual Dasein can exist authentically with others. However, the brief 
sketch of Mitsein in Being and Time addresses this gap, for it is here that Heidegger insists 
that we can only be alone or with others insofar as “Dasein in itself is essentially Being- 
with.”166 From Heidegger’s perspective, the fact that Dasein hears the call of conscience 
and cares for its own existence does not mean that it should be understood as belonging 
essentially to itself alone in ontological isolation from all others. To the contrary, despite 
his use of ‘mineness’ or individuation as the trademark of Dasein’s authentic existence 
(Eigent-lichkeit; Jemeinigkeit), Heidegger maintains that Dasein has its way of Being always 
in association with “Daseins with us [die Mitdaseienden].” As Mariana Ortega rightly puts 
it, for Heidegger, “to be in the authentic situation after we understand the call of 
conscience, is to be at a time in … situations that include others.”167 
Of course, Mitdasein is not to be understood in terms of side by side external “vorhanden” 
relations between human beings. Rather, Dasein is essentially ‘with’ because the presence 
of the other constitutes the Being of Dasein, and this presence involves an attunement to 
the particularity of others. Heidegger writes: 
 
Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others belongs to it; 
this means that because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being 
already implies the understanding of Others. This understanding, like any 
understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a 
primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, makes such 
knowledge and acquaintance possible.168 
From the above description, it is clear that – as Heidegger puts it in his summer 1927 lecture 
course on phenomenology – “Dasein is determined from the very outset by being-with- 
others."169 This insistence amounts to an extraordinarily firm rebalancing of the emphasis 
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(as discussed above, and in the following chapters) on Jemeinigkeit and individuation. If 
Dasein is “from the very outset” a being that is in relationship with others, then far from 
being a matter that might be considered down the track once the basic ontology of Dasein 
has first been established, ἦθος must rather be understood as integral to the very 
ontological constitution of Dasein in the first place. Dasein’s Eigentlichkeit and Jemeinigkeit 
need to be understood in the context of Mitdasein, not as contradictory assertions sitting 
side by side, but as equiprimordial existentialia, with each qualifying the others. Relations 
with others go ‘all the way down,’ so to speak. Regardless of the attitude any particular 
individual might have ontically toward others, Dasein is ontologically Being-with. 
Heidegger is perfectly clear on this point: 
 
Even if the particular factical Dasein does not turn to Others, and supposes that it 
has no need of them or manages to get along without them, it is in the way of Being- 
with.170 
 
As φρόνιμος, then, Dasein’s disclosiveness does not project it as a ‘monarch’ focused 
simply on its own self-interest. Rather, what is implied is a fundamental openness to the 
interests of others. As Heidegger puts it, the for-the-sake-of-itself of Dasein “does not 
assert ontically that the factual purpose of the factical Dasein is to care exclusively and 
primarily for itself and to use others as instruments [Werkzeug] toward this end."171 In fact, 
Dasein, is “the ontological presupposition for the selflessness in which every Dasein 
comports itself toward the other in the existent I–thou relationship.”172 In this sense, the 
ethics of inter-personal relationships, and the condition of possibility for morally rich 
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puts it in Being and Time: “[O]nly on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become 
possible.”173 
 
Nonetheless, the brevity of Heidegger’s account of Mitsein means that many questions are 
left unanswered. In what way, for example, does Dasein express itself as a Being-with? How 
specifically does Eigentlichkeit and Jemeinigkeit relate to Dasein qua Being-with-Others? 
My proposal is that these questions might perhaps be best understood in the context of 
the way Heidegger implicitly appropriates Aristotelian φρόνησις in its political dimension. 
Accordingly, Heidegger takes over Aristotle’s understanding of human beings as “σύνεσις,” 
that is, as beings that are naturally disposed to live together and cooperate through hearing 
and speaking,174 and who dwell together in close ontological proximity in the πολις.175 
 
To properly elaborate on the implicit connection Heidegger makes between φρόνησις and 
Mitsein, one needs to reiterate what was mentioned earlier concerning Aristotle’s account 
of φρόνησις as that which directs action, and in particular, political action, which entails 
cultivating individual friendships and learning how to care and to be cared for by others. 
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s acting on the basis of real possibilities should be read in this 
Aristotelian context. In his view, as φρόνιμος, Dasein’s existence is premised on its 
mineness, that is, those particular actions that help it to project its own authentic 
possibilities. However, far from isolating individual Dasein, this spurs it towards developing 
a political life; that is, forming relationships with other people. To explore the significance 
of Dasein’s political life, Heidegger retrieves the Aristotelian sense of the human being as 
a being with language.176 Thus, he insists that “we need to understand the basic concepts 
of Aristotle in concrete Dasein and in its basic possibilities of speaking with its world, within 
which Dasein is.”177 Hearing and speaking are fundamental to ontology because “[i]n 
hearing I am in communication with other human beings insofar as being a human being 
means speaking.”178 Further, “whether or not seeing in the context of θεωρειν reveals the 
 
 
173 SZ: 125/162. 
174 See Aristotle, “Politica,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, pp. 1127-28. Hereafter, references to this work 
will appear as Politica, the number in the original Greek text and followed by the number in the text as 
translated by McKeon. For example, Politica: 1252b29–30/1127-1128 
175 GA 18: 43/60-62. 
176 GA 18: 43/60-62; NE: 1098a3–4/1735. 
177 GA 18: 31/42-44. Emphasis mine. 
178 GA 18: 32/44-45. 
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world in the authentic sense, it is actually hearing, because it is the perceiving of speaking, 
it is the possibility of Being-with-others.”179 
 
This is a key moment in understanding the deeply Aristotelian context of Heidegger’s 
account of Mitsein, which is rooted in Aristotle’s insistence on human beings as 
fundamentally linguistic creatures. In Aristotle’s view, hearing and speaking are essential 
to the manner in which human beings live together in the world. Heidegger affirms 
Aristotle’s view that every human being is by nature a πολις–oriented animal (πολιτικον 
ζοον).180 Aristotle asserts the significance of the city when he highlights that the πολις was 
the most fundamental mode of the community, and that as such it constitutes an indivisible 
aspect of human existence. For him, to the extent that every human being lives in the city, 
the πολις is the τελος of human association, because it constitutes the context in which the 
individual can live the good life. In this way, Aristotle links the πολις with speech and ethics, 
with all three being constitutive of human beings: 
 
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious 
animal is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the 
only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere 
voice is an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals … 
the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and 
therefore likewise the just and unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone 
has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association 
of living beings, who have this sense makes a family and a πόλις.181 
 
According to Aristotle, while insects like bees appear to be constituted by πολις and 
partnership, human beings are the only genuinely political animals. Human beings are the 
only beings that can have their world in a genuine way with others. This is because of  
speech: human beings are determined by a λεγειν concerned with what is good and 
beneficial for human πρᾶξις. This πρᾶξις does not relegate the individual within its own 
private space; rather, it is the natural process that provides the space within which human 
 
 
179 GA 18: 72/104-105. Emphasis mine 
180 Politica: 1253a1/1129. 
181 Politica: 1253a10-15/1129. 
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beings live and by which they share a common world together. For Aristotle, the πρᾶξις 
brings human beings into a direct and immediate engagement with one another. For 
Heidegger, Dasein similarly lives in and out of a communal λογος and its being is at its core 
concerned with action. While contemplation relates to a solitary activity, πρᾶξις is only 
possible in a community. Dasein in its very being is thus political. It is the ζῷον λόγον εἶχον 
(rational animal, “life that has speech”) and thus the ζῷον πολιτικόν (political animal). 
 
Having said that, Heidegger goes far beyond Aristotle in his understanding of the intrinsic 
nature of human Being-with-others. His is a far more radical view that makes the πολις part 
of the constitution of Dasein’s singularity. Aristotle argues that through συνεσις and πολις, 
the φρόνιμος exemplifies that human beings are concerned with other beings about which 
they can raise questions and deliberate together.182 But for Heidegger, the 
phenomenological assertion that “Dasein is essentially Mitsein” does not imply that Dasein 
is dialogical or Being-with-others from the point of view of human beings living together in 
a vorhanden sense according to which they see each other and listen as others speak. 
Being-with needs rather to be understood in a more radical sense in its specifically 
ontological significance. Mitsein names Dasein in its own kind of being. It does not occur 
on the basis of any notion of “internal/external” reference. Heidegger is clear on this point: 
‘‘Mitsein is in every case a determination of one’s own Dasein [je eigenen Dasein].”183 
Heidegger takes Aristotle’s claim that the genuine self-sufficiency and completedness of a 
human being can only be achieved through the πολις, as a desire to 
 
show that the πολις, a characteristic way of being-together, is not brought to 
humans by chance, but rather that the πολις is the being-possibility φυσει, that 








182 Aristotle says “[f]or understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor 
about any and every one of the things that come into being, but about things which may become subjects 
of questioning and deliberation.” See NE: 1143a6/1805. 
183 SZ: 120/156. 
184 GA 18: 33/48-50. 
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Thus, to think of Being is to assume “our definite being-with-another.”185 Mitsein is not an 
essential “add on” to an already constituted Dasein. It is essential to Dasein because it is at 
its very ontological core. As Heidegger puts it in Being and Time: 
 
In Being-with and towards Others, there is thus a relationship of Being 
[Seinsverhaltnis] from Dasein to Dasein. But it might be said that this relationship is 
already constitutive for one’s own Dasein, which, in its own right, has an 
understanding of Being, and which thus relates itself towards Dasein.186 
 
Heidegger goes as far as to remark that Dasein “is essentially for the sake of Others”, adding 
that this “must be understood as an existential statement as to its essence.”187 As will be 
explored later in chapter four, Being-with is essential to the way Dasein historicizes itself; 
not as an isolated being but as a being who is ontologically constituted to be both self- 
responsible and to show responsibility for others. 
 
One contemporary scholar who has highlighted the radical nature of Heidegger’s insight 
into Dasein as Mitsein is Jean Luc Nancy. Nancy reads Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s 
Being-with as implying that Dasein’s Being is “singularly plural and plurally singular.”188 For 
him, the ‘with’ of Dasein is co-constitutive of Dasein, not as an insertion to the prior Being 
of Dasein, but as co-constitutive of it; the ‘with’ constitutes the essence of Dasein’s Being, 
“a constitution that undoes or dislocates every single, substantial essence of Being 
itself.”189 Thus, on one hand, the singularity of Dasein hinges on the ground that the Dasein 
self is a unique being who individuates itself by revealing its difference from other Beings. 
But on the other hand, this singularity is only possible on the basis of its prior constitution 
as Dasein qua Mitsein. As Sarah Sorial puts it, the singularity of Dasein is “ecstatic, it is 
exposed, open and vulnerable to the Other, always affected, touched and invaded by the 
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186  SZ: 124/162. 
187  SZ: 123/160. 
188  Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 28. 
189  Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 28. 
190 Sorial, "Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, and the Question of Dasein's Embodiment: An Ethics of Touch and 
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Having said all this, one might nonetheless agree that such insights into the constitutive 
and elemental importance of Being-with for understanding Dasein are not given the 
prominence that they deserve by Heidegger, and that more individualistic and insular 
strands tend to dominate in his account. As seen earlier, Arendt criticized Heidegger for 
the contempt with which he held public life, and claimed that a self taken in utter isolation 
from human relationships cannot really be at all.191 Levinas too attacked Heidegger on the 
same grounds that his authentic or ‘own-most’ (eigent-lich) individual is incapable of a 
genuine I–Thou relationship because the “I–myself” is ultimately in monologue with itself 
to the exclusion of others.192 
There are many passages throughout Sein und Zeit that justify such a view if taken in 
isolation. These include especially those passages where Heidegger writes of Dasein’s 
authentic Being-towards-death in which it is “released from the illusions of the ‘they’,” and 
which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.”193 However, while Mitsein is marginalised 
in such passages, they need to be read together with other moments of Heidegger’s 
account. True, Heidegger does emphasize ways in which authenticity is undermined by the 
influence of idle talk, but that is to be distinguished from the more essential Being-with- 
others that for Heidegger constitutes Dasein’s very Being. Turning away from the 
tranquilising effect of das Man is not the same thing as becoming a solitary Cogito. 
Heidegger puts it this way: 
 
As the non-relational possibility, death individualises – but only in such a manner 
that, as the possibility which is not to be out-stripped, it makes Dasein, as Being- 
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192 This critique is explored in chapter 4, below. 
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In this chapter, I have provided a preliminary sketch of how Heidegger’s accounts of 
Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit and Mitsein are best understood through close attention to his 
retrieval of Aristotelian φρόνησις. However, I have also argued that in taking up Aristotle’s 
φρόνησις, Heidegger finds it worthwhile to distance himself from Aristotle by ‘ontologising’ 
φρόνησις in order to implicitly establish the major structures for the development of the 
existential analytic. Thus, with Heidegger, φρόνησις must be interpreted not as a category 
in normative ethics, but as a central insight into the ontological constitution of Dasein. 
Further, it opens up to what Christopher Long calls “the possibility of developing an 
ontology of finite contingency [which is] guided by and must remain responsible to the 
concrete individual with which it is engaged … [and] … one that recognises itself as 
inherently ethical.”195 If φρόνησις is recognisable as intrinsically ethical in just this sense, 
then this orients the whole existential analytic in a specifically ethical direction. 
 
In the chapters that follow, I develop the introductory account sketched in this chapter 
concerning the way Heidegger’s understanding of Aristotelian φρόνησις unifies his notions 
of Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit and Mitsein. My argument is that far from closing down the 
possibility of a theory of ethical obligation, Heidegger’s ontologisation of the Aristotelian 
φρόνησις lays down, in Heidegger’s own words, “the existential conditions for the 
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In the last chapter, I showed how the ground of ethics in Heidegger can be understood as 
premised on the structure and fundamental concepts of Aristotelian φρόνησις, and that 
Heidegger’s accounts of Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit and Mitsein can be interpreted profitably 
through close attention to his retrieval of Aristotle’s φρόνησις. 
The aim of this chapter is to build on this in more detail by illustrating the way in which 
Heidegger’s phronetic discourse on conscience contributes to the critical structures for the 
development of an ontological ground of ethics. By exploring Heidegger’s distinctive 
characterisation of the call of conscience, I intend to show how the attestation of Dasein’s 
possible authenticity “sets forth” what Heidegger calls “the ontological foundations of … 
the ordinary way of interpreting conscience.”1 In a similar way to the sense that Rebecca 
Kukla has argued for the notion of “transcendental conscience”2 using Heidegger’s account 
(see below), I will claim that, as an ontological ground, the call of conscience provides us 
with a precondition for the understanding of ethics. As we will see, conscience plays this 
role for Heidegger not by suggesting concrete norms for action, but by calling Dasein to 
shed its identity as the they-self and undergoing an “existentiell modification of the ‘they’” 
that allows for the possibility of “authentic Being-one’s-self.”3 
Support for my argument that Heidegger’s phronetic discourse on conscience provides us 
with an ontological ground of ethics will be gleaned from Heidegger’s passing engagements 
with conscience in three very early works (his 1919 War Emergency Semester lectures titled 
The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview; Critical Comments on Jaspers’ 
Psychology of Worldviews (1920); and his 1920 lecture on The Concept of Time for the 
Marburg Theological Faculty), as well as some of the key moments in Heidegger’s account 
of conscience in Being and Time. 
In the first  section of  this chapter, I analyse Rebecca Kukla’s  insightful discussion  of  the 
notion of ‘transcendental conscience’ as an exemplar for my broader argument, bringing it 
 
1 SZ: 269/314. 
2 Rebecca Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," Continental Philosophy Review 35, no. 1 
(2002): pp. 1-34. 
3 SZ: 267/312. 
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into conversation also with a similar proposal by Charles Scott. I use such approaches as a 
springboard into the main discussions of the chapter. The reading that is presented here in 
this first section in rather condensed terms, is then fleshed out in detail in the textual 
analyses of sections two and three. 
In the second section, I examine the early works of Heidegger (as noted above) in order to 
show how Heidegger presents conscience as the potential ‘source’ of philosophy’s 
renewed concern for the ‘how’ of existence, and to identify the key concepts in his 
interpretation of conscience that ‘indicatively’ reveal how conscience plays the role of an 
ontological ground of ethics. By revealing those clues and the prevalent themes that are 
related to his interpretation of conscience in his early work, we will be able to discern how 
Heidegger’s dynamic description of conscience in his early work offers us a different 
approach to the traditional understanding of the concept as is expressed in the 
philosophical propositions of his neo-Kantian contemporaries. I suggest that Heidegger’s 
early account of conscience plays a transcendental role of grounding ethics as phronetic 
disclosure. 
In the third section, I focus on Heidegger’s account of conscience in Being and Time, 
especially his account of conscience as the call to primordial Being-Guilty (Schuldigsein) 
and explore the profound ethical implications of this analysis. I argue that although 
primordial guilt (Schuld) does not justify ethical obligation, it does provide a ground of 
ethics in the sense that it serves as a precondition for the possibility of Dasein’s 
‘indebtedness’ to care for its own being. I will also explore how the call to primordial Being- 
Guilty makes freedom the groundless ground by generally calling Dasein to project its own 
authentic possibilities. In the final section of the chapter, I will briefly address the likely 
misunderstanding that conscience as a ground of ethics is an annihilation of the Other. I 
argue that in Heidegger’s view, inasmuch as Dasein’s authentic care for its own Being 
means wanting to have a conscience, Dasein does not only want the Other to have a 
conscience, it also wants the Other to be receptive to its ownmost possibilities as well. 
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2.1 ON CONSCIENCE AS A TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND FOR ETHICS 
 
Rebecca Kukla’s discerning 2002 discussion of the notion of ‘transcendental conscience’ in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, provides a fine insight into the way in which Heidegger’s 
notion of conscience can be read simultaneously as an account of the ontological ground 
of ethics. It is for this reason that a close reading of her discussion follows as a way of 
establishing the broad outline that will be filled out in the remainder of this chapter. 
Kukla’s reading of Heidegger’s account is transcendental in a squarely Kantian, or Neo- 
Kantian sense.4 Critics of Heidegger, Kukla contends, have often assumed that such a 
reading either abstracts the ethical from the world, or (in Heidegger’s words,) “detach[es] 
Dasein from its world, isolating it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I.’”5 In Kukla’s view, 
this is a problematic understanding of Heidegger’s account of conscience. Thus, far from 
annihilating objective moral norms, Kukla insists that the call of conscience in Heidegger is 
“such that hearing its call constitutes subjects as responsive and responsible negotiators of 
normative claims.”6 Kukla is clear what she thinks such an account of “transcendental 
conscience” does and does not do. Heidegger, according to Kukla, is “arguing from the 
existence of normative responsiveness to the conditions of its possibility, not proving the 
possibility of such a responsiveness from a starting point that makes no appeal to it.”7 For 
Kukla, the role of this transcendental conscience: 
is not – or not merely – to normatively bind the subject, but such a foundational 
call and its proper reception serve as conditions of possibility, invoked (in those 
theories in which they appear) in order to explain how it is that we can hear and be 
bound by particular calls of ordinary conscience.8 
Kukla reminds the reader that the factical structures which individualise Dasein in Being 
and Time are not immanent properties, but existentials. The aim of this ontological 
structure is to restore a sense of responsibility of existence, so that Dasein can recover a 
more profound sense of what it means to be. Accordingly, Dasein’s ontological structure is 
 
 
4 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," pp. 1-2. 
5 SZ: 298/344. 
6 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 1. 
7 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 4. 
8 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 1. 
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the condition of possibility of all ontic ways of existing. Kukla’s Heidegger thus stands the 
western metaphysical tradition of ethics on its head. Instead of appealing to universal 
values, Dasein always already “inhabits a normative space in the sense of negotiating the 
world through concerned dealings, rather than mere causal interactions, and recognizing 
the binding force of the claims of norms.”9 By meaningfully engaging normative structures 
rather than living according to their dictates, Dasein adopts a normative responsiveness 
which is “a condition for possibility of Dasein’s individuated existence.”10 
From the outset, Dasein is engrossed in the standards, values and concerns of the 
‘theyself.’ Though Dasein is always absorbed and bound by the norms of the ‘they,’ the 
normativity of the ‘they’ “can only make a genuine claim on us in the context of our ability 
to step out of our lostness in the everyday and commit to norms by taking responsibility 
for their legitimacy, rather than taking them as simply found.”11 Kukla points out that in 
Heidegger’s understanding, our actions are considered authentic only when our 
everydayness is disrupted and we are forced to reflect and act from this distanced position 
thrust out of the everyday, which is a constitutive condition of genuine normative 
responsiveness. Authentic Dasein, in Kukla’s interpretation, is the transcendental condition 
for the possibility of the normativity of its everydayness, as Heidegger’s discourse on 
conscience in Being and Time seeks to clarify.12 
In Kukla’s view, Heidegger’s denial of any external locus of normative obligation is very 
strong. Accordingly, conscience, in its ordinary everyday understanding, is corrupted by 
codified moralities that decide ahead of time how the individual should act. Because “there 
is no particular content that could be assigned to this little voice that would be sufficient 
to initiate our normative responsiveness by its sheer power,”13 the call of conscience frees 
us from the monopolising power of the identities that define us and requires us “to 
recognize ourselves as the kinds of beings upon whom demands can be made.”14 When the 
call helps us to recognize our situation as structured by norms, our relationship to it 
 
 
9 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 3. 
10 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," pp. 4-5. 
11 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 4. 
12 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 4. 
13 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 6. 
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changes. So, instead of disclosing the power and binding force of norms, conscience reveals 
that norms bind us only in virtue of our recognition of their normative authority. 
The implication of this is that no one is able to recognize or acknowledge any normative 
claim upon him/her, without having already heeded the call of conscience. It is helpful to 
quote Kukla at length on this point: 
Heidegger’s ‘call of conscience’ ‘attests’ to the possibility of our acting authentically 
and thereby demands of us that we so act. Our recognition of the claim that this 
demand makes upon us, or our hearing of the call of conscience, constitutes our 
commitment to authentic action. The call of conscience enables Dasein to be more 
than a mere manifestation of the They … We must say that the call of conscience is 
a necessary condition of Dasein’s existence – this call discloses Dasein, by 
uncovering the implicit normative structure of Dasein’s fallen dealings, but in doing 
so it also constitutes Dasein in its individuated being.15 
What Kukla has shown so far is that the interruption of Dasein’s ‘theyself’ by the call of 
conscience is the constitutive movement of Dasein that puts it in touch with itself. This 
constitutive movement, as Bernhard Radloff suggests, is the having-to-be that alerts Dasein 
that it always is, yet must live up to its Being in its “movement (κίνησις) … into its own 
proper limit and form.”16 Along similar lines, Irene McMullin notes that its the “rising to the 
occasion of existence is demanded by Dasein, but meeting this norm occurs only by Dasein 
taking responsibility for the constraints that are, qua existentials, always already 
operative.”17 Heidegger sees Dasein as a mediating agent who ordinarily chooses based on 
something other than itself. When Dasein makes a choice, it does so as a being that has 
already been constituted in history and customs. This normative structure of the everyday 
world from which Dasein makes its choice is not readily transparent to Dasein because it 
possesses a vague and pervasive image of normalcy that Heidegger calls ‘das Man.’ Thus, 
in its constitutive role as an ontological ground, the call of conscience views norms not as 
finished determinate properties. Rather, as Kukla puts it, “the call must take some special 
 
15 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 7. 
16 Bernhand Radloff, Heidegger and the Question of National Socialiam: Disclosure and Gestalt (Toronto 
Buffalo London: University of Toronto, 2007), 100. 
17 Irene McMullin, Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations (United States Of America: 
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form that allows it to perform as a constitutive demand, somehow enabling us to recognize 
ourselves as the kinds of beings upon whom demands can be made.”18 Kukla writes: 
 
My existential determinations are not ‘finished’ properties that I possess, but 
temporally extended commitments that I am in the midst of living up to. For 
instance, if I am a professor, then this means that I am in the midst of trying to be 
a professor, and this is a norm-governed, ongoing project with respect to which my 
success always continues to be at issue. The demand that I ‘be myself’ is thus the 
demand that I strive to responsibly determine my necessarily incomplete character, 
and I must in some sense always be making this demand of myself, in order for me 
to be any way at all, no matter how fallen I am. However, my recognition of this 
demand will necessarily bring an end to the immediacy of my immersion in my 
projects, and the resulting distance will require me to put into question the 
legitimacy of my commitment to these projects.19 
Charles Scott’s reading of conscience as an ontological ground for ethics complements 
Kukla’s: 
 
The voice of Dasein’s possibility ‘calls’ in the midst of our involvements. Heidegger 
uses the experience of conscience, not its contents, as his phenomenal field … [T]he 
call itself discloses not the power of an ethos but the difference of human being, in 
its being, from its traditional ways of life … The voice of conscience as the disclosure 
of Dasein’s being in the midst of its everyday values and standards functions to 
make those values and standards uncertain and to ‘call’ Dasein to its difference 
from who it is in its efforts to be someone recognizable in its culture. [Through the 
call of conscience, our everyday norms] function as the general, anonymous agency 
by which we desire, decide, and constitute ourselves within a range of options that 
define proper identity in our broad culture and specific society.20 
For both Kukla and Scott, “Heidegger is not asking which norms bind or ought to bind 
Dasein, nor even whether there are such norms.”21 Rather, by heeding the call of 
 
18 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 7. 
19 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 8. 
20 Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, pp. 106-7. 
21 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 8. 
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conscience, Dasein’s “thought is disciplined by efforts to maintain questionableness by 
learning how to ask questions in given settings, and by finding its own heritage and its 
problems.”22 Transcendental conscience therefore indicates an obtrusion in our everyday 
normative structures, one that disempowers our everyday values, placing them in 
question. As Scott puts it, by hearing the call of conscience, 
[Dasein] learns to name things anew, to become alert to exclusions and to forgotten 
aspects in a people’s history, to overhear what is usually drowned out by the 
predominant values, to rethink what is ordinarily taken for granted, and to find out 
how to hold itself in question.23 
If there is therefore no ‘definitive’ way of life for Dasein, this is because it is not a 
determinate being with an immediate nature to be realised. Rather, its ontological 
structure, as enabled by the call of conscience, provides it with the basis for raising the 
question of being, a constitutive demand that somehow frees Dasein to recognize itself as 
the kind of being upon whom demands can be made. Consequently, as Kukla puts it, 
“asking for empirical proof of the legitimacy of this voice of [transcendental] conscience is 
confused, because its claims are ontologically prior to any practical claims with empirical 
ramifications.”24 Of course, this point does not mean that anything can be justified. Rather, 
the validity of transcendental conscience depends “upon its ability to genuinely disclose 
normative authority and to enable Dasein to respond to its normative force.”25 Again, the 
legitimacy of Heideggerian conscience is not measured by the possibilities it discloses to 
Dasein, because the question, as Charles Scott puts it, is “whether [by heeding the call of 
conscience], Dasein can find options to ground normativity as the basis on which it comes 
to be who it should be.”26 Kukla warns that when Heidegger tells us that the source of the 
call of conscience is Dasein itself, who demands of itself that it be itself, this should not be 
interpreted “as an ontic demand that Dasein replace the particular determinations it now 
has with others that better reflect some ‘true’ or ‘inner’ character.”27 The call is not an ontic 
demand of any kind, which entails that the demand it makes on Dasein cannot be 
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interpreted in terms of relinquishing or even adding to Dasein’s existential determinations. 
On the contrary, the call makes “a formal, ontological demand that Dasein live up to the 
commitments that existentially determine its individuated being.”28 
As the condition of possibility for the interruption of everyday values and norms, 
conscience is therefore closely linked to anxiety. The call uncannily interrupts the familiar 
and usual basis of action, unveiling “the ontological structure of caring Dasein”.29 The 
experience of uncanniness happens when our comfortable dealings with the normatively 
structured everyday world are disrupted. Uncanniness reveals to Dasein the way in which 
its situation is made up of normative projects, and it forces it to thematize its relationship 
to these projects. Uncanniness creates a distance between Dasein and its situation that 
makes it impossible for it to unreflectively follow the norms governing the situation. 
Stepping back from them Dasein has to commit freely to these norms in the sense of 
recognizing that they do not immediately compel it, and to thus take responsibility for their 
legitimacy. 
Such an account of Heidegger conscience as transcendental makes it possible to 
understand how conscience functions in the existential analytic to create the condition for 
the possibility of Dasein’s individuated self. As such, it is the attestation of Dasein’s 
authentic potentiality-for-Being. Accordingly, the call of conscience constitutes a necessary 
condition of Dasein’s existence in the sense that it “discloses Dasein, by uncovering the 
implicit normative structure of Dasein’s fallen dealings, but in doing so it also constitutes 
Dasein in its individuated being.”30 
Inspired by Kukla and Scott, this section has sought to provide a broad interpretation of 




28 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 7. 
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way) in his conception of freedom. He argues that moral norms have “a tyrannical power over us only when 
we have not taken care of ourselves. But [not so] if you take proper care of yourself, that is, if you know 
ontologically what you are, if you know what you are capable of, if you know what it means for you to be a 
citizen of a city … if you know what things you should and should not fear, if you know what you can 
reasonably hope for and, on the other hand, what things should not matter to you, if you know, finally, that 
you should not be afraid of death – if you know all this.” Michel Foucault, "The Ethics of Care For the Self As 
A Practice of Freedom: An Interview With Michel Foucault Conducted by Raul Fornet-Betancourt, Helmut 
Becker, Alfredo Gomez-Muller," Philosophy and Social Criticism 12, no. 2-5 (1987): pp. 5-6. 
30 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 16. 
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establishes it as an ontological ground for ethics in general. In what follows in this chapter, 
three early Heideggerian texts will be explored in order to present something of the 
development of this idea in his thought (with its specific ontological and phenomenological 
features), before I then return to his main account in Being and Time in order to explore 
the performative features of conscience that secure it as such a ground. 
 
 
2.2 CONSCIENCE AND ETHICS IN THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER 
 
Several very early Heideggerian texts are helpful for understanding the origins and 
development of Heidegger’s notion of conscience, especially how he came to interpret the 
meaning of Gewissen in a way that is so radically different from the traditional notion of 
moral conscience. These texts reveal a principled opposition to both the thought value of 
the neo-Kantians, and more so the ethical principles of Max Scheler. Heidegger comes to 
recognise the potential significance of conscience as directing us to a phenomenon of 
existential ‘testimony’ that is very different to the ‘call of duty’ issued by any objective 
principle of morality. Notably, however, the development of a transcendent account of 
conscience was gradual. Compared to Being and Time where conscience finds its most 
radical formulation, the transcendental tone of these early texts is quite subtle and often 
laced with the language of volitional ego in the sense of self-willing, wanting, choosing, 
remembering and making something transparent. In these texts, conscience is not 
presented as a ‘call,’ but is characterised as the potential “source” of philosophy’s renewed 
concern for the “how” of existence. Like φρόνησις, which does not start with anything 
hyperbolic or beyond the being of Dasein, the how of conscience is experienced in a πρᾶξις 
that brings about disclosure and that which conscience discloses is our “ownmost 











31 SZ: 318/273, 322/277, 324/279. 
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2.2.1 : Passing Engagements with Conscience in The Idea of Philosophy and the 
Problem of Worldview 
In his The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview (Die Idee der Philosophie und 
das Weltanschauungsproblem), given during the first quarter of 1919, Heidegger writes: 
[Let] us inquire further into the immanent character of the sense of [the critical- 
teleological] method. Supposing the method were clarified to the extent of showing 
that … there is a new kind of lived experience of the ought, of the giving of ideals. 
Does a blind power announce itself in the ought experience (‘thrust into conscience’ 
[ins Gewissen geschoben]), or does this ought give itself as self- certifying [als sich 
selbst ausweisendes]? If the latter, on what basis self- certifying?32 
As Theodore Kisiel notes, this is the first reference Heidegger makes to Gewissen in his very 
early lecture courses prior to Being and Time.33 In this “mere allusion,”34 the young 
Heidegger analyses the immanent character of the “critical-teleological method,” 
prescribed by the neo-Kantian scholars. He calls into question the groundless 
“presuppositions” of neo-Kantian philosophy because of its “absolutely blind [absoluter 
Blindheit]” dependence on an absolute “ought experience.”35 
This ‘passing mention’ of conscience in 1919 is an early sign of Heidegger’s rejection of 
what he later describes in Being and Time as the “ordinary interpretation of conscience 
[vulgäre Gewissensauslegung]” that gives standards for moral behaviour.36 Already in this 
early text, Heidegger criticises the “critical-teleological” method of the neo-Kantian 
philosophy in its being determined by the “blind power” of conscience, and he sees this as 
 
32 See Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (GA 56/57) (Frankfurt Am Main: Klostermann, 
1987), pp. 45-47. Translated as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview," 
in Heidegger: Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2008), 36. 
Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited with the abbreviation GA 56/57 and the number as it 
appears in the English translations, followed by the number/s as it appears in the original German texts. GA 
56/57, 36/45-47. 
33 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, 498. 
34 Kisiel, Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts, 48. 
35 GA 56/57: 36/44-45. 
36 SZ: 289-239/335-339. Interestingly, Sadler notes in his forward to his translation of Heidegger’s Zur 
Bestimmung der Philosophie that Heidegger’s “first course, ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of 
Worldview,’ is of great importance” because of “its anticipation of ideas that find more complete 
expression in Being and Time.” See Heidegger, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview," x. 
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intrinsically linked to the overall “theoretical comportment” of the western metaphysical 
tradition.37 He goes as far as to disparage conscience qua “ought experience,”38 as “the 
disaster of all previous philosophy.”39 This understanding of conscience as an “absolute 
ought,” he argues, is the reason for the seeming “supra-empirical validity 
[übererfahrungsmäßigen Geltung]” and “primordial objectivity [Urgegenständlichkeit]” 
that he considers an offshoot of western metaphysical tradition.40 The whole system of 
traditional philosophy must undergo a “refutation and radical overcoming [Zurückweisen 
und radikale Überwindung]”41 of this thread, in order to restore philosophy as “the science 
of absolute honesty” whose preoccupation is to unravel the “genuineness of personal life 
as such.”42 
Highly pertinent here is the way in which this passing reference to conscience effectively 
construes it as the ground of ethics insofar as it is a “genuine starting-point” for “the 
method of primordial science” to access “lived experience.”43 When Heidegger states that 
conscience plays the role of “the genuine starting point” for an authentic understanding of 
our “lived experience,” what he implies is that, like Aristotelian φρόνησις which sees 
through the general situation to unveil the particularities of our respective contexts, 
conscience not only situates us, it also provides us with the lenses to view values before 
we can be obligated by them. With this in mind, Heidegger therefore suggests that 
conscience must be properly understood, for whenever philosophy depends on an ought 
experience of conscience, it is “obscure at its very core.” Such approaches must give way 
for what he describes as a radically genuine method of philosophy that is tailored towards 
the possibility of a “self-certifying” experience.44 Such an experience clearly presages the 
cardinal methodological role played by the phenomenon of conscience in Being and Time 
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“attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being—an attestation which is [seiende] 
in Dasein itself.”45 
 
In this early work, Heidegger is clear about the need to “renew” the concept of conscience 
in order to “return” it – and philosophy in general – to its “genuine origins of the spirit” and 
“the vitality of genuine research.”46 It is in this context that he identifies the neo- Kantian 
tradition as highly problematic to the degree that it aligns the “theoretical concept of the 
‘ought’ with the “ethical standards” imposed by the “dictates of conscience.”47 This 
“misunderstanding of the problematic of primordial science,”48 fails to see that conscience 
is not an ‘ought,’ but a phenomenon that “grounds the ideal in its absolute intrinsic validity, 
so that in the experience of the ought a value is constituted.”49 The broad outlines of a 
transcendental account of normativity is evident here, and at one point Heidegger gives 
this a quasi-biographical expression: 
But is every value given to me as an ought? Clearly not. I experience value-relations 
without the slightest element of ought being given. In the morning, I enter the 
study; the sun lies over the books, etc., and I delight in this. Such delight is in no 
way an ought; 'delightfulness' as such is not given to me in an ought-experience. I 
ought to work, I ought to take a walk: two motivations, two possible kinds of 
'because' which do not reside in the delightful itself but presuppose it. There is, 
therefore, a kind of lived experience in which I take delight, in which the valuable 
as such is given.50 
Clearly, then, like φρόνησις which unveils the essential possibilities of practical existence, 
Heidegger privileges lived experience as the basis for normativity, and in this way, he 
rejects the neo-Kantian construal of the “ought” of conscience as the validating source for 
the axioms of “critical-teleological” philosophy. In this way also, Heidegger brackets 
Windelband with the general neo-Kantian tendency to anchor their “critical-teleological 
 
 
45 Gregor Bartolomeus Kasowski, "Conscience and Attestation: The Methodological Role of the “Call of 
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method” on the grounds of an unexplained “ought.” Windelband, Heidegger argues, is 
unperturbed by the problem of “how” one experiences conscience, and by so doing, he 
expresses his unwillingness to doubt the “validity” of what Heidegger describes as the 
unclarified phenomenon of “value-giving.”51 Heidegger’s refusal at this point to adopt the 
traditional term of “moral conscience” lies in a deliberate decision by the young thinker to 
free his philosophy from the normative principles of neo-Kantianism with its “ideal goal of 
universally valid truth.”52 
While endorsing primordial experience as the basis of conscience, Heidegger calls for a 
“rebirth of the genuine scientific consciousness and life-contexts.”53 The “factual content” 
of normative principles for Heidegger is the original primal experiences of life and world 
that occur pre-theoretically and prior to the life-world.54 Such experiences must be the 
primary loci or “the original manner of value-giving upon which the ought is founded.”55 
Heidegger explains: 
If the ideal, the goal of knowledge, truth, is a value, this does not at all need to 
announce itself in an ought. The value is something in and for itself, not an ought, 
but just as little a Being [ein Sein]. The value 'is' not, but rather it 'values' in an 
intransitive sense: in being worth-taking [Wertnehmen], 'it values' for me, for the 
value-experiencing subject. 'Valuing' becomes an object only through 
formalization. 'Object' is a misleading designation: our language is not adequate to 
the new basic type of lived experience involved here.56 
The point Heidegger repeatedly makes in this lecture course is that if philosophy is to 
reclaim its reputation as the “primordial science,” it must be alive to the fact that “the 
awakening and heightening of the life-context of scientific consciousness is not the object 
of theoretical representation, but of exemplary pre-living [Vorleben].”57 At this point, 
Heidegger hesitates to use the language of “conscience” to refer to this “new basic type of 
lived experience” that allows philosophy as a “primordial science” to “go back to the 
 
51 GA 56/5: 38-39/47-48. 
52 GA 56/57: 31/38. 
53 GA 56/57: 4/4. 
54 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, 21. 
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origin.”58 However, his critique of the neo-Kantian dependence on the “blind power” of 
conscience and suggestion for a “genuine” question of how lived experience can be “self- 
certifying,” does suggest the beginning of a movement in this direction. Such development 
of the role of conscience indicates a precondition for ethics. After all, the notion of “self- 
certifying experience,” prefigures the claim in Being and Time, that the call of conscience 
is an “attestation” of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being,” as an expression of its 
potential for ownedness, Eigentlichkeit. In as much as conscience involves “a genuine 
question of how lived experience can be self-certifying,”59 it would then seem that in 
Heidegger’s view, moral normativity is possible only on the basis of a cognisance of 
primordial concrete life. 
2.2.2 : Conscience in the “Critical Comments on Jaspers’ Psychology of 
Worldviews” (September 1920) 
The theme of conscience is also raised in an oblique yet telling way in Heidegger’s essay on 
Jaspers the following year. Here, conscience is presented as a means of reading Jaspers in 
a sophisticated manner. Accordingly, Heidegger contends that to avoid reading Jaspers’ 
work as “a finished philosophy that has been established on some secure foundation,”60 or 
as “an absolute validity of truth,”61 it is important that we: 
sharpen our consciences regarding the need to inquire into the genuine sense of 
the ‘history of ideas,’ and return radically to the original genetic motivations in this 
history that led to the establishment of such epistemological ideals in philosophy … 
It is certain that such sharpening of the conscience cannot be taken care of, or 
approached in any genuine manner whatsoever, by ‘creating’ a ‘new’ philosophical 
program; rather, it must be enacted in a very concrete manner in the form of 
destruction that is directed precisely to what has been handed down to us in the 
history of ideas. 62 
Unlike Being and Time, where Heidegger describes conscience as a call to an “attestation” 
of Dasein’s “authentic potentiality-for-Being,”63 here Heidegger does not make any 
 
58 GA 56/57: 36-7/ 45-6. 
59 GA 56/57: 36-7/45-46. 
60 Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers: 2-3/3. 
61 Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers: 2-3/3. 
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clarifications on the exact meaning of the phenomenon of conscience. Rather, he highlights 
that a ‘sharpened conscience’ is a conditio sine qua non or rather “concretely necessary” 
for a “creative” reconstruction of the ‘theories’ of traditional philosophy.64 Although 
Heidegger refrains from offering the exact explanation of how conscience undertakes this 
role, or how the “sharpening” of conscience can be realised, by granting conscience the 
methodological role of renewing philosophy’s “sense of originality,” his mention of 
conscience in this work is rich in its implication as an ontological ground of ethics. 
Accordingly, conscience is seen as a phenomenon that helps us to think without 
presuppositions in order to arrive at a “genuine confrontation with the history that we 
ourselves are.”65 Evidently, this is phronetic history, that places our factical situation not 
under any universal norm, but in a dynamically differentiated principle of action. Thus, in 
a way that anticipates his account of conscience in Being and Time, Heidegger insists that 
the “roundabout understanding enacted in [conscience] …” helps us to determine 
“whether we have really so thoroughly come to terms with that which we ourselves 
purportedly ‘have’ and ‘are.’”66 
Towards the end of the essay, Heidegger explicitly identifies the role of conscience as that 
which is “both the content and the ‘how’ of the anxious concern of the self about itself.”67 
“In this anxious concern,” claims Heidegger, “the specific past, present, and future of the 
self are not experienced as temporal schemata for objectively classifying facts; rather, they 
are experienced within a non-schematic sense of anxious concern that has to do with the 
enactment of experience in its ‘how.’”68 Conscience is here already something like an 
ontological ground of ethics in the manner by which it is specifically differentiated from its 
traditional meaning. Accordingly, conscience does not call to any specific way of life; it 
rather takes humanity back to itself as the very source of itself and the precondition for the 
understanding of ordinary conscience: 
In accord with its fundamental sense, conscience is understood here as the 
enactment of conscience, and not merely in the sense of occasionally having a 
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conscience about something (conscientia). Conscience is a historically defined 
‘how’ of experiencing the self … In indicating this connection between the sense of 
historical experience and the sense of the phenomenon of conscience, we are not 
giving the concept of the historical a broader meaning; rather, we are 
understanding it in such a way that it is being returned to the authentic source of 
itself. And this is also the factical though concealed source from which historical 
experience in the sense of the development of objective historical knowledge (the 
historical human science) arises.69 
By condemning the modern scientific movement and traditional philosophy for their 
inability to recognise the primordial phenomenon of conscience, Heidegger reveals it as a 
“fundamental” phenomenon that constitutes the “historically charged way of experiencing 
one’s self” as the fundamental “source” of all possible experience. If in Being and Time 
Dasein is said to exist mostly in the forgetfulness of Being in its everydayness 
(Alltäglichkeit), Heidegger concludes his essay on Jaspers by contending that “our concrete 
and factical life-experience has of itself a characteristic tendency to fall away into the 
objective kinds of significance in the experienceable world around it.” Yet, when “we are 
unable to see phenomena of existence today in an authentic manner, we no longer 
experience the meaning of conscience and the responsibility lying in the historical self.”70 
2.2.3 : Conscience in the Lecture on The Concept of Time for the Marburg 
Theological Faculty (July 1924) 
One final early text sheds further light on Heidegger’s coming development of the theme 
in Being and Time. Heidegger makes an incidental and thematically undeveloped remark 
on conscience in his 1924 lecture on the concept of time: a work Hans-Georg Gadamer has 
referred to as the “Urform”of Heidegger's Being and Time, (and indeed, in Being and Time 
itself, Heidegger somewhat oddly acknowledges this lecture as the origin of his account of 
conscience in the latter work).71 Echoing his earlier reference to conscience in the Jaspers 
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essay, Heidegger here sees conscience as the “coming back” that constitutes the authentic 
experience of historicality. He writes: 
 
“[t]he manner of [Dasein’s] coming back is, among other things, conscience. Only 
the 'how' can be repeated. The past – experienced as authentic historicity – is 
anything but what is past. It is something to which I can return again and again.”72 
Nonetheless, despite this similarity, the account of conscience provided here involves a 
significant shift from his earlier presentation. Of note, for example, is his integration of 
conscience into “Dasein,” which Heidegger now uses in preference to “self.” This coalescing 
of the language of Dasein and conscience is a key moment. In Being and Time, Heidegger 
writes that “we are looking for a potentiality-of-being of Dasein that is attested by Dasein 
itself in its existentiell possibility,”73 and for the most part, conscience has to do with this 
possible attestation of the self-being. In other words, Heidegger is searching for a place 
where we can undoubtfully find the possibility of being-one’s-self, and he finds it in this 
very special phenomenon of the call of conscience. This phenomenon attests to the 
possibility of authentic (own-most) existence. 
Nevertheless, it is only with Heidegger’s account of conscience in Being and Time that this 
relationship receives full development. It is only there that conscience emerges clearly as 




2.3 CONSCIENCE IN BEING AND TIME 
 
As the foregoing section has shown, there would appear to be a development in 
Heideggerian thought prior to Being and Time in which conscience comes to have an 
increasingly important place. In these earlier works, conscience is associated with 
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transparency, accountability, self-will, wanting and choosing. Overall, Heidegger tends not 
to develop a positive account of conscience to describe Dasein’s authentic potentiality of 
Being (as comes later), but rather uses it in a negative way to deconstruct the ground of 
philosophical certainty as espoused by traditional philosophy. 
In Being and Time, though, conscience comes to the foreground as Heidegger looks to 
“trace [it] back to its existential foundations and structures and make it visible as a 
phenomenon of Dasein, holding fast to what we have hitherto arrived as that entity’s state 
of Being.”74 Heidegger sees his account of conscience in Being and Time as an “ontological 
analysis” of the phenomenon, one that is “prior to any description and classification of 
experiences of conscience, and likewise lies outside of any biological” (or psychological) 
explanation of the phenomenon.75 
In this section, I will examine how – as a ‘call’ – “conscience [possesses] the character of 
summoning (Anruf) Dasein to its ownmost potentiality of being a self.”76 There are various 
structures in Heidegger’s account that constellate to inform Heidegger’s description of this 
phenomenon, and together these make up a series of windows on the way in which 
conscience is implicitly revealed as a ground upon which ethics is based. As Heidegger puts 
it himself: this account “sets forth” “the ontological foundations of … the ordinary way of 
interpreting conscience.”77 
The section will proceed as follows: On the basis of an initial discussion of the sense in 
which Heidegger’s account of conscience in Being and Time functions as a transcendental 
ground for ethics, I then tease out some key themes in Heidegger’s account, and to show 
the way in which they work together to ground ethics. First, the nature of the call as 
‘discourse’ is analysed. I then follow Heidegger’s own demarcation of the topic by dwelling 
on the three questions he identifies: i.e., who is called by the call?; what does the call 
disclose?; and who is the one who calls? This then raises the further question of how Dasein 
is enabled to understand the call, a question that raises the complex notion of Dasein’s 
understanding of its own Being-guilty. Finally, I turn to the question of the relation of 
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‘individual’ Dasein to others, a discussion that can be only just identified at this stage, 
pending a thorough analysis in Chapter four, below. Throughout this discussion, the focus 
will remain on the way that each aspect of this Heideggerian account of conscience 
underpins its status as providing an ontological ground for the possibility of ethics in the 
ordinary normative sense. 
2.3.1 : Conscience as an Ontological Ground of Ethics 
 
Heidegger’s ‘canonical’ account of conscience – in the second chapter of Division Two 
(§§54-60) of Being and Time – sits at the heart of the existential analytic, and in this way, 
it intersects with a series of other key structural components of this vast work. In the 
conscience chapter, Heidegger shows how Dasein can counter the tendency of fallenness 
by “attesting to its existentiell possibility” so that it can authentically come into 
“disclosedness” and achieve a “transparent” understanding of itself and its engagement in 
the world.78 
The first move in the investigation, Heidegger claims, is the requirement that conscience 
be “[redirected] back to its existential foundations and structures and [be made] visible as 
a phenomenon of Dasein.”79 Heidegger embarks on an untrodden path here, one which 
situates his account of conscience within the domain or trajectory of Aristotelian φρόνησις 
where Dasein is disclosed as a radically finite being who comes out of its concealment by 
disrupting the entanglement of its everydayness and owning up to its ability-to-be. 
Accordingly, while reproaching the neo-Kantians for embracing value-thinking and 
polarising the ‘ought,’ Heidegger insists that in exhibiting the constitutive phenomena that 
are essential to Being-in-the-world, the attestation of conscience does not prove the truth 
of anything because “Da-sein is always its possibility.”80 In other words, the attestation of 
the call of conscience does not come from any speculative or external source like God or 
other people. It is also not being ‘inspired’ by any biological phenomenon for which one 
can demand an “inductive empirical proof.”81 Rather, in Heidegger’s words, this 
“attestation” must “have its roots [ihre Wurzel] in Dasein’s Being.”82 This confinement of 
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the phenomenon of conscience to Dasein’s factical hermeneutic experience has the effect 
of shielding the analysis from traditional biases. Heidegger notes that this prejudice of 
tradition “rests upon an ontological perversion of [the] phenomenon” and the inability to 
acknowledge that conscience is different “from what is environmentally present-at- 
hand.”83 Admitting that his existential conscience “is necessarily a far cry from everyday 
ontical common sense,” he submits that this reversal of the meaning of the “call of 
conscience” provides the “ontological foundations” of all “everyday” notions or ordinary 
interpretation concerning the “voice” of conscience.84 It is, in other words (and as explored 
above), a transcendental notion of conscience, and not an empirical one. 
In Heidegger’s account, right from the outset, Dasein has always already been determined 
by the standards, values and concerns of its concrete world. “With Dasein’s lostness in ‘the 
they,’” Heidegger argues, “that factical potentiality-for-Being which is closest to it (the 
tasks, rules, and standards …) has already being decided upon.”85 Therefore, the authentic 
turn requires undergoing a calling or a twisting free of conventional mode of identifications 
to embrace the possibilities of Being. Conscience does not call us to be first determined or 
articulated by a set of imposed normative requirements (a sense that is invited by 
traditional ontic accounts of conscience); rather its role is to first and foremost reveal to 
Dasein that it must “bring itself back” from the ‘they’ in order to understand authentically. 
Prior to any normative moral ‘ought,’ Dasein is therefore already ethical in an ontological 
sense, even prior to any heeding of the call of conscience by which Dasein is brought back 
from its immersion in the ‘they.’ ‘Being-ethical’ is thus not a matter of submission to pre- 
ordained moral laws, for Dasein is always already hermeneutically caught up in, and 
concerned with, the everyday world which in and of itself is an ethically defined space 
governed by the ‘they.’ Far from positing its own ‘new’ normative oughts, conscience does 
not unveil any new “content;” instead, the call disrupts definitive values and makes Dasein 
the condition of its own possibility. The point is not to deny the place of values or moral 
norms; it is rather a matter of priority, where as a φρόνιμος, Dasein first considers ‘the 
being-true’ of itself which determines the extent and way in which it is to be obligated by 
moral norms. Heidegger’s point is that the analysis of Dasein’s Being precedes moral 
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normativity, for only a being of Dasein’s kind is open to anything like the call of conscience 
in this sense. Otherwise put, the call of conscience is not primarily to do with morality. It is, 
as Joanna Hodge puts it “concerned with specifying the nature of the entity, which can be 
thus in breach or fail; how it is both possible to be both judged and judging.”86 
Having said that, the ‘contentlessness’ of conscience does not equate to utter vacuousness. 
Heidegger is clear on this point: “[c]onscience gives us ' ‘something’ to understand; it 
discloses.”87 Accordingly, Dasein is summoned by the call to understand itself as itself; in 
its thereness; in its thrownness. Heidegger drives home this point through his analysis of 
hearing and listening. He writes: 
If Dasein is to be brought back from the lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this 
is to be done through itself, it must first be able to find itself, to find itself as 
something that has failed to hear itself and continues to do so in listening to the 
‘they’. This listening must be stopped, that is, the possibility of another kind of 
hearing that interrupts that listening must be given by Dasein to itself. The 
possibility of such a breach lies in being summoned immediately. Dasein fails to 
hear itself, and listens to the ‘they’, and this listening gets broken by the call if that 
call, in accordance with its character as call, arouses another kind of hearing which, 
in relation to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every way opposite. If in this 
lost hearing, one has been fascinated with the ‘hubbub’ of the manifold ambiguity 
which idle talk possesses in its everyday ‘newness’, then the call must do its calling 
without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. That 
which, by calling in this manner, gives us to understand, is the conscience.88 
To ‘hear’ oneself here, is to explore oneself. Authentic Dasein has a special kind of listening 
that gives it the capacity to be answerable to its actions and omissions. This peculiar kind 
of calling back of one’s own self is a jolting of everydayness. In this moment, morality (in 
the ordinary sense) is first made possible, not by the call, but because of the call. Through 
the call, Dasein understands its finitude, its Being-unto-death, and it is affirmed in its 
anticipatory resoluteness. Thus, like φρόνησις, conscience relates to self-knowledge and 
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concerns itself with its own ability-to-be. Because Dasein habitually privileges what 
Kierkegaard calls the “dogmatic” as it discerns its response to already established moral 
norms,89 the temporal demand of the call of conscience compels Dasein to transcend the 
moral systems provided by the theyself and to believe that no one, no history, no 
community authorises its individual self. The call forces Dasein to its forward run 
[Vorlaufen] of existence where it takes over its existence by decentring and rupturing its 
conventional (theyself) moral system. 
2.3.2 : Conscience as Discourse 
 
Heidegger sums up the core aspects of his account as follows: 
 
If we analyze conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call [Ruf]. Calling is 
a mode of discourse. The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein 
by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-itsself; and this is done by way of 
summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty.90 
Jean-François Courtine argued that Heidegger describes conscience as a ‘call’ in order to 
show phenomenologically how conscience constitutes the ipseity of Dasein, in the attesting 
of its authentic being-able-to-be.”91 Kisiel makes the same point when he says that 
Heidegger speaks of conscience as a ‘call’ so as to highlight Dasein’s being brought before 
its “absolute responsibility.”92 
The account of the call begins by identifying it as a peculiar form of discourse. As already 
noted, Dasein “fails to hear [überhört] its own self” because of its lostness “in the 
publicness and idle talk of the ‘they.’”93 To take hold of itself again in a more primordial 
way, “this listening-away [of the ‘theyself’] must get broken off;” and thus, “the possibility 
of another kind of hearing must come forward; one that will interrupt the theyself, while 
at the same time coming from Dasein itself.”94 As a mode of discourse, conscience delivers 
to Dasein the only kind of unambiguous “giving-to-understand” that can enable it to “hear” 
 
89 Søren Kierkegaard, ed. The Concept of Anxiety: a Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation On the 
Dogmatic Issue of Heredictory Sin, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 14. 
90 SZ: 269/314. 
91 Jean-François Courtine, "Voice of conscience and call of being," Topoi 7, no. 2 (1988): 106. 
98 Hyde, The Call of Conscience: Heidegger and Levinas, Rhetoric and the Euthanasia Debate, 41. 
92 
 
authentically and thereby find itself.95 It is this "voice [Stimme],” that calls, and in so doing 
it hermeneutically opens and unveils Dasein. 
 
As a mode of discourse, conscience makes conventional normative ethics possible. To 
negotiate moral norms, conscience uses discourse to reach into the deepest threshold of 
care in order to articulate through words the elemental flow and pattern of existence. 
Likewise, through discourse, Dasein listens to hear the repressed voice of its possibilities 
that lie frozen and hidden and are often passed over by the trivialising speech of ‘everyday 
ethics.’ Frank Schalow elaborates on this role: 
As a disclosive power, [discourse] provides the vocabulary to express the 
ineluctable drama of existence, the subtleties, twists of phrase, and nuances to 
articulate the meaning of care as finite. [Discourse] tests its own limits in order to 
express the following paradoxes: the individual's giving him/herself up to death to 
experience the vitality of life, Dasein's relinquishing the spoils of worldly conquest 
to win itself, or committing self-sacrifice to receive the bounty of love. The 
conveyance of care from the depths of its ’as structure’ defies univocity in order to 
capture manifold determinations of existence, the modalities of self- 
understanding. The primitive gesture or indicator ‘that for-the-sake-of’ provides 
the pre-conceptual pattern to index all the determinations of existence.96 
Michael Hyde offers a similarly illuminating reading of conscience as a mode of discourse. 
For him, “[t]here is to be sure, a challenge-response logic at work when conscience calls,” 
and appropriately so, since “[n]o moral system could exist without it.” After all, he 
contends, Heidegger would want us to realise that our nature as spatio-temporal beings is 
in and of itself “a challenge calling for response.”97 The call evokes, and at the same time 
provokes Dasein by summoning it to “be responsible for its existence; to take charge of [its 
life] … to affirm [its] freedom through resolute choice.”98 (Of course, the prima facie ‘heroic 
individualism’ of this account of the call needs to be strongly tempered by the equallly 
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primordial ‘collectivism’ of Heidegger’s accounts of Mitsein and Fürsorge, on which more 
to come below.) 
Heidegger emphasises that conscience as a mode of discourse gives Dasein the propensity 
to ‘speak’ and ‘hear,’ capacities that emanate out of the threshold of Dasein’s Verstehen. 
But, if the call is truly a singular determination of "discourse" or of discursiveness [Rede], 
Heidegger is clear that conscience is "voiced" without any vocal emission or phonetic 
exteriorisation. Conscience calls in silence, addressing itself to a well-defined kind of 
‘listening’. Further, the call emits no explicit or fixed message: it “asserts nothing, gives no 
information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it tries to set going a 
'soliloquy' in the Self to which it has appealed.”99 
Silence is crucial to Heidegger’s understanding of the potentiality of the call to dispel idle 
talk and thereby open up the possibility of genuine listening. For what he says earlier in 
Being and Time about the role of silence in discourse more generally holds true in the 
specific case of the discourse of conscience: 
Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to 
keep silent, Dasein must have something to say – that is, it must have at its disposal 
an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that case one's reticence makes 
something manifest, and does away with 'idle talk'. As a mode of discoursing, 
reticence articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it 
gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one- 
another which is transparent.100 
It is by providing us with the necessary incitation that provokes the self to be alive to its 
own possibilities, that the silent call of conscience works to provide the condition of 
possibility for genuine normative ethical reflection. As Schalow puts it, “the logos which is 
expressed in the silent call supplies the governance to direct the self back to who it already 
is.” And this happens, as Schalow suggests, because “the call addresses Dasein with a 
degree of specificity and distinctness that corresponds to its own capacity to hear.”101 
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Ironically, it is through the very silence of the voice of conscience, that Heidegger 
emphasises the “hearing” role of discourse that is necessary for disclosedness. Accordingly, 
to understand authentically, Dasein must reticently “hold its tongue” so that it can “hear” 
what is disclosed to it. Thus, in another irony, as Courtine insightfully notes, when we 
examine how Heidegger speaks of the call, “everything becomes a question of listening” 
rather than speaking. 102 The “keeping silent” of discourse reflects the “reticence” of one 
“who already understands.”103 Thus, like φρόνησις which unveils the factical possibilities 
of being in a situation with respect to individual self-understanding, when Dasein “listens” 
to the reticent voice of its conscience,104 it first adapts itself to its pre-given surroundings, 
and as Katherine Sepulveda contends, by so doing, it “makes itself to understand than to 
seek to be understood.”105 Sepulveda further claims that, in this “listening” through which 
Dasein rediscovers the truth that resonates with it, Dasein “partake[s] in the call and 
become[s] aware of it. [It] become[s] aware of a call that comes from [it], and yet over 
[it].”106 
But this ‘keeping silent’ also resonates with the ‘nothingness’ of the appeal of the call. This, 
surely, is the most counter-intuitive sense of discourse: a call that is silent, and a responder 
who listens and keeps silent! Yet, in its nothingness, the call of conscience demonstrates 
its contrast with what Van Buren calls “the noisy power and gloria of decisionism”107 
2.3.3 : The Call’s Disclosure and its Dative 
 
Early in his account of conscience in Being and Time, Heidegger sets out three key questions 
concerning the structure of the call: i.e., who is called by the call?; what does the call 
disclose?; and who is the one who calls? In order to more clearly indicate the role of 
conscience as providing a ground for ethics, these questions need closer scrutiny. I engage 
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Who does the call address? In answering this first question concerning the dative, 
Heidegger is clear that it is “[m]anifestly Dasein itself,”108 but that much more needs to be 
said. Accordingly, conscience is a summon to “Dasein's Self,” a self that has been lost in the 
‘they.’109 The call is directed to the ‘Dasein Self’ that is not simply the theyself of ordinary 
familiarity, but which is also not simply separable from it. The call changes Dasein in a 
mysterious sense, by reaching through the layers of idle talk that defines Dasein’s own self- 
understanding, and in this way, discloses Dasein to its own self. At this point, the first 
question (of the addressee) is seen to be inextricable from the second question (what is 
disclosed). Heidegger describes the situation as follows: 
[It] is essential to Dasein that along with the disclosedness of its world it has been 
disclosed to itself, so that it always understands itself. The call reaches Dasein in 
this understanding of itself, which it always has, and which is concernful in an 
everyday, average manner.110 
By so doing, the call returns Dasein to its “own Self” and “pushes [the ‘they’] into 
insignificance.”111 This passage is worth recalling in its full careful detail: 
The call reaches the they-self of concernful Being with Others. And to what is one 
called when one is thus appealed to? To one's own Self. Not to what Dasein counts 
for, can do, or concerns itself with in being with one another publicly, nor to what 
it has taken hold of, set about, or let itself be carried along with. [This] … sort of 
Dasein gets passed over in this appeal; this is something of which the call to the Self 
takes not the slightest cognizance. And because only the Self of the they-self gets 
appealed to and brought to hear, the "they" collapses. But the fact that the call 
passes over both the ‘they’ and the manner in which Dasein has been publicly 
interpreted, does not by any means signify that the ‘they’ is not reached too. 
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into insignificance. But the Self, which the appeal has robbed of this lodgement and 
hiding-place, gets brought to itself by the call.112 
It is difficult to consider a more thorough ground for the possibility of ethics than what 
Heidegger here describes. Here the silent but searching ‘voice’ of conscience is affirmed in 
its capacity to address the ‘truest’ (though Heidegger avoids this term) self, the self that – 
as much as this is ever possible factically – is other than the public or everyday self of 
everyday self-understanding. Is this not what is assumed in the ordinary conception of 
conscience: self-reflection that is ‘honest’ and even brutal in its stripping away of all 
pretension? Yet here Heidegger provides an account of the ontological possibility of such 
an ontic psychological or spiritual state. The ‘self’ that is addressed is not the self that is 
the stuff of idle talk and self-deception, but the self that authentically is. As such, 
conscience “calls Dasein forth (and ‘forward’) into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons 
to its ownmost potentiality-for Being-its-self.”113 Accordingly: 
If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, 
and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find itself – to 
find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in that 
it listens away to the ‘they’. 114 
In addressing this first question, the second question has already been broached. The silent 
and contentless disclosure of the call is ultimately nothing other than a summons to 
authentic resoluteness, without which – I have maintained – the ordinary idea of 
conscience is without obvious grounding. 
From Heidegger’s perspective, Dasein’s lostness in the ‘they’ is a condition of possibility for 
its ordinary everyday inauthentic Being-in-the-world. When the call of conscience arouses 
in Dasein “another kind of hearing” rather than “hearing the noise of the manifold 
ambiguity of everyday new ‘idle talk,’” Dasein has the opportunity to transgress the moral 
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itself free from its lostness in idle chatter, and in this way to take responsibility for its ethical 
life. 
For Heidegger, though, the call is both unequivocal and open to misunderstanding. It is 
“unequivocal, even though it may undergo a different interpretation in the individual 
Dasein in accordance with its own possibilities of understanding.”115 This is a key point, for 
(like the ordinary notion of conscience), Heidegger’s transcendental account is consistent 
with the possibility of delusion and error, not vis-à-vis error or misunderstanding of 
putative moral absolutes, but in terms of the perversion of the call itself: 
When ‘delusions’ arise in the conscience, they do so not because the call has 
committed some oversight (has mis-called), but only because the call gets heard in 
such a way that instead of becoming authentically understood, it gets drawn by the 
they-self into a soliloquy in which causes get pleaded, and it becomes perverted in 
its tendency to disclose.116 
If the call of conscience can be perverted, and if the call is the condition of possibility for 
moral normativity, this raises interesting questions about a sense in which the ἦθος can be 
entirely distorted and misconstrued even before concrete moral reflection can begin. This 
raises the possibility of something like systematically distorted normative structures. Here 
again, Heidegger opens a rich avenue for ethical consideration that he leaves almost 
entirely unexplored. 
Before moving on to consider Heidegger’s third question concerning the call (the identity 
of the caller), it is perhaps important to make a few brief remarks about the relationship 
between this Heideggerian account of the call of conscience by comparison with Kant, on 
one hand, and Nietzsche, on the other. 
One might well suggest that there is a superficial level of similarity between Kant and 
Heidegger in the sense that both reject heteronomous influence on the ‘moral agent.’ If 
autonomy is a central plank of Kant’s Grundlegung, it is difficult to deny a hint of the same 
in Heidegger’s rejection of the authority of established normative frameworks and his 
preference for the authentic ‘inner’ discourse of conscience. Nonetheless, moral 
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discernment (insofar as this notion makes any sense in the content of Being and Time) must 
not be understood in Heidegger in anything like the Kantian sense qua a rational faculty 
that gives the moral law to itself. Rather, in line with Scott, I suggest that being an 
ontological structure of possibility, Heideggerian conscience “puts in question the 
combination of axioms, [their] authorising disclosures and judgements … in such a way as 
to expose [their] underlying assumptions or implicit ideological stance.”117 While Kant 
would perceive the call of conscience fundamentally, as a "court of justice"118 which has an 
implicit significance to the idea of "the moral law," Heidegger sees in the call an orientation 
to πρᾶξις which highlights what Van Buren calls the "practical insight (φρόνησις) in 
individual situations as what is fitting (προσαρμογή) in relation to us (σε σχέση με εμάς), 
that is, in relation to each individual in his or her own circumstances."119 If Kant conceives 
conscience as “practical reason holding the human being’s duty before him for his acquittal 
or condemnation in every case that comes under a law,”120 Heidegger appeals not to a 
rational faculty of the mind, but to an ‘understanding’ that characterises the “running 
ahead [Vorlaufen]” of its finitude.121 
A similarly superficial similarity might be discerned with Nietzschean thought insofar as 
Heidegger advocates the summoning of the self beyond the limits of all established moral 
absolutes, with its institutionalized laws and principles.122 One might discern here echoes 
of Nietzsche’s “self-overcoming movement” that frees the individual to affirm itself. 
However, for Nietzsche, conscience here collapses into the will to power, by which the 
individual transcends itself to become more than what inherited forces and traditional 
ideas prescribe for us. As he puts it, "the man [sic] who does not wish to belong to the mass 
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[sic]: 'Be your-self.”123 Or as he asks in The Gay Science: "What does your conscience say? 
You must become who you are."124 
However, such an approach is far from the Heideggerian notion of the call of conscience, 
which is hardly reducible to will to power. While Heidegger’s account is consistent with an 
existentiell decision to reject traditional moral norms, all such matters lie beyond the scope 
of the existential analytic itself. Indeed, ontic conformity with established norms would 
appear to be as much in line with authentic resoluteness as their rejection. Further, in its 
focus on calling Dasein back to its Self, what is missing is any strong volitional dimension. 
The call is thus “unmediated and beyond willing,” as Scott puts it: 125 As Heidegger puts it 
himself, “the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor 
prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so … [Rather] ‘It’ calls, 
‘against our expectations and even against our will.” 126 Or as Scott elaborates: “the call is 
neither an intentional act of expectation, desire, or belief, nor a ‘performance’ by the 
‘agent’ in the world.127 In a sense that points forward to later Heideggerian themes and 
beyond the existential analytic itself, the call of conscience is, most basically, the call of 
Being itself. 
2.3.4 : The Source of the Call and Uncannyness 
 
On the basis of the foregoing brief exploration of the first two Heideggerian questions 
concerning the structural features of the call of conscience, this section turns to the third 
question concerning the identity of the caller. It is here that the notion of ‘care’ for one’s 
Being arises, and with self-care a sense of genuine freedom arises. 
Heidegger submits that the “caller maintains itself in conspicuous indefiniteness 
[auffallenden Unbestimmtheit]” and refuses to answer questions about its name, status, 
origin, or repute.”128 Against its everyday perception or ‘worldly orientation,’ he tells us 
that the “peculiar indefiniteness” of the caller of conscience is often interpreted as 
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“nobody or nothing.” However, existentially understood, “that which calls the call, simply 
holds itself aloof from anyway of becoming well-known, and this belongs to its phenomenal 
character.”129 Further: 
The peculiar indefiniteness of the caller and the impossibility of making more 
definite what this caller is, are not just nothing; they are distinctive for it in a 
positive way. They make known to us that the caller is solely absorbed in 
summoning us to something, that is heard only as such, and furthermore that it will 
not let itself be coaxed.130 
Reiterating what he has been saying in his account of conscience, Heidegger notes that 
when Dasein is appealed to by the call from the “they-world,” it is “its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being-itsself [that] functions as the caller.”131 Otherwise stated, the caller 
is the Dasein’s “authentic self:” 
[The] call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor 
prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls against 
our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly 
does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from 
me and yet from beyond me and over me [Der Ruf kommt aus mir und doch über 
mich].132 
Caught up in the underlying structure of its "everydayness," Dasein "is not itself;" for here, 
Dasein's "potentiality-for-Being- its-Self," its possibilities, come under the "dictatorship" of 
the ’they’ – a dictatorship of habits, customs, and conventions that can all too easily cause 
Dasein to forsake and forget its authentic temporality and thus its potentiality-for-Being.133 
But when Dasein understands itself authentically, it becomes the Heideggerian φρόνιμος, 
who understands what conscience discloses to it: “the fact ‘that it is, and that it has to be 
something with a potentiality-for-Being as the entity which it is.’”134 Therefore, the 
indefinite caller of conscience is authentic Dasein that seeks to find itself by calling out to 
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the Being-in-the-world who is always “listening away.” In its bid to find itself authentically, 
the caller is “anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” and summons 
Being-in-the-world to find itself “in the very depths of its uncanniness [im Grunde seiner 
Unheimlichkeit].”135 Opposing “everyday” Dasein’s desperate flight into publicness, 
Heidegger contends that conscience ceaselessly appeals in its “uncanny mode of keeping 
silent” and makes possible a return to authentic self-understanding.136 
Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday 
way it has been covered up. Out of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein itself, as 
conscience, calls. The ‘it calls me’ is a distinctive kind of discourse for Dasein. The 
call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and 
foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The 
call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time what 
we have hitherto merely contended: that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a 
threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself [selbstvergessene 
Verlorenheit].137 
It is on the basis of describing conscience as the ‘uncanny mode of keeping silent’ that 
Heidegger exposes conscience as that which “manifests itself as the call of care.”138 In his 
view, “the call of conscience—that is, conscience itself—has its ontological possibility in 
the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care.”139 Care confers upon Dasein its 
phronetic status and by so doing helps it to see itself as its own point of reference, by 
summoning it in “the depth of its uncanniness” to “the reticence of its existent potentiality 
of-being.”140 As a call of care, conscience reveals the individuality and the mineness of 
Dasein, and the reason for this, as Heidegger indicates, is because “at bottom, conscience 
is essentially always mine, not only in the sense that one’s most proper potentiality-of- 
being is always summoned, but because the call comes from the being that I myself always 
am.”141 The call of conscience discloses the individuality and the always-being-mine of 
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Dasein and attests to the authenticity of its being. Heidegger designates this eminent, 
authentic disclosedness attested in Dasein itself by its conscience, “resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit]” – “the reticent projecting oneself upon one’s most proper being-guilty 
which is ready for anxiety.”142 Anxiety discloses Dasein’s fundamental possibility of “being 
free for the freedom of choosing and taking hold of itself,”143 and this is its ownmost 
potentiality of being. That is so even if this coming into its own as an authentic individual 
needs to be also understood equiprimordially as its being-freed for authentic relations with 
others (in ways to be explored later). As the uncanny, the existential “not-being-at-home 
with one’s self,” anxiety reveals Dasein as always already ahead of itself, always “beyond 
itself,” thrown into a world of possibilities which it may or may not actualize for itself.144 
Here again, the ethical potency of the angst-filled call of care comes to the fore. The 
discourse of conscience as care articulates Dasein’s ability-to-be which gives Dasein the 
ontological space to “free itself for its world of authentic potentiality for being, a 
potentiality which reveals the being of beings as they are “in themselves,” including both 
inner-worldly beings and Dasein itself.”145 Conscience thus frees up Dasein from its 
everydayness to be self-responsible. This notion of self-responsibility is given quite 
extreme expression in the early (1925) History of the Concept of Time lectures, when 
Heidegger comments that Dasein “can choose itself, [and] what is chosen in this choice is 
nothing other than willing to have conscience.”146 In his 1930 lecture on the Essence of 
Human freedom Heidegger gives this a Kantian twist in the comment that “[p]ractical 
freedom as autonomy is self-responsibility, which is the essence of the personhood of the 
person, the authentic essence, the humanity of man.”147 
Importantly, as Craig Nichols has noted, the sense of freedom that Heidegger is proposing 
here is “an understanding of freedom with a content, a ‘toward which’ … [that] stands as 
an alternative to the common, ‘ordinary’ understanding of what may be called ‘negative’ 
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freedom, an uncritically conceived notion of freedom understood as a mere lack of 
restraint or simply a freedom from.”148 Further, by manifesting itself in freedom, 
conscience as care highlights the necessary responsiveness of the hearing Dasein. 
Notwithstanding the state of thrownness, to care for our Being – to be eigentlich – means 
having the agency to subdue the exigencies that define who we are. Like φρόνησις, it is a 
freedom that necessitates the exercise of hermeneutical judgement, drawing upon 
knowledge and the understanding of individual concrete situations that far transcend 
already established norms. Without such a sense, ethical normativity of any kind is ontically 
impossible. Kukla makes this point with such clarity, that I give her the final word: 
[I]f we were merely carried along by the everyday, then our relationship to it would 
not be normative at all. The norms of the They would function for us like laws of 
nature, compelling us immediately at the level of blind impulse, rather than binding 
us in virtue of our recognition of their force and our commitment to them. If the 
legitimacy of a norm is not something I can even call into question, or if the choice 
to transgress is not even a notional possibility for me, then I cannot follow the norm 
out of a commitment that is responsive to its normative force … Every normatively 
bound action inherently contains an individuating moment: actions that are 
responsive to norms must be actions that belong to someone in particular who is 
responsible for them.149 
2.3.5 : The Call as a Summons to Primordial Schuldigsein 
 
If the foregoing has worked its way through Heidegger’s three key questions dealing with 
the structure of the call – its sender, its content, and its addressee – and the relevance of 
all three to the question of the ground of ethics in Being and Time in particular, what has 
yet to be broached is the absolutely central and additional question of how Dasein can 
authentically come to understand the appeal of conscience. This points to the key 
distinction Heidegger makes between what he calls ‘ordinary’ guilt and primordial 
guilt/debt [Schuld], and the significance of this ontological sense for understanding the 
tacit ethical ground that emerges from the pages of Being and Time. In this connection, 
 
148 Craig M. Nichols, "Primordial Freedom: The Authentic Truth of Dasein in Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ " 
Thinking Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences 9 (Vienna 2000 ): 2. 
149 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," 4. 
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Heidegger asks two fundamental questions. “[What] is it that is essentially implied when 
the appeal is understood authentically? What is it that has been essentially given us to 
understand in the call at any particular time, even if factically it has not always been 
understood?”150 
In putting to one side ordinary psychological notions of having “a ‘good’ conscience” or 
feeling guilty,151 Heidegger insists that it is necessary to consider Schuld in an appropriately 
ontological sense: i.e., Dasein’s “idea of guilt [must be drawn] from the Interpretation of 
its own Being.”152 
The primordial being-guilty of Dasein [ursprüngliches Schuldigsein] as Heidegger defines it, 
is “being the ground of being defined by a not [ein Nicht] – that is, being-the-ground of a 
nullity [Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit].153 Central to Heidegger’s account is that Dasein is 
ontologically – and not merely contingently – guilty, or in debt. He is aware of the radicality 
of this position, and contrasts it with the everyday understanding of guilt that perceives it 
as a contingent lack: e.g., Dasein can be guilty by incurring a debt by owing something to 
the other “which is due to him.”154 Similarly, one can be guilty by “being to blame or being 
responsible for [schuld sein an]” a lack, for an absence of something that ought to belong 
to the other.155 For Heidegger, such understandings of guilt as “owing,” “having debts,” 
“being responsible for,” “making oneself punishable,” being “laden with moral guilt,” and 
so on, are pervaded by the same assumption concerning “something which ought to be 
and which can be is missing,” and of something “not-Being-present-at-hand.”156 
Accordingly, understood as a lack, the notion of “moral guilt” deforms the primordial sense 
of the word by shifting Dasein’s attention to a concern for worldly affairs. For him, Dasein’s 
existential Being-guilty is unconnected to any debt, obligation or “ought” that can be 
quantifiable or measured. The Being-guilty (or Being-indebted) of Dasein is not because 
Dasein ‘lacks’ something or must make restitution for something in order for it to be 
corrected. It is more a matter of understanding Dasein in its facticity as such. 
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For Heidegger, Schuld is an essential characteristic of Dasein because it “has been thrown 
[geworfenes]” into existence and “brought into its ‘there,’ but not of its own accord.” 
Dasein exists as a “thrown” entity that “can never get [its] basis into its power.”157 
Nonetheless, Dasein is essentially responsible for its thrownness. In other words, “as 
existing, Dasein must take over Being-a-basis … [and] be its own thrown basis.”158 
To this entity it has been delivered over, and as such it can exist solely as the entity 
which it is; and as this entity to which it has been delivered over, it is, in its existing, 
the basis of its potentiality-for-Being. Although it has not laid that basis itself, it 
reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden by Dasein’s 
mood.159 
Heidegger emphasises that the “not,” of Schuldigsein does not have “the character of a 
privation, of a lack as compared with an ideal which is set up but is not attained in 
Dasein.”160 Rather nullity defines Dasein in its very Being; or as Heidegger puts it: “entities 
whose Being is care … are guilty in the very basis of their Being.”161 In a sense, then, the 
guilt, or the nullity, is constitutional: it relates not to something we do, but to who we are 
as a being that has found itself in the midst of the world, not of its own making. The call to 
recognize our primordial Schuldigsein is a phronetic call that requires an understanding of 
“the hermeneutic Situation,” recognizing as thrown the possibilities from which we choose. 
Crucially, Heidegger is absolutely explicit that this notion of constitutional nullity relates 
directly to the condition of possibility for ethics in the usual ontic sense. 
[T]his Being-guilty is what provides, above all, the ontological condition for Dasein's 
ability to come to owe anything in factically existing. This essential Being-guilty is, 
equiprimordially, the existential condition for the possibility of the 'morally' good 







157  SZ: 284/329. 
158  SZ: 284/330. 
159  SZ: 284/330. 
160  SZ: 285/331. 
161  SZ: 286/332. 
106  
forms which this may take factically. [But the] … primordial ‘Being-guilty’ cannot be 
defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself.162 
 
As a ground of ethics, the nullity of conscience points toward the the fragility out of which 
every obligation or duty in ethics emerges. In other words, ethics needs to be ontologically 
attuned in order to take into account the type of being that is its ultimate subject. This is a 
being that (as Dreyfus has suggested) is called to understand its ontological emptiness – its 
nullity – and to engage in moral reflection within this context of awareness.163 The call of 
conscience summons us to freely face our death by accepting the nothingness of our 
finitude which requires engaging face to face with the truth of our existence. And herein 
lies the irony: that the ground of ethics – authentic Dasein, as the very condition of 
possibility for moral normativity – turns out to be an Ab-Grund, a null ground, a ground 
which factical Dasein – as the ethically reflective being that seeks norms to guide its actions 
– “can never get … into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis.” This 
is ironic, but also paradoxical: a fecund but abyssal ground that makes possible all 
normativity of action. “And how is Dasein this thrown basis?,” Heidegger asks. “Only in that 
it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown.”164 
Finally, Heidegger’s analysis of conscience points to the priority of responsibility, for 
Schuldigsein “also has the signification of ‘being responsible for' [schuld sein an] – that is, 
being the cause or author of something. The call predisposes authentic Dasein in 
accordance with its fundamental character as a being of care. Heidegger elaborates this 
point in his summer 1930 course on human freedom, in which freedom is placed at the 
core of what it means to be human, making us “being[s] capable of accountability … [since 
the] essence of person, the personality, consists in self-responsibility [Selbstverantwort- 
lichkeit].”165 This self-responsibility is integral to the choices Dasein makes as it projects 
itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown (a theme that points the way into 
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It is the primordial chasm of the ‘not’ that makes possible the freedom that provides the 
condition for the proper understanding of ethics. In this sense, the existential ‘not’ of 
Dasein’s nullity paradoxically turns out to be a transformative presence that grants the 
openness of freedom, and in this way, the condition of possibility of the authentic moral 
life. As Frank Schalow puts it, Dasein “first locates the origin of its freedom in the abyss” 
and then “observes the constraints of moral grounds.”166 
2.3.6 : Conscience and the Obscured Priority of the Other 
 
As already hinted above, the sketch of the ground of ethics that has been provided in this 
chapter invites a severe criticism that has been levelled often enough at Heidegger. I speak 
here not so much of his own moral failings in terms of his disastrous liaisons with National 
Socialism, but rather of the perceived hyper-individualism of his account in Being and Time. 
Indeed, if Heidegger’s account of conscience in §54-60 of this text were the only sections 
of relevance to this pervasive theme, one certainly could be excused for concluding that 
authentic Dasein is a deeply isolated being devoid of any primal bond with another. After 
all, the call of conscience as Heidegger develops it in these sections specifically involves a 
call coming from Dasein, to Dasein, about Dasein’s own Being. Further, insofar as inter- 
personal otherness appears at all, it is represented largely by das Man, and in this sense 
the ‘other’ stands for the frustration of conscience, and with it the very possibility of the 
ethical life. 
However, as I will elaborate below (especially in the fourth chapter on Mitsein) this is to 
deeply foreshorten the full scope of Heidegger’s account in Being and Time. Of course, one 
might well argue – and indeed, this is a very reasonable complaint – that Heidegger is 
himself partly responsible for this very misunderstanding, given the brevity of his 
engagement with dimensions of authentic otherness, both in this work and perhaps in 
most others. Yet, it would be wrong to suggest that clear and unmistakable glimpses of a 
fuller picture are not staked out in Heidegger’s texts, even if they are so often left without 
the level of development they invite, and without the integration with other elements that 
they so clearly require. 
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Two examples must suffice. The first case of such pointed lack of development is 
Heidegger’s passing allusion (and that is really all it is) to “the voice of the friend whom 
every Dasein carries with it.”167 The allusion occurs in his discussion of discourse, linked to 
his earlier discussion of Mitsein (on which, more later). Yet the potential to link this to his 
analysis of the call of conscience is left completely undeveloped. Are we to assume that 
the “voice of a friend” must always be understood only in the context of an internalised 
“idle talk” that works against the possibility of an authentic heeding of the call of 
conscience? Or is there the possibility that such a reference might rather be tied into 
Heidegger’s account in the sense of aiding the intensity and directionality of the call? 
Heidegger doesn’t say. 
Yet (and here is the second more substantial example) Heidegger does at one point in his 
account of conscience allude to the ontological ‘positivity’ of Being-with-others in the 
context of resoluteness: i.e., “a potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concernful 
solicitude [Fürsorge].”168 Heidegger is here very clear (albeit from a bare couple of 
paragraphs!) that Being-with-others can be a genuine source of momentum in Dasein’s 
being called back to authentic resoluteness; and even facilitating the calling back of others. 
After all, as Heidegger reminds his reader, 
Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one' s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, 
nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ’I’. And how should it, when 
resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being- 
in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being- 
alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.169 
For Heidegger, the ‘internal’ (so to speak) dialogue of the call of conscience makes possible 
an ethical encounter with the other. After all, in a work that so fundamentally challenged 
the ‘inner-‘outer’ distiction that separated the Cartesian cogito from the ‘external world,’ 
there is no basis for separating Dasein from the world of others. To be in-the-world is 
always to be in-the-world-with-others. And this Being-with-others immediately has ethical 
implications. This is a point that Heidegger so clearly, and yet so briefly, makes: 
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Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others 
who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this 
potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is 
resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others. Only by authentically Being- 
their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another – not by 
ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the ’they’ and in 
what ’they’ want to undertake.170 
There is so much to unpack here that Heidegger’s text omits to carry forward. A fuller 
account of the implications of these two passages must await, especially until the 
existentialle of Mitsein is considered in chapter four, below. Nonetheless, suffice to say for 
now that one wonders how Being and Time might have been changed had this notion of a 
“solicitude which leaps forth and liberates” the other been developed, or of what it means 
ontologically for Dasein to become “the ‘conscience’ of others” had received the 
substantial elaboration that it deserves. Nonetheless, the trajectory of these comments 
are clear, insofar as the very nature of conscience is transformed by such a vision, no longer 
being simply a matter of self-interest or self-involvement alone. When the call of 
conscience summons Dasein to authentically take up the issue of how it will be in the world, 
Dasein – it would seem – is at the same time called to assume the responsibility for caring 
for others and its world. Here, indeed, ethics – in its fully-inter-personal and full-blooded 
sense – is presupposed in its ontological grounding, for Dasein is at the same time 





This chapter has focused on the ethical implications of Heidegger’s account of conscience. 
On the basis of an exploration of Rebecca Kukla’s discussion of the notion of 
‘transcendental conscience’ (in the first section), I then traced how the phenomenon of 
conscience evolved from his early work (section 2), culminating in his developed 
presentation in Being and Time (section 3). Throughout the chapter, I examined how 
Heidegger distinguished the primordial phenomenon of conscience from the moral notion 
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of the concept, which he associated with the presupposed ’ought’ underlying traditional 
metaphysics, but also the way in which the traditional understanding is grounded in an 
ontological conception of conscience. The upshot of Heidegger’s account of conscience is 
clear. By heeding to the call, Dasein acts not as a servant who is constantly delivered over 
to the conventional moral wisdom of its day, but as an authentic self-responsible and 
resolute being that is aware of its own finitude, and in that anxious comportment is ready 
to heed the summons of care to act in line with its authentic potentiality-for-Being. It is in 
this way that conscience as φρόνησις reveals the “truthful safekeeping”171 of Dasein as a 
being of πρᾶξις and by so doing provides it with a proper ontological ground for ontic moral 
reflection. As Kukla rightly puts it: “in every response to a call as normatively binding, there 
exists the implicit figuration of conscience as an authoritative speaker.”172 
In the chapters that follow, Heidegger’s account of authenticity (chapter 3), and then 
Being-with (chapter 4), will similarly be presented in their profound significance for the 
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Having shown how the key notions Heidegger deploys in describing φρόνησις as conscience 
suggest conscience as a precondition for the possibility of ethics, the aim of this chapter is 
to examine how Dasein becomes authentic when “it understands itself as wanting to have 
a conscience.”1 Through an investigation of how Heidegger discloses the existential 
structure of the ‘experience’ of authenticity, I intend to show how the different key 
elements of the concept constellate to further contribute to an ontological basis for ethics. 
To this end, the chapter will examine the very idea of authenticity in the early Heidegger, 
analyse some of the key metaphors and vocabularies Heidegger employs to discuss it in his 
very early work, and then chart how this language and these themes are then developed 
more fully in key moments in his account of authenticity in Being and Time. 
The chapter proceeds in three phases. In the first section, I examine some of the scholarly 
debates surrounding Heidegger’s account of authenticity via Benjamin Crowe’s helpful 
suggestion concerning three interpretive trends: the “ontological”, the ”narrativist”, and 
the ”emancipatory” readings. On the basis of a focus on the last of these, I explore how 
(understood in terms of emancipation) Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit evokes Aristotelian 
φρονησις when Dasein “understands the call [of conscience] undisguisedly.”2 While each 
of Crowe’s three interpretive trends sheds light on the key features of Heidegger’s notion 
of authenticity, I think that the emancipatory account proves to be the most useful 
interpretation that fully illustrates the relevance of authenticity as a condition for the 
possibility of ethics. Thus, seen as an emancipatory resoluteness, authenticity serves as an 
existential condition for the possibility of ethics when it opens Dasein up to break free from 
the enclosing structures of the normative world into which it is thrown and to act in light 
of the fact that it has to own (eigentlich) its being by taking responsibility for the force of 
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To flesh out this emancipatory account of authenticity so as to achieve more clarity on how 
the concept maps onto my thesis concerning Heidegger’s ground of ethics, the second 
section of this chapter embarks on an investigation of some of the varying vocabularies 
and metaphors in Heidegger’s very early work that foreshadows his talk of authenticity in 
Being and Time itself. The section will specifically survey the published and unpublished 
post-war courses of Heidegger that span from 1919 to 1923. By analysing these early 
works, I explore the longer trajectory of his thought on authenticity (even as he makes use 
of different metaphors) that culminates in Being and Time. As will be shown, while 
Heidegger never explicitly uses the language of authenticity in these early texts, the 
thematic threads are both clear and important. 
In the third section, I focus on Heidegger’s explicit examination of authenticity in Being and 
Time. This discussion will first expose the dynamic interplay between the features of 
Dasein’s inauthentic and authentic ways of life and the profound ethical implications of 
this analysis. It will also seek to examine three key components of authentic experience 
(anxiety, Being-towards-death and resoluteness) which make possible the existentiell 
modification of the Being of inauthentic Dasein. By exploring these key features of 
authentic experience, I will show why Heidegger views conventional ethics as 
inauthentically oriented because of its failure to see the ‘ontological essence’ of Dasein as 
an ability to be (Seinkonnen), the “for the sake of” (Worumwillen) which constitutes the 
fundamental ground of all moral norms. 
The chapter will conclude with an examination of Dasein’s authentic historicality. My core 
claim here is that Heidegger roots Eigentlichkeit in Geschichtlichkeit (which at this stage in 
his thought, and on the basis of the texts themselves, is not to be construed in any German 
nationalistic sense). Thus, reading Heidegger against the existentialist critique, I suggest 
that understood as an emancipatory account, authenticity does not announce Dasein as a 
self-determining being with absolute freedom. Instead, as Heidegger himself puts it Being 
and Time, authentic experience is "a modified way in which … everydayness is seized 
upon.”4 So, by implication, as a condition for the possibility of ethics, Heidegger’s account 
of authenticity does not involve the creation of values ex nihilo. Instead, it provides for a 
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creative reappropriation of Dasein’s historical tradition which makes Dasein "the being of 
its [ground]," a [ground] that "is never anything but the [ground] for an entity whose Being 
has to take over Being-a-[ground]."5 In taking over its ground, Heidegger says that “Dasein 
lets its ownmost Self take action in itself [in sich handeln] in terms of that potentiality-for- 
Being which it has chosen.”6 
 
 
3.1 THE DEBATE CONCERNING AUTHENTICITY IN THE EARLY HEIDEGGER 
 
Despite being one of the central concepts of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, the 
meaning of the term Eigentlich[keit] is heavily contested in the scholarship. Of course, the 
meaning of this term as it is understood in Anglophone scholarship, will be heavily 
influenced by how it is rendered into English. In this essay, I have chosen to follow usual 
practice by translating Eigentlich[keit] as authentic[ity]. There are, of course, limitations in 
doing so. On one hand, the sense of genuine[ness] or proper[ness] that is evident in normal 
German usage of the term is preserved. But on the other hand, what is lost is the more 
literal meaning that points to Dasein as ‘own-most’ (eigent-lich), along with the possibilities 
for associations with other cases of this fecund semantic field in Heidegger’s work, 
(including, for example, his later vocabulary around Ereignis and its cognates).7 Clearly both 
associations are important, and in this way Heidegger’s usage of the language of 
Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time picks up on his earlier emphasis on the call to a life of 
genuineness or inwardness.8 
In his book on Heidegger's Religious Origins,9 Benjamin Crowe provides an insightful 
demarcation of three different interpretations of Heidegger’s account of authenticity that 
provides an excellent lens with which to progress the argument of this chapter. As I 
highlighted earlier, although each of these three readings sheds light on the fundamental 
components of the concept of authenticity, the emancipatory account brings together the 
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key features of the other accounts and at the same time supplements them with the 
element of Dasein’s retrieval to its concrete possibilities which receives little or no 
attention in the narrativist and ontological accounts alone. In what follows in this section, 
I explore one at a time, noting the way in which the third is especially important for the 
furthering of the argument of this thesis. Of course, in following Crowe’s threefold 
demarcation, I will omit other more critical readings that certainly have their advocates 
and their place within a broader account of the legacy of Heideggerian ‘authenticity’ than 
is offered in this chapter. These include accounts such as those by Karl Löwith and Richard 
Wolin that focus on authenticity in its moral and political contexts, including its potential 
for enlistment into authoritarian and nihilistic projects; and by Theodor Adorno who linked 
it to the ideology of capitalism.10 To these one might add accounts – such as that by Sonia 
Sikka11 – that read Heideggerian authenticity simply as a version of the Kantian ethics of 
autonomy. While such accounts undoubtedly contain important insights into the wider 
significance of Heidegger’s account, they lack the specifically exegetical approach to 
Heidegger’s texts that is required here. 
3.1.1 : The Ontological Account of Authenticity 
 
Crowe’s designation of the different interpretations of authenticity starts with the analysis 
of the ‘ontological’ account – a feature he considers outstanding because, according to 
him, “it integrates Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity into a more general account of his 
philosophical project as a whole.”12 Citing Michael Zimmerman and Thomas Sheehan as the 
proponents of this view, Crowe argues that in the ontological reading, Heidegger’s 







10 See Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, 30.; Karl Lowith, ed. European 
Nihilism: Reflections on the European War, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism (Columbia: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), 160.; Theodor Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973), passim. 
11 See, Sonia Sikka, "Kantian Ethics in Being and Time," Journal of Philosophical. Research 31 (2006): 319. 
Sikka argues that just as Kant divided the human being into a freely acting, moral self, and a mechanically 
acting, empirical self, in Being and Time, “Dasein also has two ‘selves,’ or possible ways of being, one of 
which involves an unsteady being driven about by daily concerns, and the other a self-possessed choosing 
to be responsible.” (SZ 319/366-367) 
12 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 166. 
115  
about human nature” that Zimmerman calls “temporal openness” and Sheehan 
understands as “excessive appropriation into recess.”13 
Zimmerman notes a certain unresolved doubleness at the heart of Heidegger’s account of 
authenticity. On one hand, the state of inauthenticity degrades Dasein to the status of a 
mere “continuing ego-subject” and by so doing conceals the fact that fundamentally, 
Dasein is defined by openness. However, on the other hand, an authentic individual 
“resolves to accept the openness which [it is] paradoxically.”14 To be authentic “involves 
an ontological transformation of the temporality of an individual life,” and “through its 
ontological openness, the authentic individual gains a more ‘appropriate’ understanding of 
him/herself.”15 
As Crowe points out, Thomas Sheehan’s reading complements Zimmerman’s. For Sheehan, 
to resolve or to be authentic simply means waking up to and ‘allowing’ one’s appropriation- 
unto-beingness (Ereignis).”16 Sheehan contends that in authenticity, one encounters one’s 
own true or proper being. Here, “one recuperates one's essence and thus attains 
‘authenticity’ by becoming one's proper (or ‘authentic’) self.”17 Further, Sheehan argues 
that this retrieval does not occur in the sense of “overcoming and controlling” ourselves, 
but in the sense of “accepting [ourselves] as ever recessive.”18 
Crowe’s discussion succeeds in showing the commonality between Sheehan’s and 
Zimmerman’s accounts. They share the view that in becoming authentic, the enclosure 
created by self-deception and dispersal in inauthentic everydayness is defrayed so that 
Dasein can bring itself to its own moment of vision. Accordingly, the ontological account of 
authenticity sees it as a specific way of life in which openness to Being is revealed as 
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“clearly brings the alienated nature of inauthentic life, and its overcoming in authenticity, 
to the forefront of the discussion.”19 
Beyond those approaches considered by Crowe, other examples of such a reading of 
Heideggerian authenticity abound. Christopher Macann, for example, has argued that 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in Being and Time could be assumed to be the climax 
of Nietzsche’s slogan “Become who you are!” which Nietzsche employs in his last work, 
Ecce homo. According to him, Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’ and Heidegger’s ‘Finitude of 
Dasein,’ could be “taken as the only remaining salvational recipe, the last bulwark against 
nihilism.”20 On a different but related tack, Meghan Craig draws a similarity between 
Heideggerian authenticity and Shakespeare’s Hamlet. According to Craig, the question “to 
be or not to be” evokes questions of what it really means to 'be',” and is picked up later in 
the play when in Polonius’ earnest advice to his son Laertes: “To thine own self be true.”21 
Yet Crowe’s critique of this ontological reading is equally perceptive. He is opposed to what 
he describes as the “abstractness and theoretical flavour”22 of this reading, This includes 
the apparent disconnect between “the cognition of what we are and some kind of 
transformation of how we are.”23 While leaving open the possibility that this disconnect is 
endemic to Heidegger’s own presentation, Crowe criticises Zimmerman’s and Sheehan’s 
failure to point out the problem of this disconnect as such: i.e., how the uncovering of 
Dasein’s basic structure of intelligibility translates into a practical dimension. Further, 
Crowe questions the possibility of this reading maintaining the difference between the 
existential and existentiell. The achievement of the Daseinanalytik is not the right theory 
about the human nature, but a resolve to live one’s life in one’s own way.”24 In Crowe’s 
reading, the theoretical orientation literally sucks the blood out of Dasein’s firsthand lived 
experience in the world. A credible interpretation of authenticity should avoid “reifying 
Heidegger’s categories as far as possible”, by which it becomes “some sort of theory of 
 
19 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 167. 
20 Christopher Macann, "Existentialism, Authenticity and the Self " in The Continnum Companion to 
Existentialism, ed., Jack Reynolds and Ashley Woodward Felicity Joseph (London: Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2011), 198. 
21 Meghan Craig, "To Be Or To Be: Understanding Authenticity from an Existential Perspective," Journal of 
Society for Existential Analysis 20, no. 2 (2009): 292. 
23 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 166. 
23 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 166. 
24 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 166. Crowe cites SZ: 300f/346f. 
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‘essence’ or ‘true self’ underpinning ordinary life. For when this happens, it runs the risk of 
“sliding into what Heidegger was wont to call the “language of metaphysics.”25 
3.1.2 : The Narrativist Account 
 
Crowe takes Charles Guignon’s account of authenticity as a classic example of what he calls 
the “narrativist” account. The major merit of this reading, according to Crowe, is that it 
sees the aim of authenticity as re-establishing a sense of “the gravity and responsibility of 
existence by unveiling a more profound understanding of what it means to be.”26 As against 
the popular existential interpretation which sees an authentic individual as a free agent 
who authors its own life independent of any external moral principle, the narrativist 
reading shifts the discourse on authenticity to incorporate the ineradicable “role of 
tradition and community in Heidegger’s more general account of … authenticity.”27 In this 
way, authenticity makes room for historicality, because as Guignon puts it, authentic 
historicality sheds light on the transpersonal element that “points towards a communal 
sense of responsibility for realising goals.”28 
In this way, for Guignon, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is ‘a fundamental historicality’ 
because its central role is “to combat the groundlessness of the contemporary world by 
uncovering enduring values and meanings within the framework of worldliness and human 
finitude.”29 But further, Guignon perceives authenticity to be best understood as a mode 
of Being in which Dasein lives moments as part of a coherent and cumulative narrative, and 
in which it clear-sightedly faces up to the inevitable truth of its own finitude. Guignon’s 
authentic Dasein possesses a kind of coherent and cumulative narrative, as he puts it 
himself, ‘‘a well-crafted story’’ with ‘‘a beginning, a development, and an ending that gives 





25 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 167. 
26 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 167. 
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coherent or integrated” insofar as Dasein is deprived of its ontological propensity to face 
up to the inevitable truth of its finitude.31 
 
While Crowe concedes that the narrative account of authenticity is right in questioning 
voluntarist existentialists interpretations of authenticity which negate the dynamic 
historical contexts of Dasein in its description of authenticity, he is eventually quite critical 
of this account, since the dynamic interplay between the notions of authenticity and 
inauthenticity is much “richer than Guignon’s account would indicate.”32 By placing 
‘‘coherence’’ or ‘‘integration’’ at the centre of his account, Guignon overlooks other 
aspects of authenticity, such as vocational commitment and the need for a special kind of 
disclosive experience.”33 Further, even with its synonymous concepts such as ‘integrity,’ 
‘cohesiveness’ and ‘focus,’ the characterisation of the “coherency” of authenticity is 
vague.34 Crowe goes further still in suggesting that authenticity, understood in this sense, 
brings Heidegger’s account much too close to a “Kantian view about the moral value of 
rational consistency.”35 
3.1.3 : The Emancipatory Account of Authenticity 
 
John Van Buren’s interpretation of authenticity in the early Heidegger is typical of what 
Crowe calls the “emancipatory reading.” This interpretation – which Crowe considers the 
most convincing – sees authentic self-responsibility as neither ‘subjectivism’ nor 
‘relativism,’ but Dasein’s ability to hold itself free for responsibility over its ontological 
heritage. An authentic individual, according to the emancipatory reading, is one “who has 
broken out of the dictatorship of [das Man] and its various ideological manifestations and 
so no longer remains complicit in these.”36 
Crowe is correct in effectively suggesting that this emancipatory account retains the 
strengths of the other two interpretations, but without their attendant problems. First, the 
emancipatory account gives credence to both historicism and to groundlessness, and in 
this way does better justice to the thrown context in which Dasein has its Being. Second, 
 
31 Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, 167. 
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it does better justice to the sense in which authenticity can only ever be “a modification” 
of Dasein’s average inauthentic way of relating to itself.37 Third, as opposed to the 
alternative readings, the emancipatory account brings out more clearly the liberating 
aspect of Fürsorge according to which authenticity pertains not only to Dasein’s care for 
itself, but also gives rise (as seen in the previous chapter) to “a free community of 
individuals,” where one “becomes the conscience of Others” by “letting them be free for 
their own possibilities.” 38 
What follows is a close textual interpretive investigation of authenticity in light of this 
emancipatory reading. In doing so, I will be working towards a broader aim of establishing 
how the key elements of this theme contribute toward the ontological ground of ethics 
that I have argued is integral to early Heideggerian thought. While focusing largely on 
Heidegger’s account in Being and Time (see section 3.3), the following section (3.2) will 




3.2 COGNATES OF AUTHENTICITY IN THE EARLY HEIDEGGER 
 
In what follows, several works of the young Heidegger will be examined in terms of the way 
in which they help prepare the ground for the category of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time. 
These are, namely: Heidegger’s 1919 correspondences with Fr. Engelbert Krebs, Karl Löwith 
and Elizabeth Blochman; his lecture course in the winter semester of the same year on The 
Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview, his 1919/21 essay, “Comments on Karl 
Jasper’s Psychology of Worldviews” (published in Wegmarken); his winter 1921–22 lecture 
course, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle; and finally his summer 1923 course, 
Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity. to the intention is to demonstrate the unifying 
thread that leads through Heidegger’s thought on authenticity which by far receives its 
most complete treatment in Being and Time. These works will be explored in terms of the 
way they develop a wide range of overlapping themes and vocabularies that can be 
profitably read as important stepping stones (even experiments) along the way 
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towards Heidegger’s more fully developed notion in Being and Time. Further, like 
Eigentlichkeit itself, these themes and terms can and should be understood in terms of the 
abyssal ethical ground to which they contribute in Heidegger’s early work as a whole. 
3.2.1 : Published Correspondence from 1919 
 
Perhaps the main initial development of the idea of authenticity in Heidegger’s work can 
be traced to his 1919 correspondences with Fr Engelbert Krebs, Karl Löwith and Elizabeth 
Blochman. These three different letters mark the first moment in Heidegger’s work where 
he refers to the necessity of returning to the basic moments of life in his criticism of 
western metaphysical tradition. The logic of his later notion of authenticity is present in 
these letters in his discussion of the way in which philosophy provides a pre-wordly or pre- 
theoretical frame, and his talk of “a life of inner truthfulness,” “a concrete [life of] factical 
origin” and “graced moments of life” – experiences where “we feel ourselves belonging 
immediately to the direction in which we live.39 
In 1919, Heidegger was teaching Catholic philosophy at Freiburg University, having 
established a strong reputation in the field. However, in his letter of that year to Fr. Krebs, 
his colleague, he indicates that he was exorcising himself completely from the tractions of 
Catholic dogmatic teachings both in his academic philosophy and personal life. The young 
Heidegger does not announce that he has lost his religious faith or even abandoned the 
Catholic Weltanschauung for what it was. Rather, he announces his complete departure 
from the system of Catholicism because the “epistemological insights that pass over into 
the theory of historical knowledge have made the system of Catholicism problematic and 
unacceptable to [him]."40 
Heidegger calls into question Catholic dogmatic teachings, accusing it of adopting a 
theoretical approach as a way of restricting the freedom of its members, a measure that 
has made it hard for him to live as a true philosopher. Philosophy qua philosophy, in 
Heidegger’s understanding, requires, “inner truthfulness towards oneself and those one is 
supposed to teach."41 Consequently, in seeking to deliver philosophy from the shackles of 
 
39 Joachim W. Storck, Martin Heidegger, Elisabeth Blochmann: Briefwechsel, 1918-1969 (Deutsche 
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the dogmatic teachings of the church, he announced his intention to direct his research 
energy towards a retrieval of what lies latent in Catholicism and traditional metaphysics, 
which for him is “a call to the eternal vocation of the inner man."42 
While Heidegger does not explicitly describe authenticity in this letter, an attentive look at 
his remarks suggests a substantive allusion to the basic contours of the concept as it is 
developed in Being and Time. Two elements are linked here: “inner truthfulness towards 
oneself” and “a call to the eternal vocation of the inner man.” Such a philosophical lifestyle 
is contrasted with the Catholic life-world with its dogmatic restrictions. The impression 
Heidegger gives here is that for one to be a true philosopher, one must be free to choose 
one’s own determinations in order to seize the possibility that belongs to oneself. This 
possibility, however, can only be attained through a strong stance in facing the true nature 
of one's own finitude where we recognise that we are who and what we make of ourselves 
in the course of living out our active lives rather than a self-determination obtained from 
fixed boundaries like the method of dogmatic Catholicism. 
In a letter in the same year to his student, Karl Löwith, Heidegger provides a clearer picture 
of his evolving notion of authenticity, this time framed via the ideal of staying true to one’s 
"genuine self.” Graduating from his second-year course with Heidegger, Löwith had asked 
Heidegger to explain the source of his philosophical questioning, and its connection to 
abstraction and logic. In his reply, Heidegger notes that “I work concretely and factically 
out of my ‘I am,’ out of my intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and 
whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live.”43 His 
philosophical curiosity, he explains, emanates from his constant grasping of his historical 
situation which makes him the starting point, initiator, and sustainer of action when it 
comes to pursuing his own possibilities. The anticipation of the developed category of 
Eigentlichkeit is also palpable here, a concept that (like Gewissen) was to be grounded upon 
his reading of the Aristotelian φρόνησις; as that which enables practical action. Thus, given 
that the key to Eigentlichkeit is taking action, Heidegger, as Steven Crowell claims, sees the 
legitimacy of his concrete factical experiences “not as something [he] represents to 
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[himself], but as something [he] is in a sense able to do.”44 As Crowell further points out, in 
Heidegger’s view, “possibility is an ability to-be (Seinkonnen) whose modal character 
derives from the fact that it "is" only [when something is] an issue for me … that I can 
succeed or fail at being in trying to be it.”45 
Heidegger’s contemporaneous correspondence with Elizabeth Blochmann points in similar 
directions, even as it adopts a different vocabulary. Here, Heidegger writes of the need to 
embrace “graced moments of life,” where “we feel ourselves belonging immediately to the 
direction in which we live.”46 Echoing his letters to Krebs and Löwith, Heidegger writes that 
we experience such ”graced moments” only when we are attuned to our “individual unique 
inner truthfulness,” by which there is an “inner adherence to the central I and its God- 
directed striving toward goals.” He notes that like the strenuous occasions of musical 
compositions, graced moments of life requires us to be able to: 
wait for the high-pitched intensities of meaningful life, and we must remain in 
continuity with such gifted moments, not so much to enjoy them as to work them 
into life, to take them with us in the onrush of life and to include them in the 
rhythms of all oncoming life. And in moments when we immediately feel ourselves 
and are attuned to the direction in which we vitally belong, we cannot merely 
establish and simply record what is clearly had, as if it stood over against us like an 
object. The understanding self-possession is authentic [eigentlich] only when it is 
lived, when it is at once a Being … [The graced moments of life occur when we] 
become aware of [our] directedness, which is not theoretical but a total 
experience.47 
Although Heidegger does not provide us with the practical examples of how such “graced 
moments” can be lived, he indicates that it is an alertness which disrupts our normal 
everydayness. Clearly anticipated here is his later account of authenticity as an existentiell 
modification of Dasein, for such graced moments interrupt its Being-in-the-world, unveiling 
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authentic possibilities that are not defined by theoretical principles, but by new factical 
awareness. 
Heidegger’s responses to Krebs, Löwith and Blochmann are evidently significant in two 
respects. First, his emphasis on living a life that reflects one’s “inner truthfulness,” working 
“concretely and factically out of [one’s]I am” and embracing one’s “graced moments of 
life” confirms the intrinsic link between authenticity and wanting-to-have-a conscience, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. By maintaining that choosing out of our concrete and 
factical “I am” is the only path to " inner truthfulness” or “genuine” understanding of who 
we are, Heidegger exemplifies how the experience of conscience is possible only through 
a form of authentic action. 
Second, these letters show Heidegger effectively insisting on the requirements for the 
possibility of ethics right from his early years in academic philosophy. However, by 
disparaging theoretical ethical frameworks and emphasising that he philosophises out of 
nothing but his own “concretely and factically ‘I am,’” Heidegger here enacts the need to 
relaunch ethical inquiry from another dimension; that is, by dislodging the centrality of 
universal moral principles as the heart of ethics. Every ethical inquiry must proceed on the 
basis of, we might say, a phronetic living out of one’s Being, which emanates from the 
immediacy of our lived world experience. In effect, as Dennis Schmidt has suggested, “to 
think of ethics,” for Heidegger, is to think out of the sources of our being.”48 In his “Letter 
on Humanism”, Heidegger himself puts it this way: “ethics [qua the thinking of] ἦθος … 
ponders the abode of the human being … [and as] thinking which thinks the truth of being 
as the primordial element of the human being … it is in itself originary ethics.”49 Thus, in 
suggesting a ground of ethics, Heidegger indicates that πρᾶξις and deliberation on πρᾶξις 
are to constitute a way of being in the world, and ethical theories are to be concerned more 




48 Schmidt claims that Heidegger’s critique of the traditional understanding of ethics draws from its 
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3.2.2 : Authenticity in the Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview 
 
Heidegger also tacitly raised the theme of authenticity in an evocative way in his 1919 
lecture course on The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview, a work Theodore 
Kisiel has referred to as his initial “hermeneutic breakthrough.”50 Here, something like his 
later notion of authenticity is presented as the key to reforming the academic philosophy 
of his university and the ideology of his German nation in general.51 
Amidst the social and political instability confronting the German nation and at the same 
time frustrated by the lack of attention academic philosophy pays to concrete individual 
life, Heidegger launched his first lecture course explaining why “returning to the [authentic] 
origins of the spirit”52 is the only conduit that can lead to the renewal of both German 
nation and the academic philosophy of his time. While advancing his case, Heidegger claims 
that for philosophy to address the vital living situation of individuals, it would have to avoid 
being contaminated by the western metaphysical tradition whose “concern is only the 
“practical provision of rules,” rather than advancing the course for the “primordially 
motivated personal Being whose practical experiences of real life is at the core of what it 
means to be authentically human.”53 
Heidegger utilises the opportunity of his first lecture course to radically reinterpret the 
phenomenological position of Edmund Husserl in light of his approach to the problem of 
philosophy. For the young Heidegger, Husserl’s phenomenology had given precedence to 
theory over lived experience; to the pure transcendental ego over what Heidegger 
describes as the “historical ego” and the “ego of the situation,”54 which he would later term 
“Dasein” in Being and Time.55 For Heidegger, the dominance of the theoretical in 
philosophy – a dominance that he sees enacted in Husserlian thought – amounts to a crisis 
in which philosophy stands at a “methodological crossroad which will decide on the very 
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life or death of philosophy.”56 Actually, in Heidegger’s view, it was this “primacy of the 
theoretical” – and not the threat of “naturalism as some have opined” that was the true 
crisis, for it had the effect of “deform[ing] the true problematic.”57 Husserl’s theoretical 
orientation of the pure ego, “hold[s] stubbornly to a one-sided goal,”58 deforming the richly 
textured Umwelt, the firsthand world of lived experience in which one primarily exists and 
carries out practical tasks. 
Heidegger suggests that as an unmediated, direct personal experience, life “does not 
consist just of things, objects which are then conceived of meaning this or that.”59 Instead, 
when I take life as an inherent, primordial mode of interpreting myself within my 
surrounding world, ethics then becomes first meaningful and primary. What this means, as 
Crowell suggests, is that, for the young Heidegger, it is only our “concrete practical 
identities” that can “provide the necessary ‘ends’”60 Ethics is about human life. Thus, rather 
than being defined in terms of reason or law as the criterion for concrete realities, to be 
ethical is to acquire an identity that transcends universal good. This transcendence “is a 
constant upsurge into the future, a recurring process of becoming, delivering us over to 
the responsibility of continual self-invention and creative metamorphosis.”61 Otherwise 
put, because Dasein is always an issue for itself, Heidegger suggests Dasein’s practical 
existence and life experience as a clue to the origin and purpose, or rather the ontological 
structure, of ethics. 
Towards the end of this lecture course, Heidegger elaborates on his claim concerning the 
primacy of factical life over theory by drawing a link between “authentic life experience” 
and “life intensification.” He contrasts these two ideals with what he calls ‘‘minimizing of 
life’’ or ‘‘superficial’’ experience of life, a remark that is certainly suggestive of the dynamic 
interplay between authenticity and inauthentic in Being and Time: 
[T]here are authentic life-experiences, which grow out of a genuine life-world 
(artist, religious person) … Depending upon the authentic motivational possibilities, 
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there arises the phenomenon of life intensification (in the opposite case, 
minimizing of life). This phenomenon is not determined by a feeling of experienced 
content. There are people who have experienced much in various worlds 
(artistically etc) and yet are? ‘inwardly empty.’ They have reached only a 
‘superficial’ experience of life.62 
Although the exact implication of this comparison is not entirely clear, the example of 
someone who has ‘‘experienced much in various world of arts’’ suggests the idea of a 
significant knowledge of the world of arts alongside a lack in having an experience of 
genuine artistic prowess. Here, surely, is an anticipation of the account in Being and Time, 
of inauthenticity as a mode where Dasein losses itself because it exists in ways in which the 
world is publicly and “superficial[ly]” interpreted. 
The implications for the possibility of ethics are clear here. By identifying “the primordial 
intention of authentic life”63 as the proper place of emergence for every philosophical 
inquiry, Heidegger indicates that the normative force of ethical theories should always be 
grounded in a primary level of experience that is intensely personal. As such, it is 
“improper, untrue and nonessential [uneigentlich]” for theories to make absolute claims 
on us, because theories are “experience[s] without world,” always encouraging me to 
“leave my lived experience behind.”64 Theoretical claims are binding on us only when we 
live our primordial life experience, and this is a seminal point in relation to the possibility 
of ethics. Jeff Malpas highlights this connection in arguing that it is consistent with 
Heidegger’s approach to insist that every actual authentic ethical “engagement [should] 
come from working through concrete [phronetic] problems and situations”, for we cannot 
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3.2.3 : Authenticity in the Jaspers Essay, and in Phenomenological Interpretations 
of Aristotle 
The focus on authenticity qua genuine living or resolution in his 1919 letters and lecture 
course continues into Heidegger’s works of the early 1920s, though increasingly these 
themes are articulated in a heightened way through the terminology of ‘existence.’ 
In his Comments on Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of Worldviews, Heidegger informs his readers 
that the concept of existence “is intended to refer and point to the phenomenon of the ‘I 
am,’ the sense of being which lies in the ‘I am’ as the starting point of a fundamental 
phenomenal context and the problematic belonging to it.”66 In his reading, the notion of 
existence as the ‘I am’ is not to be explained “in a theoretical manner,” which as he 
suggests, defines Karl Jaspers’ usage of the concept. Rather, Heidegger is explicit about his 
desire to trace it back to its Kierkegaardian origin for whom existence was closely related 
to “subjectivity”, “inwardness” and thus to “truth.”67 In so doing, Heidegger indicates that 
he wishes to “renew” the term, returning it “to the genuine origins of the spirit” and “the 
vitality of genuine research.”68 According to Heidegger: 
[E]xistence [takes the shape of] an “authentic dimension of life … holding open of 
the concrete and trouble-laden horizon of expectation which every context of 
actualisation as such develops … What turns out to be important here is accordingly 
the fact that I have myself that is, the basic experience in which I encounter myself 
as a self. Living in this kind of experience, and gearing myself to its very sense, I am 
able to question after the sense of my “I am.” This having-myself is ambiguous in 
many different respects, and this diversity found in its meaning must be understood 
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contexts of classification that have been elevated to the structure of regions within 
an autonomous system.69 
Heidegger’s remarks about existence here epitomises the ideal of authenticity that he has 
endeavoured to communicate in his correspondence and lecture courses immediately 
prior to this work. As a model of authenticity, he presents ‘existence’ as the phenomenon 
which represents our historically conditioned environment where, as temporal beings, our 
potentiality-for-Being makes issue of its own Being a matter for itself. Harking back to the 
Aristotelian concept of φρόνησις, Heidegger claims that the phenomenological fact of 
existence is that human beings are already out there in the world, engaging with the tools 
and objects of their experience. Accordingly, Heidegger uses ‘existence’ to highlight this 
immediacy of human experience which is itself the ‘site,’ (the ‘Da’) where the disclosure of 
Being takes place. Heidegger brings this point home later in Being and Time, when he 
emphasises that “Dasein finds itself proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids …” For 
him, “this elemental worldly kind of encountering which belongs to Dasein … goes so that 
even one’s own Dasein [is] something it can itself proximally ‘come’ across.” And Dasein 
demonstrates this “only when it [does not] look away from ‘experiences’ and the ‘centre 
of its action.”70 
Heidegger deepens his use of ‘existence’ in relation to authenticity in his winter 1921–22 
lecture course of Aristotle and phenomenology. Still frustrated by the fact that the 
academic philosophy of his time was not doing adequate justice to the concrete individual 
life within its respective historical contexts, Heidegger refers his students to the challenge 
he made earlier in his winter 1919 course regarding the choice of “either [to] live, work, 
and do research relative to unexamined needs and artificially induced disposition … or [to 
be] prepared to grasp concretely a radical idea and to gain [their] existence in it.”71 Here 
he presents them with the options of being “richly gratified by dainty literary morsels and 
glossy magazines, and … enervated by “religious” whining that [they] … rate … as evidence 
of superiority”, or to rather explore the possibility of “letting oneself be diverted from 
facticity … which, if defended, constitutes existence (which is precisely a radical existentiell 
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worry).”72 What is crucial, Heidegger insists, is to “see philosophically the genuine situation, 
without recourse to prophetism and the allure of a prophetic leader.”73 
Heidegger here frames authenticity as a disruption, a wrestling or twisting free of our 
everydayness, a description that is consistent with Dasein’s authentic modification of the 
theyself in Being and Time. Accordingly, ‘distress’ or ‘worry’ is intrinsic to human existence, 
a claim that perhaps anticipates his later (equally Kierkegaardian) focus on the authenticity 
of the atunement of anxiety. In this state, one embraces “the nexus of life.”74 Insofar as 
one continues to “work one's way toward [this] situation,” the person will not only be 
conceived as having actualised this ideal of ‘existence,’ but he/she would be understood as 
having fully integrated it into his/her life.75 
Interestingly, while developing his idea of Selbstwelt as the most fundamental becoming 
of reality, Heidegger explicitly points to Christian life as the experience that highlights and 
properly apprehends the phenomenon of one’s own factical world. He cites the personality 
of Christ, and “The kingdom of God among us” (Lk 17, 21) that Christ preached, as a historical 
example of the rebirth of factical life experience. In Heidegger’s reading, the Christian life 
experience of the Parousia does not only open the access to the originality of life, it also 
occurs through distress and anxious worry, a movement he contrasts with complacency 
which is the prevailing mode of the inauthentic lifestyle as he will discuss it in Being and 
Time.76 
According to Heidegger, this life of complacency or normalcy must be subjected to a 
“refutation and radical overcoming [Überwindung]” so as to renew philosophy as “the 
science of absolute honesty”77 dedicated to accessing the “genuineness of personal life as 
such.”78 To accomplish this “refutation and radical overcoming,” Heidegger intensifies the 
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explicitly ethical import of his account by insisting that there has to be freedom or the 
necessity of choice: 
This task of becoming free for this fact [tatsache] of the matter, existence, is 
accomplished in becoming free from handed down possibilities and traditional 
types of determining and classifying this being in general inquiry of philosophy. We 
have to make clear to ourselves that all previous research that is related to 
existence in any sense at all … reveals a basic neglect: a neglect to inquire first of all 
into the actual constitution [eigentliche Verfassung] of the very entity that is 
treated … It must be shown that all previous philosophy, on the basis of its origin, 
was not in a position to determine this entity more precisely as existing, though this 
entity was taken up as part of philosophy’s pre-possession [Vorhabe]…. Hence, the 
task of freeing up existence itself and acquiring explications of it is necessarily 
bound up with the task of shaking up present-day existence (that is ontologically 
obstructed) in its obstructiveness, of dismantling it in such a way that the basic 
categories of consciousness, person, are led back to their primordial sense.79 
While identifying freedom as a necessary component of ‘existence,’ Heidegger goes further 
to articulate other identifiable features in his reading of the concept that prefigures his 
later interpretation of the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction in Being and Time. One 
prime example is the anticipation of his later account of “falling” in his discussion of the 
“many ways” of failure evident in ordinary, everyday factical human living, symbolised by 
myriad forms of “excess” (the “hyperbolic”) and defect (the “elliptical”).80 As opposed to a 
“complacent” (one might say, ‘fallen’) mode of life, genuine existence involves a life of 
“movedness,” a mode of self-awareness, where one takes hold of oneself to make oneself 
accountable. Heidegger’s description of what might be called the way of Being of phronetic 
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The movedness is such that as a movement of itself, it procures itself for itself. It is 
the movedness of factical life which makes this very life; indeed, factical life, as it 
lives in the world, does not itself properly produce the movement. Instead, factical 
life lives the world as the ’in which' and ’toward which' and ’for which' of life.81 
Heidegger here recasts the language of authenticity in the connection he makes between 
factical life, which he refers to as “caring [Sorgen]” and the world within which we live, 
which he calls “fallenness”.82 The main attribute of factical life that Heidegger distinguishes 
is that it “is always in the broadest [sense], caring about one’s daily bread.”83 Fallenness, 
however, – “taken in a very broad, formal indicative sense as privation”84 –is a fundamental 
“poverty” that indicates “in one way or another that something is not always missing, but 
also indifferently accepted, rejected and taken and grasped in terms of some interest.”85 It 
is, as Heidegger says, “a priori an enigma”86 which is simply Dasein’s way of being, or rather 
the burden (molestia) of its factical thrown existence. 
Crucially, Heidegger associates such fallenness with the inclination towards understanding 
“knowledge of principles,”87 including those typically appealed to in disciplines such as 
ethics. Here is the very paradox that will be seen often in later Heideggerian thought (and 
which has already been discussed above), that the philosophical tradition of ethics fails 
precisely because it proceeds from a distorted ground. The true ground of ethics, such as 
it is, is to be sought not in theoretical formulations, but rather in the anarchic ‘innerness’ 
of factical life. Ethics should not be derived from the “inflexibility of traditional philosophy” 
that binds all philosophising.88 Rather, its task is to ultimately foster a kind of phronetic 
guidance where every individual Dasein is led back to embrace and surrender to its pre- 
theoretical life from which its tasks and determinations emerge. Heidegger puts it this way 
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Philosophical research is: neither a view and systematization of propositions of 
knowledge and general principles of being ... nor a teaching in the sense of a 
provision of practical clauses and norms ... but rather a researching-understanding 
guiding into the life figures themselves, not with directives and rules, not in a 
historicist way as a historical understanding of the mere objectified past, but rather 
a guiding that, at decisive points and in general, surrenders the living understanding 
to itself and to the genuineness of its originary understanding, from which genuine 
motives accrue for the (tasks) determinations assigned to it, to its generation, and 
to humanity.89 
Heidegger suggests here that the most “specific way” of resolving the philosophical error 
created by fallenness of life is to return to the fact that the proofs of “knowledge of 
principles [like ethics]” do not need “to be sought far and wide but can be found within 
each person in the way one lives one's life.”90 Accordingly, over against the complacency 
and distance from ourselves occasioned by our fallenness, one takes a stand that abides by 
one’s genuine life experience. While calling for life and experience to bypass the vacuous 
allurement of ethical principles and theories, Heidegger’s appeal is that life should be 
investigated as what James Reid calls “an evidence situation” paradigm, where experiences 
“are considered as expressions of a certain way of life embodying motives and tendencies 
open to phenomenological scrutiny in the light of a certain paradigm of genuine life.”91 
Again, as with the other lecture courses, the broad outline of an ontological account of 
‘authentic normativity’ is evident here. Recalling his account of φρόνησις, as that which 
unveils the essential possibilities of practical existence – Heidegger pictures factical life or 
existence as a ground of ethics in the sense of thrusting the individual into an anxiety- 
inducing movement that brings the “I am” to the fore in a radical and pure manner. This 
“I” of authentic experience is not lived as a universal exemplar but is marked rather by a 
radical sense of mineness (“Jemeinigkeit” as he terms it in Being and Time). This is the 
context of ἦθος, and it is only within this context that authentic normativity can take root. 
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To further accentuate the prefigurement of his account of authentic resoluteness in Being 
and Time, Heidegger goes as far in this earlier text as to make use of the language of anxiety 
and resoluteness. Accordingly, any “opportunity of seeing through one’s life” takes place 
because of one’s “anxious worry about not becoming lost”92 in one’s self-alienated 
absorption of everyday existence. For one to rediscover one’s Being and to be concerned 
about it, one must constantly engage in a struggle against the reality of everyday life and 
all the normative values that underpin it. As he notes: 
[Anxious] [w]orry [Bekiimmerung] does not mean a mood with a worried mien, but 
rather the factical Being-decided [Entschiedensein], the apprehension of Existenz … 
as the apprehension of that about which one is to be concerned. If one takes 'caring’ 
as a vox media (which in itself, as a category of meaning, has its origin in the 
claiming of facticity), then worry is the care of Existenz.93 
In ‘anxious worry,’ we twist free of our inherited normative patterns in order to define 
ourselves within a range of options or possibilities. This anxious worry is neither an escape 
from the world, or a hibernation into the life of narcissism or self-centeredness, but nor is 
it any kind of guarantee of easy answers about which of one’s possibilities should be 
pursued. Here we come to a crucial aspect of Heidegger’s thinking of authenticity in its 
relation to ethics, for what authentic anxious existence provides is not an alternative route 
to absolute ethical norms, but only ever the ground for the possibility of normative ethics. 
Heidegger puts it this way: 
Through worry about Existenz, nothing is changed in the factical position of life at 
any given time. What is changed is the How of the movement of life, which as such 
can never become a matter for the general public or for the ‘they’. The concern 
involved in the dealings is a concern which is worried about the self. For its own 
part, factical life's worrying about its Existenz is not a brooding about oneself in 
egocentric reflection; it is what it is only as the counter-movement against life's 
tendency towards falling, i.e. it takes place precisely in the concrete movement of 
dealings and of concern.94 
 
92 Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotele: 366/13. 
93 Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotele: 393/51 (notes 1). 
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Heidegger’s point is clear: the traditional metaphysical model of ethics has to be put in 
question for reducing ethics to theories or principles without due attention to the radical 
finitude of Being. Our factical situation which requires displacing the centrality of any 
framework of principles within which choice could assume its Aristotelian sense of 
phronetic deliberation about means to predefined ends. As Lawrence Hatab puts it, 
Heidegger’s sense of ‘anxious worry’ is a "pre-ethical" analysis which advocates for ethical 
propositions to be rediscovered at a place where Being reveals itself to human existence. 
Hatab writes that Heidegger’s thinking on the anxious worry of existence substitutes 
ethical truth with a “pre-reflective ethical world” that uncovers the possibilities of ethics 
beyond the scope of theories. When this happens, Hatab suggests: 
[E]thics [becomes no longer] a simple philosophical specialty, but a social project 
that keeps the existential claim of morality alive as an issue that people must 
continually engage … We must attend to this prereflective ethical world to better 
understand how values function in our experience, to open up the ethical life, its 
conditions, demands, and difficulties.95 
3.2.4 : Authenticity in Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity 
 
One final text – the pivotal 1923 lecture course, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity – 
will round out this survey of sources relating to the development of Heidegger’s account 
of authenticity and its implications for ethics. In this early lecture course, the idea of 
authenticity is understood in relation to ‘wakefulness’ and here also Heidegger deploys 
terminologies like ‘resolve,’ ‘decision,’ and the taking hold of one’s existence, all key 
terminological elements for his discussion of authenticity in Being and Time. 
At the beginning of this lecture course, Heidegger indicates to his readers that “[o]ur 
own[ness] [Eigenheit]” is by all means “a ‘how of being,’ an indication which points to a 
possible path of being-wakeful.”96 This sense of “ownness” refers to our nonrelational 
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irreducible individuality [Eigentümlichkeit], and according to him, we are ‘wakeful’ or 
‘being awake’ to the reality of the allegiance we owe ourselves through our individual self- 
creation. Heidegger describes ‘wakefulness’ as ‘‘a possibility of [Dasein’s] becoming and 
being for itself in the manner of an understanding of itself.’’97 This framing of ‘wakefulness’ 
as a hermeneutic project that gives us immediate access to human life, is suggestive of the 
idea of transparency which he uses to describe understanding in §31 of Being and Time. 
In discussing how this hermeneutic project of human facticity is carried out, Heidegger 
redeploys the same features he has been using to describe authenticity in his earlier 
writings. First, he calls attention to the fact that a temporal being like Dasein has a fore- 
structure in which is developed “a radical wakefulness for itself,” when it is 
“hermeneutically interrogated with respect to and on the basis of the character of its 
being.”98 Second, he contends that hermeneutic interpretation “belongs to the being 
factical life itself,” and that it is a distinctive feature of “how the character of being facticity 
is.”99 Third, he reintroduces his previous use of the language of existence to describe 
authenticity: 
[This] being of factical life is distinctive in that it is in the how of the being possible. 
The ownmost [Eigentlich] possibility of being itself which Dasein (facticity) is, and 
indeed without this possibility being ‘there’ for it, may be designated as 
existence.”100 
Further, Heidegger summarises his thematic inquiry of the development of the concept of 
authenticity with the observation that the emerging notion of wakefulness he has been 
considering is indeed the possibility of ‘‘authentic be-ing itself.’’101 Being a ‘hermeneutical 
engagement,’ authenticity “is not a ready-made possession but rather arises and develops 
out of a fundamental experience, and here this means a philosophical wakefulness, in 
which Dasein is encountering itself.”102 As opposed to being abandoned to become an 
“object of indifferent theoretical meaning,”103 authenticity aids Dasein to “live and work in 
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a primordial self-interpretation” which makes it to be “ontologically and factico-temporally 
prior to all accomplishments in the sciences.”104 
What remains to be seen, though, is how authentic Dasein can perform this self- 
relationality in order to embrace its ownmost possibility. This is a question that is 
addressed a few years later in Being and Time, in which the power of a more fully- 




3.3 AUTHENTICITY IN BEING AND TIME 
 
The preceding survey of selected early Heideggerian texts have indicated something of the 
thematic development of the concept of authenticity in these works leading up to its full 
development in Being and Time, and in the context of its tacit but powerful ethical 
implications. While the terminology around existence and authenticity had evolved 
somewhat by the time of Being and Time, the focus on the unending ‘questionableness’ of 
existence remained fundamentally the same. In Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes a 
deepening of his account of authenticity, now in service to his primary objective: “to exhibit 
an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being—an attestation which is in 
Dasein itself.”105 Accordingly, on the basis of his account of how the call of conscience is 
“ordinarily interpreted,” in Being and Time, Heidegger goes to illuminate the emancipatory 
role of authenticity by demonstrating how Dasein can summon itself out from the ’they’ 
and back to an authentic understanding of existential guilt. Heidegger’s task as Kasowski 
has noted, was to show “the attestation of this possibility … in order to connect his 
existential analysis with existentiell experience.”106 
There are various elements that come together in Heidegger’s account of authenticity in 
Being and Time that help provide, as he puts it, “the existential condition for the possibility 
of … morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically.”107 In 
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what follows in this section, these elements will be sketched as a way of bringing together 
the various threads of an emancipatory framing of Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit, noting the 
way in which they do indeed contribute to an overall account of the conditions for the 
possibility of ethics. In the discussion to follow, a key context for reading Heidegger’s 
accounts of authenticity, of the falling of Dasein and the ‘they-self’, as well as his accounts 
of anxiety, Being-toward-death and resoluteness, will be the many parallels and analogies 
with Kierkegaardian thought. Kierkegaard, I will suggest, provides a telling hermeneutic 
lens for reading these themes in Being and Time, and for this reason, engagements with 
some relevant aspects of his writings will prove fruitful for the organising strategy in the 
argument to come. On this basis, I provide (in 3.3.1) an initial understanding of what is at 
stake in Heidegger’s concept of Eigentlichkeit, noting the helpful parallels in Kierkegaard, 
and the implications for understanding the ethical resonances arising. This leads to an 
examination of Heidegger’s account of inauthentic modes of being (3.3.2), of falling and 
the they-self, noting (again via Kierkegaardian thought) the implications for understanding 
the meaning and possibility of authenticity. There then follows a working through of the 
outcomes of this discussion for Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety (3.3.3), Being-towards- 
death (3.3.4) and resoluteness (3.3.5), all of which are again illuminated through allusion 
to Kierkegaardian antecedents. Finally, I examine (in 3.3.6) the account of Dasein’s 
authentic historicality – including fate, heritage, destiny and repetition – as it is set out in 
the later part of Being and Time, and which, I argue, is essential to establish a holistic 
understanding of Heidegger’s account of authenticity in its ethical dimension. 
3.3.1 Reading Heidegger’s Eigentlichkeit in Kierkegaardian Context 
 
The structural similarities between Heidegger’s account of authenticity/inauthenticity in 
Being and Time and the thought of the great nineteenth century Danish figure Søren 
Kierkegaard, have been widely noted by scholars for some time.108 However, beyond the 
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legacy of Kierkegaardian ideas on the early Heidegger’s thinking more generally, the focus 
here is on the particular cluster of themes around Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit that will be 
explored within the larger context of analogous features in Kierkegaardian thought. 
Leaving to one side the knotty issue (that lies beyond the scope of this paper) concerning 
the extent to which Heidegger’s account historically or biographically drew on a direct or 
indirect reading of Kierkegaard,109 in what follows, I argue that the relationship between 
their accounts sheds significant light on a key sense in which Heideggerian ‘authenticity’ is 
heavily implicated in the nascent ethical trajectory of his thought. 
At the heart of Being and Time is Heidegger’s famous distinction between two modes of 
Dasein’s existence: authenticity and inauthenticity [uneigentlichkeit]. Beyond simplistic 
existentialist accounts of psychological life choices exercised by a ‘metaphysical’ subject, 
Heidegger’s account of the nature of this distinction is decidedly ontological in nature. 
Dasein is authentic when it appropriates and makes its own those possibilities through 
which it constitutes itself as the entity thrown into its particular “there.”110 When Dasein 
fails in its understanding and pursuit of its authentic possibilities – when it “flees in the face 
of” its Being111 –, then it is inauthentic. But what does this distinction mean, and how is it 
to be understood as relevant to any purported ground for the possibility of ethics in 
Heidegger? 
While their terminology differs, and while Heidegger is exceptionally keen to avoid any 
sense of the interiority of the traditional metaphysical subject that he sees continued in 
Kierkegaardian thought,112 Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit nonetheless shares with 
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Kierkegaard’s account of spirit and the self a clear focus on the theme of ‘self- 
ownership’.113 For Heidegger, Dasein’s authenticity is to be understood in the context of its 
‘own-ness’ (‘Eigen-keit’, so to speak) and mine-ness (Jemeinigkeit). The question of 
authenticity/inauthenticity is thus essentially to do with ontological (as distinct from 
psychological) ‘self-ownership’. Even as he insists on an understanding of Dasein as always 
already Being-in-the-world, and not as withdrawn into itself apart from the world, 
Heidegger is absolutely clear on this point: “[m]ineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and 
belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible.” He 
also argues that “in each case, Dasein exists in one or two [of these modes], or else it is 
modally undifferentiated.”114 As Dreyfus has noted, central to Heidegger’s explanation 
here is the fact that “the possibility of existing in any of these three modes is what” it means 
to acquire mineness. In other words, “what makes my [possibility] my [possibility] is that I 
exhibit a particular stand on what it means to be. [And] [t]hat is what is most essential 
about me.”115 Heidegger brings this point home elsewhere when he explains that: 
[B]ecause Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility [eigene Möglichkeit], 
it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never 
win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something 
which can be authentic – that is, something of its own [eigen] – can it have lost itself 
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and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these 
expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded 
in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.116 
This focus on the integrity of the individual in becoming its own self is also at the 
core of Kierkegaardian thought, even if it takes different form in the signed and 
pseudonymous works, and from one pseudonymous author to another. Beyond his 
famous accounts of the stages of existence that culminate in the self-transparency 
of the religious stage, one might point to Anticlimacus’ famous lines about the self 
being “a relation which relates itself to its own self”117 as the place where the deep 
connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger becomes apparent. For instance, 
while describing the ‘self’ (Selv) as “a relation which relates to itself” in The Sickness 
Unto Death, Anticlimacus remarks that as “a relation of two factors, a human being 
is not yet a self.”118 For him, every human being is a “synthesis” that is constituted 
not only by the mingling of psyche and body, but by this relation’s relating back 
upon itself. This conscious reflexivity is referred to as the dawning of ‘spirit.’119 Thus, 
the human being only becomes a self when existence authorises it to relate to itself 
in a movement of reflection and self-awareness.120 
This Kierkegaardian notion that for one to be fully understood as an existing individual, one 
has to reflect upon one’s own existence, involves an undeveloped but explicit ontology of 
human being. As Richard Colledge has noted, in his three stages framework of 
 
 
116 SZ: 43-44/68. 
117 Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and 
Awakening by Anti-Climacus, ed. Søren Kierkegaard, trans. Alastair Hannay (2004), 43. 
118 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and Awakening 
by Anti-Climacus, 43. 
119 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and Awakening 
by Anti-Climacus, 43. As Colledge puts it, the spirit, for the “Kierkegaardian pseudonymous authors,” 
appears to function as an innate human “faculty” that operates by unsettling the individual through 
awakening it to its eternal telos.” According to him, “[i]n itself, [the spirit] is neither a source of good nor 
evil; in being the foundation of consciousness, it is rather the condition of possibility for both.” 
Kierkegaardian Spirit “is the gnawing voice within that breathes fire and intensity into human existence, 
driving it along the difficult road toward fulfillment of its potentiality. Thus, spirit is of the essence of 
human being.” See Colledge, "Heidegger's Subjective Ontology: A Metaphysics of the Existing Individual," 
10.120 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and 
Awakening by Anti-Climacus, 85. 
120 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and Awakening 
by Anti-Climacus, 85. 
141  
understanding the individual, Kierkegaard presents us with a “subjective ontology of the 
self,” one that is “oriented purely toward illuminating the individual’s task of existence” 
and “has validity only when it is “read of from … concrete lived experience[s].”121 
Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger similarly insists that the self, if it is to be authentically itself, 
must relate to itself as its ownmost possibility. In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that 
“Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: 
to be itself or not itself … by taking hold or by neglecting.”122 The implications of this framing 
of authenticity, and with it the possibility for a grounding for ethics, flow into many other 
areas of early Heideggerian thought, including his famous reframing of the traditional 
conception of truth.123 
The significance for this vision of authenticity as self-ownership is profound in the context 
of Heidegger’s deeply Kierkegaardian conception of what might be called an authentic 
grounding for ethics. To the extent that, for Kierkegaard, traditional ethics is understood 
in the sense of commitment to an established set of customary moral norms and duties 
(typified by Hegelian Sittlichkeit, for example), and understood as universally binding, such 
a conception of the ethical is deeply inadequate. Famously, what is therefore required (in 
the words of pseudonym Johannes de Silencio), is a “teleological suspension of the ethical” 
in order that a higher-order sense of the ethical is able to emerge; one that is organically 
connected with (authentic) subjectivity in its relation to the eternal.124 In a not dissimilar 
sense – prescinding, of course, from Kierkegaardian notions of a theological teleology for 
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124 In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard argues that Abraham is the knight of faith because he suspended the 
ethical in order to obey God’s command to kill his son, Isaac. Abraham truly represents the knight of faith 
for understanding God’s command and choosing to act accordingly rather than listening to the moral 
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Press, 1983), pp. 18-20, 35. 
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ethics, as well as his language of subjective interiority – Heidegger also rejects the 
adequacy of any notion of ethics as rooted in customary norms. Any authentic ground for 
ethics must – by definition – be rooted in mine-ness (Jemeinigkeit), characterised by an 
understanding of its ownmost possibilities, regardless of the earnest free advice of the 
‘they.’ 
3.3.2 : Inauthentic Dasein 
 
If Heidegger’s notion of authenticity shares Kierkegaard’s focus on self-ownership, so too 
there is a tight analogy between their understanding of inauthenticity, or as Kierkegaard 
puts it, the failure to become a self. Accordingly, for them both, there is something of an 
inverse proportionality between authenticity (Heidegger) /spirit (Kierkegaard) and what 
might be called, ease of living. Otherwise put, both see a deep connection between 
authenticity/spirit and anxiety. It is for this reason that Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, 
devotes special attention to the way that Dasein/ the individual is so often characterised 
by a failure of self-ownership; by a becoming owned by the ‘they’ (Heidegger) /the crowd 
(Kierkegaard) and in this way loses itself. 
In his description of Dasein’s inauthentic everyday mode, Heidegger emphasises that 
Dasein is characterised by its “absor[ption] in the world of its concerns.”125 This 
forgetfulness of itself, as Dasein lives in the thrall of “the ‘they’, echoes heavily the 
Kierkegaardian critique of the “public” (Heidegger’s das Man), “chatter” (Heidegger’s “idle 
talk”), “anonymity” (Heidegger’s “ambiguity”), “inquisitiveness” (Heidegger’s “curiosity”), 
and “levelling” (Heidegger’s “fallenness”) in his description of the ethical stage of life.126 It 
is precisely the need for liberation or emancipation from this thrall that Crowe convincingly 
identified as perhaps the chief marker of Heidegger’s account of authenticity.127 
Heidegger’s das Man (like Kierkegaard’s “crowd”) functions as a general, undifferentiated 
or rather detached agency through which Dasein decides, desires and understands itself, 
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fails to live up to its potential for self-ownership (eigentliches Selbestein, Eigentlichkeit).128 
For the most part, he maintains, the ‘they’ pervades Dasein’s understanding of its 
possibilities: 
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic 
Self – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens 
ergriffenen]. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the ‘they’, 
and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the 'subject' of that kind of 
Being which we know as concernful absorption in the world we encounter as closest 
to us. If Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time that 
the ‘they’ itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the- 
world which lies closest. Dasein is for the sake of the ‘they’ in an everyday manner, 
and the ‘they’ itself Articulates the referential context of significance.129 
Insofar as Dasein is, so to speak, ‘lived by’ the ‘they’, Dasein is not authentically itself (fails 
in its task of self-ownership), but now is the they-self, an ontologically impoverished 
version of itself. The possibilities by which Dasein qua they-self understands itself are no 
longer its “ownmost” but are instead possibilities that are familiar and accessible to 
everyone. As Derek O’Connell points out: 
[It is not that the ‘they’] knows each Dasein’s particular possibilities and calibrates 
its claims accordingly, but … [that] it completely ignores those particularities, 
instead prescribing the same universally applicable possibilities to everyone.130 
As such, Dasein submits to the manipulations of the ‘they,’ seamlessly folding into its 
understanding of its own possibilities and taking onboard as its own, the prescribed 
opinions and normative ‘truisms’ of the day. Inauthentic Dasein relinquishes its own 
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We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and 
judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise, we shrink back from 
the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking.131 
Such a condition of Being, in which the received imperatives of the ‘they’ hold sway over 
Dasein’s ownmost possibilities and understandings, is what Heidegger terms “falling” 
(Verfallen). However, crucially, in Heidegger’s reading, the fallenness of Dasein does not 
imply that Dasein falls into the world from some “purer and higher primal status.”132 In this, 
of course, his account of fallenness is to be sharply distinguished from theological ethical 
accounts, such as Augustine’s, that see falling as the result of temptation leading to sin, and 
as such to be understood in reference to the state of grace or some higher worthier state of 
being. While Heidegger does at one point refer to Dasein’s “constant temptation towards 
falling,”133 he does not portray falling as an erroneous option; much less a failing of the will. 
On the contrary, falling is an essential aspect of Dasein’s existence insofar as Dasein is 
Being-in-the-world into which it has been thrown, and indeed (as will be explored later), 
Dasein-with others. As such, temptation is part and parcel with the basic character of 
factical life; and falling, far from being the debasement or corruption of human nature, is 
an ordinary feature of Dasein in its inauthentic everydayness. This sense of 
constitutionality, if not inevitability, is one of the more crucial aspects of Heidegger’s 
account of inauthenticity, and it will be one to which I will return shortly. 
Just as the question of inauthenticity has little to do with the corruption of will or moral 
standing as such, nor is it connected – despite being a matter of great ontological 
significance for Heidegger’s account – to any sense of the ‘loss’ of Being. Inauthenticity is 
never for Heidegger (nor for Kierkegaard, I would suggest) a question of the gain or loss of 
its own Being as such. Heidegger is very clear on this point: 
[T]he inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree 
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characterised by inauthenticity - when busy, when excited, when interested, when 
ready for enjoyment.”134 
 
In Chapter 5B of Being and Time, Heidegger provides quite an extended phenomenological 
analysis of “the everyday Being of the ‘there’, and the falling of Dasein,”135 in his discussions 
of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Insofar as an “idle talk,” is a discourse, it “serves not 
so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather 
to close it off, and cover up the entities within-the-world."136 In an account that strikingly 
recalls Kierkegaard’s figure of the aesthete,137 Heidegger’s discussion of “curiosity” focuses 
on the untetheredness of Dasein’s attention (the dilution of care) by which it “concerns 
itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being 
towards it) but just in order to … [seek] novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another 
novelty.”138 The result is that falling becomes not only part of Dasein’s everydayness, but 
essentially invisible. In this state of endemic “ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit],” “it soon 
becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is 
not”. Further, this obscurity reaches all the way down, extending from Dasein’s encounters 
with objects in the world, to its “Being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein's 
Being towards itself.”139 
While for both Heidegger and Kierkegaard inauthenticity (or the failure to become a self) 
does not amount to a loss or diminishment of Being as such – Dasein/ the individual 
remains ‘in being’ so to speak – such a way of being does amount to a failure of ‘existence,’ 
in the technical sense of that term. For both Heidegger and Kierkegaard, existence requires 
‘self-ownership’ (in the broad sense indicated above). For Kierkegaard, existence was the 
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domain of innerness, subjectivity and spirit, and to live a life that is marked by the dictates 
of public opinion was to renege on the task of existence.140 For Heidegger, falling is 
“existentially determinative for Being-in-the-world”, for far from understanding its 
ownmost possibilities and projecting itself into them, in its falling Dasein “remains in the 
throw” of its thrownness, “and is sucked into the turbulence of the ‘they's’ 
inauthenticity.”141 The key point here is that authenticity – for Heidegger as for Kierkegaard 
– is not a metaphysical ‘state’ of being that determines the status of that being. Rather, 
authentic existence is a task. As Merold Westphal says of Kierkegaardian thought, the 
notion of the self is a “task word and not … [an] achievement word.” 142 One might say the 
same of authentic Dasein. As such, existence is the goal rather than the foundation; it is a 
task defined by responsibility – an ethical task in the deepest sense – and not anything like 
a fixed ontological state. 
However (to return to a point to which I alluded briefly above), it is the very routineness of 
inauthenticity that is perhaps the most striking aspect of Heidegger’s account. Accordingly, 
perhaps matching the extremity of Kierkegaard’s descriptions of the individual in its 
religious stage of existence,143 Dasein’s inauthentic mode of Being that is presented not as 
the exception to the rule, but as the usual state of affairs by which Dasein exists. It is not 
that inauthenticity is a tendency or state into which some people fall quite often, and other 
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people less so. Rather: “[a]uthentic Being-one's-Self takes the definite form of an 
existentiell modification of the ‘they.’”144 In other words, it is the they-self which is normal, 
and authenticity is a derivation of the default inauthentic they-self: “proximally and for the 
most part Dasein is not itself but is lost in the theyself, which is an existentiell modification 
of the authentic Self.145 As an ‘existentiell modification’ only, no clean “detach[ment] from 
the ‘they’” is possible.146 It is for this reason that Heidegger goes as far as to name the ‘they’ 
as “an essential existentiale” within the existential analytic.147 
All of this sheds a powerful light on the sense in which Heidegger’s account of authenticity 
contributes to his largely undeveloped but compelling account of the conditions of 
possibility for ethics. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the key element here is responsibility for the 
Self. To paraphase Cem Zeytinoglu, Dasein’s ethical context is its “standing out there (in 
ek-static existence) in the opening where it is thrown.”148 To ek-sist is to assume 
responsibility for one’s Being. Self-responsibility is at the heart of what it means for Dasein 
to be in-the-world. But if it is clear, as Heidegger maintains, that Dasein is summoned to 
assume its responsibility even as the “’who’ of everyday Dasein is the ‘nobody’ to whom 
every Dasein has already surrendered,”149 then Heidegger raises very specific questions 
about the theoretical possibility of ethics, or indeed of properly moral behaviour in 
practice. In what sense, then, can his account of authenticity ever contribute to any kind 
of ethical grounding? 
First of all, it is important not to mistake Heidegger’s frequent use of apparently 
disapproving language and negative connotation to describe the practices associated with 
fallenness, for a developed position that offers a morally evaluative account of 
inauthenticity as such. It is clearly the case that such language is used by Heidegger in this 
chapter of Being and Time. Falling is referred to as a “downward plunge” that involves 
“temptation, tranquillizing, alienation and self-entangling.”150 “Idle talk” (Gerede) is 
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described in terms of “gossip” (Nachreden) and “passing the word along”; it is compared 
to “scribbling” rather than writing; it is described as a “perverting [of] the act of disclosing;” 
as something that “suppresses” and “discourages any new inquiry”; as a practice that 
“uproots” understanding, and (perhaps with a hint of sarcasm) “releases one from the task 
of genuinely understanding.”151 
Heidegger’s account is clearly walking a fine line here. On one hand, it is clearly the case 
that he is contrasting such practices with those he would associate with understanding and 
interpretation (that he discusses in Part A of Chapter 5). Understanding, after all, is 
described as “the existential Being of Dasein' s own potentiality-for-Being … [such that] this 
Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of,”152 and practices associated with 
understanding (and interpretation and assertion) can likewise be shown to be positively 
inflected in Heidegger’s account. Understanding is clearly ‘on the side’ of Being, and there 
is thus a certain tragedy involved in Heidegger’s description of how it is “constantly torn 
away from authenticity and into the ‘they’ (though always with a sham of authenticity).”153 
However, on the other hand, it is crucial here – as everywhere else in Being and Time – to 
understand the terms of Heidegger’s account that looks to clearly distinguish (in ways 
abandoned by later Heideggerian thought) between existential structures and existentiell 
attestations. Seen in this light, one might assume that Heidegger would have no hesitation 
in affirming that it is ‘better’ to engage in the difficult work of looking to genuinely 
understand than it is to throw out half-baked opinions on the basis of common prejudice. 
However, such a distinction is at the level of practice rather than existential structure. Of 
the latter, it is important to note that while understanding is a fundamental existentiale 
within the existential analytic, so too (as noted earlier), is the ‘they’. Both authenticity and 
inauthenticity are hard wired, so to speak, into the ontological structure that is Dasein. 
Heidegger is quite explicit about this: 
[E]ven in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. And 
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itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode 
of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof.154 
It is on this basis that Heidegger can quite intelligibly indicate – in anticipation of the very 
critique of his account intimated above – that his analysis of falling should not be 
understood as a “moralizing critique of everyday Dasein” but rather an “interpretation 
[that] has a purely ontological” intention.155 As to the question concerning the very 
possibility of authenticity – and with it, “the existential condition for the possibility of the 
'morally' good and for that of the 'morally' evil … that is, for morality in general and for the 
possible forms which this may take factically”156 – here the discussion must turn to 
Heidegger’s account of anxiety and of anticipatory resoluteness. For it is here that the 
conditions of possibility of moral action are fleshed out in their existential dimensions. 
3.3.3 : Anxiety and Authentic Dasein 
 
Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety stands as one of Being and Time’s most influential accounts, 
and certainly one that is laden with important implications for how this text provides 
something like a ground for ethics. For it is in the atunement of anxiety that Dasein is 
“individualize[d],” and it is in this anxious individualisation that Dasein is brought “back 
from its falling,” to something like ‘self-ownership’, as “authenticity and inauthenticity are 
[made manifest as] possibilities of its Being.”157 Here again also, the figure of Kierkegaard 
lurks suggestively in the background, as underlined by Heidegger’s brief but clear 
acknowledgement of the Dane as “[t]he man who has [hitherto] gone farthest in analysing 
the phenomenon of anxiety.”158 
Heidegger introduces anxiety as a fundamental atunement by which Dasein breaks from 
ineluctable tendency of blending into the anonymous ‘they’, through which it can come 
authentically into “disclosedness” and achieve a “transparent” or a “modified” 
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structural unity of Dasein as care; “simplif[ing]” the being of Dasein in a manner that makes 
manifest the “primordial totality” of “its structural whole.” 159 
Yet, in keeping with his account of authenticity as but an “existentiell modification” of the 
they-self, Heidegger is quite frank about the rarity of genuine anxiety. As a rule – and here 
Heidegger is at one with Kierkegaard – Dasein avoids the crucible of anxiety. The 
“phenomenon [of anxiety],” Heidegger comments, is rare in that “Dasein … for the most 
part remains concealed from itself in its authenticity because of the way in which things 
have been publicly interpreted by the ‘they.’” Nonetheless, he insists, “the factical rarity of 
anxiety as a phenomenon cannot deprive it of its fitness to take over a methodological 
function in principle for the existential analytic.” 160 Even if Dasein is generally inauthentic, 
the very possibility of anxious authenticity points tellingly toward the underlying truth of 
its Being. In the mode of inauthenticity, the world is disclosed in the mode of θεωρία, 
according to which beings are projected in their Vorhandenheit, and Dasein is concealed in 
the obviousness of habit and familiarity. However, in attuning Dasein to authenticity, 
anxiety opens Dasein up to the uncanniness of its alienation and lostness in the ‘they’; it 
stirs Dasein up to undergo a rupture that would interrupt its everydayness and disclose 
both world and its own self to it. 
As a process of disclosure, anxiety reveals Dasein once again as φρόνιμος. As William 
Macomber long ago pointed out, in the anxiousness instigated by disclosure, the anxious 
Dasein sees itself as a being, whose “process of … awareness arises out of its [own] 
activity.”161 But anxiety has a paralysing significance as well, since the object of anxiety is 
neither a particular definite possibility, nor an entity in the world, but instead their 
interruption: 
That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only does this 
indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-the-world is 
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at all. Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions 
as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.162 
The experience of anxiety is thus in another sense the obliteration of the world, or at least 
the world in its everyday inauthenticity. As such, nothing is projected to disrupt or replace 
the non-relational character of our authentic self.163 Anxiety does not emanate from 
somewhere or something in particular; it arises from nowhere and nothing in particular, 
indicating that it proceeds from the historical and social matrix of Dasein’s Being, which 
presents itself not in any particular possibility but, through the presentation of the 
possibility of possibility itself:164 
Dasein’s inauthentic everydayness is incapable of articulating the phronetic sense of 
Dasein’s authentic possibilities.165 In “being anxious about Being-in-the-world of itself,”166 
anxiety “takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms 
of the world and the way things have been publicly interpreted.” As such, it “throws Dasein 
back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic possibility-for-being-in-the- 
world.”167 
The great importance of such an account for a ground for the possibility of ethics, 
is clear. The paradox of anxiety is that Dasein loses its world – it emancipates, 
disowns or strips itself of its everydayness – in order for it to come to possess an 
authentic world of its own possibilities. In Heidegger’s view, Dasein’s experience of 
authenticity is broadly speaking the anxiety that opens it up to nothingness. In this 
nothingness, authenticity ‘frees us’ for anxiety in a way that ruptures our everyday 
sense of self and opens the sway of our possibilities so that we respond to the way 
in which existence presents itself to us. It is only at this point that morality can gain 
anything like a genuine foothold, as distinct from a mere ‘joining of the dots’ as they 





162  SZ: 186/231. 
163  SZ: 187/231. 
164 SZ: 187/231-232 
165 GA 19: 33/46-47. 
166  SZ: 187/232. 
167  SZ: 187/232. 
152  
Heidegger also links opening of the space of authentic possibility via anxiety directly to the 
opening of genuine freedom: 
Anxiety individualises Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as 
something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities ... [It] 
makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – 
that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. 
Anxiety brings Dasein face-to-face with its Being-free (propensio in) … the 
authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always 
is.168 
If anxiety is the crucible of genuine freedom, it is also the birthplace – the authentic ground 
– of the possibility of ethics. But, as always, this ground is always an Ab-grund. In this way, 
there is a regress or reversal at work in the connection between Dasein and conventional 
normative ethics. While conventional accounts of ethics projects the individual – as that 
which is pre-given or determined in advance – as a condition of possibility for ethics, the 
authentic-anxious Dasein is not given in completeness. As Joanna Hodge puts it, ethical 
enquiry as “a continuing project of renegotiation between [the] definable forces [of ethics] 
… and πρᾶξις, a form of activity through which [Dasein] acquires an identity.”169 Thus, 
Heidegger’s analysis of the authentic anxious Dasein suggests that ethics does not tell us 
what to do; instead, ethics is grounded in the openness of care. This does not amount to 
any sort of insurrection against normativity. Instead, as Vogel puts it, “the anxiety- 
provoking idea that ’No-thing’ grounds our Being-in-the-world simply returns us to our care 
for our Being as the basis on which anything can matter to us.”170 
Anxiety is a ground for ethics to the extent that it opens in Dasein a "transparen[cy]" about 
"the truth of [its] existence."171 This is the condition of possibility of any genuine 
normativity. Charles Scott elaborates on this insight as follows: 
No history, no community, no subjectivity authorizes the individual’s life ... When 
Heidegger says that an individual … takes over its most proper and true being in 
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possibility, he is saying that an individual’s world and life are decentred and 
ruptured by the individual’s resolve.172 
It cannot be denied, nonetheless, that Heidegger’s account of anxious and individuated 
Dasein strikes various other scholars as incompatible with a robust ethical sense. Hubert 
Dreyfus, Michael Haar and David Carr, for example, have all questioned whether ethics is 
possible in a context in which Dasein’s cultural heritage of pre-given norms of moral 
obligation – the voice of the ethical ‘they’ – have been entirely evacuated. According to 
Dreyfus, in such a situation, “all differentiations are revealed by anxiety to be totally 
indifferent, and so all equally meaningless.”173 This, he maintains, is not a ground for ethics, 
but rather a form of anti-morality. In a similar vein, Haar characterises the anxious 
emptiness of Dasein’s state of mind as a “floating and melting of significations” that, in the 
face of the shattering of the familiarity of the everyday, remains entirely relative.”174 Some 
time ago, Carr underscored a similar charge of evaluative nihilism. Heidegger gives the 
impression, he suggested, that the nonrelational authentic individual is: 
a solitary hero pitted over against an anonymous, inauthentic public as an 
iconoclastic rebel rejecting the conformist mass: a figure who is all erratic originality 
repudiating the humdrum conformity of average everydayness and asserting his 
own authority.175 
To this, one might add Fredrick Olafson’s not dissimilar claim from several decades back 
that Heidegger and Sartre are allies in the scheme of revolutionary individualism and the 
liberal theory of personality. In Olafson’s view at the time, Heidegger’s existential analytic 
purges value-qualities from Being and substitutes it with the notion of projection (Entwurf), 
a move that bears a telling similarity to Sartre’s approach in “Existentialsm is a Humanism” 
(and in some ways also in Being and Nothingness). Both Heidegger and Sartre, he argued 
then, “emphatically deny that human beings can properly be said to know what is morally 
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and in this way, they both “repudiate in principle the use of the concepts of truth and falsity 
in moral contexts.”176 
 
Such critiques, as dated as some might be, put their finger on a point of great importance 
for Heidegger’s account, as well as for the argument that is being mounted here about its 
significance for ethics. However, their bite is felt only, I would suggest, when the full scope 
of Heidegger’s account is foreshortened, and his examination of the positive role of history 
and heritage is disregarded. There is, of course, a vital need to ensure that, as Derek 
O’Connell puts it, the apparent “tension between history, represented primarily by das 
Man, and the authentic, anxious individual” is bridged via “a genuine connection between 
authenticity and history.”177 The challenge is to achieve such a holistic view of Heidegger’s 
text in this regard. 
However, before addressing this issue, it is important to deepen the fray by examining 
Heidegger’s account of Being-towards death and resoluteness in the context of their own 
contributions to this complex tapestry of authenticity, freedom and the ground of ethics. 
3.3.4 : Dasein’s Authentic Being-toward-Death 
 
Any examination of Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s authentic possibility would be 
incomplete without touching upon the analysis of Dasein as Being-toward-death. Here 
again Heidegger’s emphasis – one that also bears traces of a Kierkegaardian heritage, if less 
obviously so than others178 – is on the way in which the anticipation of death individualises 
Dasein, separating it out from the taken-for-granted platitudes of the ‘they.’ It is only in 
such a context in which its finitude is fully understood and incorporated into its projections 
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“Factically,” Heidegger suggests, “Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part 
in an inauthentic Being-towards-death.” 179 Against the popular conceptions of death as a 
future biological event experienced by everyone, in his analysis of the existential- 
ontological structure of death, Heidegger presents the genuine anticipation of death as 
“the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being – 
that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.”180 At one point Heidegger describes 
this as “an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from 
the Illusions of the "they", and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.”181 
However, such authentic anticipation of death is – like anxiety itself (with which it is deeply 
connected 182) – a consumately individualising phenomenon: 
Death is a possibility-of-being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. 
With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This 
is the possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. 
Its death is the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands 
before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality- 
for-Being.183 
In its everyday mode of existence, Heidegger argues, Dasein is constituted by 
“representability,”184 according to which the ‘they’ presents Dasein with undifferentiated 
roles where anyone can serve in its place. However, in appealing to death as Dasein’s 
ownmost possibility, Heidegger highlights Dasein’s non-representable possibility in the 
context of its ownmost possibility or ownmost potentiality-of-Being. 
The ethical potency of death as Dasein’s ownmost possibility is brought to the fore here in 
this focus on the open horizons of “pure possibility” of an utterly individual kind that are 
made possible by the authentic mode of Being-towards-death. Whereas the ‘they’ 
circumscribes Dasein by placing a limit on its potentiality for Being, and the mode in which 
it can comport itself towards death, authentic Dasein is in a strong sense, ‘on its own’ with 
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its ownmost possibilities before it. As such, Dasein understands itself as a “non-relational 
possibility,” according to which its relations with others are unravelled. Dasein’s authentic- 
Being-towards-death dissolves Dasein’s care for particular worldly beings, as it faces its 
own death alone, “primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude.”185 “Dasein can be 
authentically itself”186 only when it detaches itself from das Man and radically individuates 
itself. Or again: 
Anticipation allows Dasein to understand that that potentiality-for-being in which 
its ownmost Being is an issue, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not 
just 'belong' to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it 
as an individual Dasein.187 
Such a radically individualised vision might be seen as cutting two ways ethically. On one 
hand, what is emphasised here is the ontological ground for an ethic of personal 
responsibility. However, as has been pointed out often enough (as surveyed in the previous 
section), are there not significant problems with such a radical and absolutist doctrine of 
radical ethical isolationism? Does Heidegger imply, as Sorial has argued, that “Dasein 
stands alone against the world, isolated and torn from others in its finitude?”188 Or does he 
not here anticipate what Sartre declared to be “the first effect of existentialism”: that it 
“puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for 
his existence squarely upon his own shoulders”?189 
As indicated above, if this was the sum total of Heidegger’s presentation of the ontological 
context of the ethical situation, then such a critique of Heidegger’s account in Being and 
Time would be entirely justified. However, the discourse of radical (hyper?)  individualism 
– perhaps even a prima facie ethical solipsism and value neutrality – needs always to be 
seen in the context of, and balanced against, the complementary emphasis in the text 
concerning the centrality of both historicality and Being-with. It is only when we grasp the 
significance of the dynamic interplay between individualised authenticity and the resolute 
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Dasein attentive to the truth of its being-with-others, and in the midst of its historical 
world, that are we able to completely make sense of the ethical context and implications 
of Heidegger’s account. The following section thus turns to consider authentic resoluteness 
in this light. 
3.3.5 : Resoluteness: The Choice of Authenticity 
 
Heidegger’s account of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) proceeds directly from his 
presentations of anxiety and Being-towards death, but it also gathers these together with 
various other ethically charged moments of the existential analytic, such as the analysis of 
Gewissen (examined earlier) and Mitsein and Fürsorge (examined in the following chapter). 
“In resoluteness,” he suggests, “we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most 
primordial because it is authentic.”190 Resoluteness names Dasein’s capacity to make itself 
fully transparent to itself, through which it makes sense of the significance of what is 
disclosed to it according to the “for-the-sake-of-which” of its projects. Dasein comes to 
‘see’ the world authentically, so to speak, through a modification of its Being-in-the-world 
and Being-with-Others: 
[T]his authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way in 
which the ‘world’ is discovered (and this is founded upon that disclosedness) and 
the way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed … [B]oth one’s Being 
towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one’s solicitous 
Being-with Others, are now given a definite character in terms of their ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves.191 
Heidegger is very clear that this modification amounts not to a “detachment” from the 
world, as if that was ever possible (Dasein becoming a worldless “free-floating ‘I.’”)192 
Rather, as resolute, Dasein emerges from its lostness in the ‘they’. In this sense, far from 
being a flight from the world, resoluteness “frees [Dasein] for its world.”193 
Resolute Dasein, then, remains grounded in its factical ‘there’, and in its engagements 
within  the world  sees with  the  eyes of  φρόνησις.  Heidegger  speaks   of  this  mode  of 
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inhabiting its “there” when it exists in the “authentic transparency” of resoluteness as the 
”Situation [Situation]:’”194 a “spatiality” where, as Kasowski puts it “Dasein finds itself when 
it hears the “call of conscience” and exists in a possibility it has chosen.”195 Within this 
space, the ‘they’ – which otherwise still shapes the world – is silenced. When Dasein 
hermeneutically inhabits its Situation in this way, it is in the mode of πρᾶξις. Accordingly, 
Dasein is not called to some parallel universe or “some empty ideal of existence.” But 
rather to abide authentically in the concrete “current factical … circumstances” of its 
existence.196 With the Situation, Dasein acquires the capacity for self-debate (conscience) 
and resolution (decision), and in this way “modifies with equal primordiality both the way 
in which the ‘world’ is discovered and the way in which one’s coexistence with others is 
disclosed.”197 
Once again, the ethical potency of authenticity comes to the fore, this time in the structural 
components of resoluteness. Dasein is individualised, but not in the sense of breaking free 
of its factical situatedness within the world and its others. There is no free-floating 
voluntarism here. There is no getting behind its thrown “nullity”, as Heidegger puts it 
elsewhere, to some pure perspective that is absolutely beyond the reach of the ‘they’. 
Heidegger is very clear on this point, and his subtle elaboration on this matter is worth 
careful attention: 
‘Resoluteness’ signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 
‘they’. The irresoluteness of the ‘they’ remains dominant notwithstanding, but it 
cannot impugn resolute existence … Even resolutions remain dependent upon the 
‘they’ and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution 
discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency to 
Dasein. In resoluteness the issue for Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, 
which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factical 
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what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is 
possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the ‘they’.198 
What is at stake here is Dasein’s capacity for an authenticity (an ‘own-most-ness’) that does 
not (nor cannot) obliterate the ‘they’, but which can interrupt and question the ‘they’s’ 
assumption of certainty. Rather than living under the thrall of cultural normalcy, resolute 
Dasein exists as the φρόνιμος with the capacity to meaningfully deliberate (προαιρεσις) on 
the concrete possibilities within which it finds itself. Dasein is thus involved, as Charles 
Scott puts it, “in a reflective movement that puts in question its own certainty, its structure 
of expression, its perspectiv[al] reach, and its prescriptive possibility.”199 Resoluteness 
imbues Dasein with the capacity to make considered decisions. Dasein, qua φρόνιμος, 
enacts its capacity to face up to the fact that its cultural projections are but one of many 
ways of engaging with the world. In this way: 
Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what 
is ready-to-hand and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others”.200 
Here indeed is an ontological ground for ethics par excellence: “the existential condition 
for the possibility of … morality in general,” as Heidegger puts it. 
 
3.3.6 : Dasein’s Authentic Historicality 
 
Central to the argument of this chapter is a rejection of interpretations of Heidegger’s 
notion of Eigentlichkeit that portray Dasein as the radically solitary author of its own 
destiny – Dasein as effectively ‘causa sui’ – and thus of misguided ethical implications 
drawn from such an account. In turning to Heidegger’s discussion of historicality 
(Geschichtlichkeit), the grounds of this rejection will be further elaborated. In Heidegger’s 
presentation of fate, heritage, destiny and repetition, the depth and complexity of 
Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit is highlighted, along its key role within the existential analytic 
understood as providing a ground for the possibility of ethics. 
Having maintained that authentic Dasein must project intself upon its ownmost 
possibilities, in the seminal §74 of Being and Time, Heidegger notes that: “we must ask 
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whence, in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects 
itself.”201 What, in other words, is the origin of Dasein’s possibilities? This is a question that 
goes to the heart of the meaning of authenticity itself. If Dasein is the radically autonomous 
(literally self-made) individual of existentialist fame, then this is an entirely rhetorical 
question: it is Dasein that must be the author of its ownmost possibilities. Yet here we find 
Heidegger providing a very different response that instead underlines Dasein’s irretrievably 
factical character: Dasein is an entity whose wholeness lies in its “coming back to its factical 
‘there.’” 202 Dasein’s ‘own-most-ness, therefore, is always only ever the own-most-ness of 
its factical thrownness; and “as thrown, it has been submitted to a ‘world’, and exists 
factically with Others.203 This is an insistence that is not new to §74, for it was driven home 
unequivocally and with great force already in §58, in the account of conscience and 
Dasein’s ontological guilt, as was surveyed earlier. Accordingly, Dasein is “released from its 
basis … to itself” through its historicality. This is a basis that it can never “get into its power; 
and yet, as existing, it must take [it] over.”204 
In Heidegger’s account of Geschichtlichkeit, he gathers together his analyses of conscience, 
Being-toward-death and resoluteness, but then adds to this a diachronic and quasi ‘social 
ontology’ sense that deepens the ethical context of the whole. Accordingly, resoluteness, 
which is defined as “a projecting of oneself upon one's own Being-guilty” in reticence and 
anxiety, is said to “gain … its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness.205 Of course, 
Dasein’s facticity is a given, regardless of its mode of Being, and so Heidegger reminds his 
reader that “proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the ‘they’.206 However, what 
marks authentic existence off from everydayness is Dasein’s emancipatory resoluteness: 
its having made its factical basis its own by taking it over. It is the “grasp[ing]” of the finitude 
of its existence that “snatches [Dasein] back” from the dissolution of everydayness, and it 
is in this way that Dasein is able to be brought “into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals].” 
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In this way, “Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has 
inherited and yet has chosen.”207 
Here the usual sense of ‘fate’ – of the individual as powerless to own or shape its future – 
is turned upside down. In Heidegger’s account, fate is precisely in its being received and 
taken over by Dasein: “[o]nly if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside 
together equiprimordially in the Being of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist 
in the mode of fate”.208 Dasein can be “futural” only insofar as it has authentically taken on 
its past which has come down to it. Anything less is simply a matter of remaining “in the 
throw,” 209 in which it allows itself, and its future, to unfold according to the dictates of the 
‘they’. Here we have an account of Dasein not as a detached autonomous individual making 
decisions in a context of absolute arbitrary ‘freedom,’ but of a factical individual living in 
the midst of a continuous whole with others, from which Dasein’s own possibilities emerge. 
Authenticity is a matter of Dasein’s relationship to the possibilities within which it has 
always already found itself. Will it simply “remain in the throw” of the inertia of the they- 
self, or will it “take over” its thrown basis as its own? 
What is already palpable here is the deeper sense of historicity that Heidegger is building 
into his account. Accordingly, Dasein’s factical basis is presented in diachronic relief, as a 
bestowal from a past that far exceeds it. Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is presented as 
textured and structured by its own deep history: 
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical 
possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which 
that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one's coming back resolutely to one's 
thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have 
come down to one. 210 
In a sense, in this analysis of authentic historicality, Heidegger recognises the overall 
factical life of Dasein as a moment of inculturation. Dasein comes into its world as a gift of 
its deep past. Dasein is, in a sense, its heritage, for this heritage provides Dasein with the 
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authentic possibilities upon which it can project itself. Authentic resolute Dasein does not 
create its own possibilities. Instead, its possibilities are rooted in a particular historical 
context that is “handed down” to it, and which are available for it to appropriate: it make 
its own.211 
At this point in the text, ‘Sein’ and ‘Zeit’ indeed come powerfully together. Dasein’s 
authentic historicizing presupposes a condition of authentic temporalizing according to 
which it is open to and holds together the past and future in the interlaced present. 
Dasein's past (its heritage) is brought alive in its present “moment of vision”212 as a set of 
opportunities for its future. Heidegger refers to this structural phenomenon as 
“Wiederholung,” which Macquarrie and Robinson translate as repetition, though equally 
important is the sense it carries of retrieval. Authenticity requires the retrieval of 
possibilities from the past (heritage) by creatively resolving upon the possibilities that have 
been made available, as well as the constant repetition of its choices in loyalty to its 
resolve, even as it struggles with the dictates of the they-self. 
Heidegger is very clear in distinguishing this notion of retrieval-repetition from any sense 
of Dasein’s enslavement to its past. The idea is not that Dasein simply ‘relives’ its heritage; 
nor that Dasein’s involvements level down all possibilities and restricts “the possible 
options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the 
respectable – that which is fitting and proper.”213 Rather, in retrieval-repetition, Dasein 
stands in the present, fully open to its state of receptivity to its heritage, and fully 
committed to the task of taking on the weight of that heritage, by freely making it its own; 
entering into it as its chosen fate. Freedom, and hence the possibility of ethics, is thus 
underpinned (in part) by authentic resoluteness in which the finitude of one’s existence is 
grasped, and the promise of one’s heritage is primordially appropriated. 
Heidegger describes this process of retrieval-repetition as a kind of conversation, or 
“reciprocative rejoinder,”214 in which Dasein takes on board its heritage, treasuring the 
opportunities it presents and the restrictions it obligates. According to Charles Scott, this 
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reciprocative rejoinder is a process where one ‘turns again’ to one’s tradition and then 
‘turns over’ “or recoils in that turn to a new horizon and thought.”215 Dasein seeks not to 
jettison or ‘move beyond’ its past, but rather, absorbed in its history, it understands itself 
in terms of its history and takes over the possibilities made accessible by it, acting in the 
present in order to accomplish something for the future. Dasein thus critically engages with 
its past so that it can retrieve and rethink what is possible for its future. As he puts it around 
five years later in his lecture course on truth in Plato: 
To engage oneself with the disclosiveness of beings is not to lose oneself in them; 
rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they may 
reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are and in order that 
presentative correspondence might take its standard from them.216 
At this point, anticipatory resoluteness is shown to blend directly into the themes that will 
be explored in the final chapter which follows. Heidegger points out that this primordial 
historizing or fate is not just structurally constitutive of individual authentic Dasein, but 
also of the community of which Dasein is a part. This notion of “destiny” [Geschick] points 
to “Dasein's historizing in Being-with Others.217 Heritage, in other words, is never just 
“mine” in a vacuum, but is always a shared destiny of a people, with whom Dasein has its 
Being. Dasein’s authentic (own-most) possibilities are thus to be retrieved from a larger 
matrix, within which they always remain embedded. 
Of course, this coming together of Geschichtlichkeit with the notion of a “shared destiny of 
a people” raises the spectre of Heidegger’s later enlistment of this idea to justify the 
National Socialist vision of German destiny. This is a matter to which I will return in the 
thesis conclusion. Suffice at this stage to simply point out that such an application amounts 
to an insidious distortion of Heidegger’s own account, since it implies that all German 
‘Daseins’ should project an understand their heritage in the same way, and put it to the 
same ends. Such a view amounts to the evacuation of the keynote hermeneutic and 
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phronetic sense that is integral to Heidegger’s account in the 1920s. Gone is any sense of 
the tension between shared heritage on one hand, and the radical individualising 
detachment of authentic Dasein from das Man (including all homogenising nationalistic 
propaganda) on the other. 
Finally, the entire thrust of Heidegger’s analysis of authentic historicality has Dasein 
resolutely situated towards its to-be, its future possibility. This is a possibility that is 
granted by, and is in deep conversation with its past, but which is also freely appropriated 
for its future. Accordingly, as a ground for the possibility of ethics, Heidegger as Schmidt 
puts it, suggests that “all talk of ethics is premature and must begin with a critique of the 
preset historical moment.”218 Ethics does not begin “as an experience of values and duties.” 
Rather, “a reawakening of historical consciousness is the first step in recovering the 





Throughout his early work, Heidegger uses a series of strategies and diverse terminologies 
to develop his account of authentic existence. This chapter has charted some of his early 
formulations between 1919-23 in which key aspects were emerging of what was to become 
Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time. In siding essentially with what Benjamin Crowe described 
as an ‘emancipatory account’ of Heidegger’s Eigentlickeit, this chapter has emphasised 
Heidegger’s focus on the meaning and possibility of Dasein’s shedding the domination of 
the they-self in embracing its authentic possibilities, even as it has also acknowledged 
aspects of Heidegger’s account that map onto aspects of the two rival readings identified 
by Crowe (i.e., the ontological and the narrative readings). 
While Heidegger’s account of authenticity contains no specific claims about ethics or moral 
normativity in general, nor particular claims about moral norms in particular, it is 
nonetheless clear, I have argued, that it is one of those means through which he largely 
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of … morality in general.”220 After all, what Heidegger’s account of authenticity provides is 
a highly textured account of human freedom, and it is precisely such an account that is 
indispensible for any developed subsequent ontic account of moral psychology and of the 
character and reach of moral normativity. 
At its fullest extent – as anticipatory resoluteness set in the context of historicality – 
Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit is an account, par excellence, of Dasein as residing within the 
ἦθος: the factical world within which it finds itself, and which provides it with its most 
fundamental network of meaning. The ἦθος is the saturated manifold of meaning, 
structured by heritage, within which Dasein lives and moves and has its Being, without 
which no authentic possibilities are possible. So, in his insistence on Dasein’s irreducible 
facticity, Heidegger is simultaneously insisting on the ethico-ontological context within 
which morality – the grasping of moral and immoral possibilities – are possible in the first 
place. Of course, Heidegger remains silent on the whole matter of how it is possible to 
discern the moral value of actions, for this is already to point in the direction of metaethical 
accounts of the good, and even the beginnings of normative accounts that would separate 
good and bad actions. Nonetheless, what he does provide is a basic ontological account of 
the condition of possibility of ethics in this more developed sense; an account that provides 
a framework within which ethics can get a foothold on the basis of a highly developed 
conception of the kind of being it is that is the dative of normative obligation. 
Nonetheless, no account of the full implications of early Heideggerian thought in its 
relevance for ethics would be complete without a more thorough engagement with 
Heidegger’s account of Being-with-Others. Here his accounts of conscience and 
authenticity are both integrated and deepened in a highly consequential account of the 
belonging-together of Dasein with others in the human community. Does the 
appropriation of my heritage subject the Other to the dominion of my projects, or does it 
also create room for the Other to be free for their possibilities? In the following chapter, I 
maintain that Heidegger’s account very clearly shows that the latter is the case. Indeed, if 
Dasein’s authenticity is best read in an ‘emancipatory’ light, as I have maintained here, 
221 SZ: 298/344-345. 
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then Heidegger’s account of “liberating solicitude [Fürsorge]”221 is central to his account of 
Mitsein; and indeed, for his implicit account of the ontological ground of ethics in general. 







If there is one thing that can be agreed upon even by those who understand the nature of 
ethics very differently, it is that ethics necessarily assumes relations between and among 
individuals; within and among communities of individuals. To that extent, any ontological 
ground for ethics must – by definition – understand people as being intrinsically in relation. 
Any fundamental ontology of the human that does not have relation at its core is therefore 
doomed to begin with abstraction and misrepresentation. 
The previous chapters have shown how early Heideggerian thought does in fact develop 
just this inter-communal sense that is required for ethics. In the first chapter of this thesis, 
I explored how Heidegger’s discourse on conscience, authenticity and Being-with stems 
from his close reading of the different features of Aristotelian φρόνησις that provides a 
rich phenomenological foundation for the understanding of ethics as an enactment of 
Being-in-the-world; of Dasein as a being of πρᾶξις who properly dwell in the truth of its 
being.1 In many senses, the last two chapters have focused on dimensions of early 
Heideggerian thought that, prima facie, lack an obvious engagement with Dasein’s 
relationality, though I have shown that this conclusion is not borne out by the texts. These 
chapters outlined how Dasein’s call of conscience and its authentic resoluteness lay out an 
existential background for the possibility of ethics. Together, they provide the basis of 
ethical obligation insofar as Dasein’s call to attest to an “authentic potentiality-for-Being- 
a-whole” in anticipatory resoluteness2 functions as a primary self-obligation that is 
constitutive of Dasein. 
Nonetheless, a focus on these two existentialia is insufficient for the demonstration of a 
robust ethical ground at the heart of the existential analytic. As Lawrence Vogel puts it, 
they are inadequate, in themselves, to show holistically how fundamental ontology is also 
simultaneously a fundamental ethics;3 for how the meaning of Being can ontologically 
make sense of, or relate to, Dasein’s fundamental character of social existence. Even given 
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what has been said above concerning Eigentlichkeit, in what sense can Dasein openly 
encounter others who are also to be understood in their Eigentlichkeit; in their ‘own-most- 
ness’? 
It is with the notion of Mitsein that Heideggerian thought opens out fully and explicitly to 
the irreducible ontological relationality of Dasein. My core claim in this chapter is that 
despite the relatively limited space accorded to Mitsein (and Mit-dasein, Miteinandersein) 
in Being and Time (an account that is developed in its main lines almost entirely within §26 
of that work), it is a crucial leaven within the existential analytic that underpins the 
intrinsically ‘inter-Daseinic’ nature of the early Heideggerian account. Accordingly, Dasein 
is specifically constituted not as an autonomous self, but as one whose radical (ecstatic) 
phronetic openness to Being also predisposes it to be in relation to others. On the basis of 
this observation, I suggest that like conscience and authenticity, Heidegger intends to 
capture in Mitsein an Aristotelian sense of Dasein as a ζωον πoλιτικόν—a being whose 
Being-possibility can only be understood in a πόλις, in a κοινωνία, or community.4 Mitsein 
underpins the relationality of Dasein. As Mitsein, Dasein’s self-understanding intersects 
with the other. While it entails no particular normative framework for action, as basic to 
Dasein’s Being, Mitsein makes possible an understanding of ethical relations that is based 
on freedom/responsibility and empathy. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. In the first part, I set the scene for the textual analysis 
to come by engaging with Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of Heideggerian Mitsein as the 
paradoxical logic of singular plural, by which it serves as a ground for "a co-existential" 
analytic.5 On this basis, I then examine early Heideggerian texts in terms of the way in which 
Mitsein is fundamentally located at the heart of the analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the- 
world. After exploring the equiprimordiality of Being-in and Being-with in Heidegger’s early 
thought, Mitsein will be explored in terms of its particular relations with Rede, Fürsorge 
and ἦθος itself. I then examine the way in which Heidegger’s Mitsein offers us an 
ontological ground of ethics that is based on the notion of responsibility/freedom and 
empathy. In successively discussing these implicit ethical moments of Mitsein, I will show 
how they all cohere to provide an over-arching structure that points to Heidegger’s 
 
4 Politica: 1253a10/1129. 
5 Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Being-with of Being-there," Cont Philos Rev 41, no. 1 (2008): 4. 
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fundamental ontology as an abyssal ground of ethics. In the final section, I turn to some of 
the ‘classical’ criticisms of Heidegger’s Mitsein levelled by Martin Buber, Jean-Paul Sartre 
and Emmanuel Levinas, taking each in turn. What the respective critiques of these thinkers 
share is the general contention that one looks in vain for a depth analysis of ethical 
relations with the other in Mitsein insofar as Heidegger prioritises Dasein’s being at the 
expense of the other. Against this view, I argue that Heideggerian Mitsein points specifically 
toward an ethical relation with the authentic other that is an intrinsic and not a contingent 
dimension of human sociality. Thus, Mitsein is neither a mere abstraction, nor a description 
of relations between ontologically independent egos or subjects. On the contrary, Mitsein 
captures an aspect of Dasein’s ontological structure that exists even before any coherent 
distinction between the I and the other is made. Therefore, insofar as Dasein exists as 
Being-in-theworld, and as Mitsein, to be obligated to itself is at the same time to be 
obligated to others with whom it is in a relationship of caring-for or solicitude (Fürsorge). 
Like the call of conscience and authenticity, Mitsein informs ethical relations not by 
subjecting Dasein and the other to a standard of behaviour. Rather, it involves a phronetic 
attunement to the particularity of others, giving the other a space to live as a being of 




4.1 NANCY ON MITSEIN: DASEIN AS SINGULAR-PLURAL 
 
In his Etre singulier pluriel (Being Singular Plural), Jean Luc Nancy provides a rich insight 
into the way Heidegger’s Mitsein presents Dasein not as a singular being, but rather a being 
whose meaning lies in its necessary "co-existential" nature or relations; in which the ‘I’ of 
Dasein is equiprimordial (or “co-original” to use Nancy’s language) with the ‘we.’6 Nancy’s 
reading of Mitsein is especially illuminating for the analysis to come. The aim here is not to 
"investigate to what extent the Heideggerian project motivates Nancy's writing" in order 
to reveal "the creative frictions between the two thinkers" as Daniele Rugo has set out to 
do in his recent work.7 Rather, my short discussion of Nancy’s reading is geared towards 
 
 
6 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 13. 
7 Daniele Rugo, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Thinking of Otherness: Philosophy and Powers of Existence (New 
York: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2013), 1. 
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inspiring and orienting an interpretation of Mitsein that Heidegger himself suggests even 
while leaving it somewhat mired in tensions and ambiguities. Recognising Heidegger’s lack 
of development of the notion of Dasein’s relational self, Nancy describes Mitsein as a 
“paradoxical logic of singular-plural,” and what he has to say in this regard opens up a re- 
examination of what still remains unthought about the concept. This insistence on what 
remains unthought is crucial, for Nancy is not uncritical of the lack of thorough integration 
by Heidegger of his own insights in this respect. Specifically, he points out the precarity of 
Heidegger’s insistence that Dasein is both ‘Being-there’ and ‘Being-with’ in an equally 
constitutive and primordial sense.8 Further, he sees the lack of recognition of the 
importance of ‘the with’ in Being and Time to be “not accidental.” For him, this oversight 
“stems from [the] text itself”: 
Despite the presence of the terms Mitsein and Mitdasein in the text, no lengthy or 
rigorous analyses of the concepts are provided as in the case of the main concepts 
[“’care,’ ‘anxiety,’ ‘world, ‘Being-towards-death,’ etc”] – far from it. Yet, Mitsein and 
Mitdasein are posited as co-essential to Dasein’s essence, that is, to its property as 
an existent for which Being is not its ontological foundation but rather the bringing 
into play of its own sense of Being as well as of the sense of Being itself. Therefore, 
Being-with, and more precisely Being-there-with, constitutes an essential condition 
for Dasein’s essence. How? It is not easy to answer this question due to the limited 
analysis presented in the text (and one must add that Heidegger’s later works do 
not supplement this analysis in any substantial way, even though they do not 
completely abandon the motive in question).9 
For Nancy, this “resistance and relative obscurity” of Heidegger’s text by which it fails to 
“offer access to one of its essential dimensions in any explicit and detailed way” is a 
significant point in itself.10 Even as Heidegger brings forth a crucial insight into the 
constitutional ‘with’ of Being-in-the-world (to be explored in what follows), this very insight 
risks being “hidden, lost or suppressed” between das Man and historicity or destiny.11 In 
failing to sketch out his account of Mitsein properly, Nancy complains, Heidegger leaves his 
 
8 Nancy, "The Being-with of Being-there," 4. 
9 Nancy, "The Being-with of Being-there," 2. 
10 Nancy, "The Being-with of Being-there," 2. 
11 Nancy, "The Being-with of Being-there," 5. 
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reader unclear about how Mitdasein is even possible. “[H]ow should one picture it?”,12 he 
asks. Nancy’s working out of this question – to be traced below – provides a compelling set 
of insights that will be enlisted in my reading of Heidegger’s own texts in what is to come 
in this chapter. In short, this is a reading that makes possible a further sense in which 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology can be seen to be simultaneously a fundamental ethics. 
Crucial to this reconstructive interpretation of Mitsein is Nancy’s claim that Dasein’s Being- 
in-the-world implies an ability to make sense, but this making sense must involve the 
existence of another Dasein. Being-with is therefore always already a sharing of Being with 
another, and therefore “Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating 
in the with and as the with of this singularly plural coexistence.”13 There is a vigorous active 
sense of what I will call ‘co-responsibility’ at work here, according to which Dasein 
appropriates meaning which can only be derived from its Being-in-the-world-with-others. 
Nancy’s use of Hannah Arendt language, “human plurality” and his later translation of 
Dasein “with” as “sharing” [partager]14 points not toward a sense of ‘partnership’ between 
two separate autonomous beings, but of Dasein as existing in a plural world of shared 
meaning, involving a ‘partaking’ of Being without assuming ownership of it.15 
Nancy applauds Heidegger’s championing of the cause of an ontology of the “with” that 
steers a course that has been so overlooked by the western tradition that tends only to 
lurch “between two subjects, the first being ’the person’ and the second ’the community,’ 
thereby leaving no place left for the ‘with.’”16 For Nancy, Heidegger’s break-through 
addresses the strange vagueness that has always surrounded the notion of relationality. 
The conventional perspective on sociality has always been to see human relations as 
merely a relation of exteriority that overlooks ‘the with’ as such, a relatedness that 
fundamentally constitutes each ‘I.’ This conventional notion of the terms of relationality is 
often presupposed by the concept of society or community, which as a result neglects the 
‘with’ in favour of what Olli Pyyhtinen describes as “a pure interiority, achieved in the 
 
 
12 Nancy, "The Being-with of Being-there," 4. 
13 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 3. 
14 As it noted by Nancy’s translator, partager does mean "to share," but it also means “to divide” or “share 
out.” See, Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 194. 
15 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 3. 
16 Nancy, "The Being-with of Being-there," 5. 
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hyper-existence of society or in a harmonious community which unites individuals who are 
assumed to share a common substance.”17 For Nancy, given that Heidegger’s merit consists 
in precisely grasping the “‘generic being’ of humanity as ‘essentially social’: a co- 
ontology,”18 a reformulation of the concept is therefore needed in order to address the 
question of the political fate of fundamental ontology that is often shrouded in what Simon 
Critchley calls “the autarkic telos and tragic-heroic pathos of the thematic of authenticity, 
where ,… Mitsein is determined in terms of ‘the people’ and its ‘destiny.’19 
Interestingly, Critchley’s interpretation of Mitsein pointedly reflects Nancy’s conclusion. In 
his view, what Heidegger seeks to establish in Mitsein is the inversion of Descartes’ “I think, 
therefore I am” to “we are and only therefore we think.”20 Mitsein thus stipulates that the 
world is part of who I am, and to extricate myself from the world, as Descartes suggested, 
is to miss the point that at the core of our being is the fact that as human beings, we are 
inextricably bound together in the complex web of social practices that make up our world. 
On Critchley’s reading, therefore, even though Heidegger disparages this common plurality 
of Mitsein as inauthentic, what seems to be “the authentic, communal mode of Mitsein 
that masters the inauthenticity of das Man is das Volk `[the people].”21 Critchley’s 
perspective is that the only way one can make sense of how the authentic Dasein can be 
with others is to see it through Dasein’s struggle to identify with the world that surrounds 
it and in which it is completely immersed for the most part. 
In Nancy’s reading, the effect of Heidegger’s account of Mitsein is profound. Indeed, when 
the whole of the Existential analytic is viewed through this prism, Heidegger’s famous 
Seinsfrage is essentially transformed into the Mitseinsfrage.22 In other words, "the 
 
17 Olli Pyyhtinen, "Simmel and ‘the Social’," in Conclusion: Simmel and Contemporary Social Theory (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 163. 
18 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 42. 
19 Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French 
Thought (London: Verso, 1999), 240. 
20 Simon Critchley, "Being and Time, part 3: Being-in-the-world: How Heidegger turned Descartes upside 
down, so that we are, and only therefore think " The Guardian Monday June 22, 2009. 
21 Simon Critchley, "Originary Inauthenticity: On Heidegger's Sein und Zeit," in Between Levinas and 
Heidegger: Suny Press Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed., John E. Drabinski and Eric S. Nelson 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014), 118. 
22 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 78. Ignaas Devisch has argued that when Nancy writes that “[the question 
of being (Seinsfrage) is therefore the question of being-with (Mitseinsfrage),” what he implies is that 
“being-with is a tautology.” And it is actually “to break through this stubborn tautology, a tautology as old 
as philosophy itself” that Nancy sets out to do in his reading of Heidegger’s Mitsein as being-singular-plural. 
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question of what we still see as a 'question of social being' should in fact constitute the 
ontological question;"23 or as he says elsewhere, "the singular-plural constitutes the 
essence of Being, a constitution that undoes or dislocates every single, substantial essence 
of Being itself.”24 Nancy is clear what such a seismic reconstruction of Heidegger’s account 
as a “paradoxical logic of singular plural” entails, and in this he looks to do justice to both 
aspects of the doublet of singular-plural. In terms of Dasein as ‘singular,’ Nancy writes: 
Dasein is characterized by the bringing into play of its own Being in its Being itself, 
or rather, to be, for Dasein, means to bring its Being into play, exposing it to having 
to-be (and not to becoming) what it is, since it ’is’ its ’to-be’ or its ’ex-Being,’ its 
Being-outside-of-itself. Dasein does not have to become [devenir] but to come to 
itself [advenir] in the act of taking responsibility for an essential non-essence whose 
sense is a Being-ahead-of-itself or a Being-exposed or brought into play.25 
As such, being the ‘there’ reinforces how Dasein discloses itself. The ‘there’ of Dasein opens 
it to the world. Second, Dasein is singular in its anticipation of its own death, in which its 
utter singularity is accentuated. But further, and perhaps most tangibly of all, Nancy insists 
on a basic notion of common individualisation as a force for the irreducible singularity of 
Dasein: 
…  from  faces  to  voices,  gestures,  attitudes,  dress  and  conduct,  whatever   the 
’typical’ traits are, everyone distinguishes himself by a sort of sudden and headlong 
precipitation where the strangeness of a singularity is concentrated. Without this 
precipitation there would be, quite simply, no ’someone.’ And there would be no 
more interest or hospitality, desire or disgust, no matter who or what it might be 
for.26 
However, in Nancy’s view, the other side of the singular-plural nature of Dasein has not 
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plurality which co-appears" by the virtue of its Being-with.27 But, if Dasein is primordially a 
plural being, if it is intrinsically a Being-with-others, what exactly would this ‘there’ of many 
Dasein look like? Nancy lists three possible ways of interpreting Dasein’s Being-with in 
order to make sense of how “many Dasein’s can be the ‘there’ together.”28 For him: 
First of all, … as the Being-with of several Dasein, where each opens its own da for 
itself’? Or as the … Being- the-there-with, which would require that the openings 
intersect each other in some way, that they cross, mix or let their properties 
interfere with one another, but without merging into a unique Dasein. Or else –, in 
third way—as a common relation to a there that would be beyond the singulars?29 
For Nancy, what we see in these three possible senses of interpreting Dasein’s Being-with 
is “in reality three possible modes of the ’common’: the “banal Being alongside each other” 
of essentially separate beings (sense 1); , “the common as ownmost structure in itself, and 
thus as communional or collective.”30 (sense 3); or finally, the common as the “sharing of 
properties (relations, intersections, mixtures).” In his assessment, senses one and three 
respectively represent an a priori pure interiority and pure exteriority.31 Accordingly, the 
first, “seems to fall back into the simple contiguity of things,” something that clearly 
misrepresents Heidegger’s ontological concept of Mitsein, since this sense of Mit-dasein 
does not constitute Dasein’s essence. On the other hand, the third sense “seems to 
suppose a single communal Dasein beyond the singulars,” and in this way it loses sight of 
Dasein’s genuine essential singularity or ‘owness’, while also threatening to collapse into a 
tacitly Fascist “communautaristic” vision “in which the individual has no weight at all.”32 
What intrigues Nancy and inspires his account is therefore what a fuller account of the 
second sense might look like in more fleshed out form. Such an account would steer a 
course between the horns of individualistic sovereignty on one hand, and a totalising sense 
of das Volk on the other. That such an account of this second mode - the ‘Being- the-there- 
with’ of Dasein – is largely unexplored in Being and Time (“and will remain so in the rest of 
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Heidegger’s work”33) is a deeply problematic aspect of Heidegger’s work, and one that 
amounts to an unfortunate legacy of its own. While Heidegger does intend the side-by-side 
sense of Mit-dasein (as described in the first mode), this effectively emerges from his text 
nonetheless. Further, something closer to the third sense emerges in his later texts from 
the 1930s and beyond in which “the affirmation of the essentiality of the with is insidiously 
neglected in favour of another category, community, which appropriates the with into a 
destinal unity.”34 . 
Understood in this light, Nancy’s diagnosis of both the problems and the promise of 
Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein as Being-with unfolds as a general interpretation of the 
impoverished state of the ontology underlying ethics and political philosophy more 
generally. Accordingly, much political philosophy tends to pivot between this same dual 
tendency seen in Heidegger, likewise failing to do justice to a genuine ontology of ‘the we’ 
that might be forged between these two extremes. Elsewhere, for example, Nancy argues 
that the liberal individualism of Western democratic theory plays out on the basis of the 
first sense identified above, according to which the individual is intrinsically voluntaristic: 
its sense of being-with is understood as a fundamental ontic action in which the other is 
recognised through his/her difference to myself.35 On the other hand, the ontological logic 
of the third sense makes possible the Communist and Socialist agendas in which the ‘we’ 
becomes a political response to the alienation of modernism by locating the condition of 
existence in co-existence.36 Although Nancy recognises freedom of choice as a potentially 
helpful way to redress the impact of totalitarianism, individualism also brings about a 
“decomposition” of the sense of community, of the ‘we’.37 The notion of community has to 
be reconstructed and relaunched as the question of what actually constitutes ‘us’ today as 
social beings. 
For Nancy, what is required is a fundamental shift in the way we ontologically understand 
the co-originary nature of the ‘with’. Accordingly, ‘we’ as a basic requirement of Being is 
neither “a project of fusion, or in some general way a productive or operative project – nor 
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is it a project at all.”38 It is rather antecedent to every social relation as the “co-essence” of 
Being. The ‘with’ constitutes being and this is not “simply an addition but what evidences 
being as such.”39 Being can never be understood in isolation or even as external to the 
being-with of entities. Rather, there must already be a being for another being to be for 
“Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the 
‘with’ of this singularly plural coexistence.”40 In Nancy’s vision of the primordial 
togetherness of Being and the ‘with’, while amorphous collectivity is out of the question, 
so too is any in-principle individualism that would separate the ontological questions of the 
‘I’ and the ‘we’: 
[I]t is not the case that the ‘with’ is an addition to some prior Being; instead, the 
with’ is at the heart of Being. In this respect, it is absolutely necessary to reverse 
the order of philosophical exposition, for which it has been a matter of course that 
the ‘with’—and the other that goes along with it—always comes second, even 
though this succession is contradicted by the underlying [profonde] logic in 
question here.41 
The mention here of the ontological status of the ‘other’ is crucial for Nancy’s 
understanding of the chasm between his own reconstructed account of Heideggerian 
Mitsein, and a Levinasian account (of which, more later). For now, suffice to point out that 
when Nancy’s Heidegger writes of the singular-plural nature of Being, he is a long way from 
the Levinasian account of alterity that has an ‘I’ entering into a relation with an ‘other that 
is separated from it in infinite exteriority.’ For Nancy, there is neither "the other, nor the 
others, but a singular-plural," a primordial ‘we.’42 
Nancy’s logic of singular-plural sees Mitsein as constituting “the essence of Being, a 
constitution that undoes or dislocates every single, substantial essence of Being itself.”43 It 
is, as Sarah Sorial contends, a logic that “stipulates that each of us is a singular and unique 
being but that this singularity can only be expressed and exposed in the context of Being- 
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with-others or community.”44 As such, Mitsein transforms the sense of Dasein’s ownmost 
structure into a “a double potentiality” of “pure exteriority and pure interiority.”45 
Accordingly, Dasein’s singular uniqueness is only ever expressed in its comportment 
towards the world that finds expression only in the ‘we.’ To be a self, for Nancy, is to 
assume a constituent unit of Being where the element of I, you, and we, take place. It is to 
assume a self that locates itself (sich befinden) there in the world, in the event of the world. 
As Sorial understands it, Dasein’s “singularity does not isolate the subject in [his/] her 
difference because the singular being is ecstatic insofar as it only arises as exposed, open 
and vulnerable to the other, always affected and invaded by the other.”46 Or as Nancy puts 
it with great clarity: 
We can never simply be ‘the we,’ understood as a unique subject, or understood as 
an indistinct ‘we’ that is like a diffuse generality. ‘We’ always expresses a plurality, 
expresses ‘our’ being divided and entangled: ‘one’ is not ‘with’ in some general sort 
of way, but each time according to determined modes that are themselves multiple 
and simultaneous (people, culture, language, lineage, network...). What is 
presented in this way, each time, is a stage on which several [people] can say ‘I,’ 
each on his own account, each in turn. But a ‘we’ is not the adding together or 
juxtaposition of these ‘I's.’ A ‘we,’ even one that is not articulated, is the condition 
for the possibility of each ‘I.’47 
My suggestion is that in Nancy’s ontology of Being-with as singular-plural lies a broad 
interpretation of Heidegger’s account of Mitsein, one that sees our social world as utterly 
pervading our entire self. As opposed to the Levinasian actual alterity of the other, Nancy’s 
logic of singular-plural portrays Heidegger’s Dasein as a co-essential being whose Being- 
with opens the door for the question of the other in its life. As co-essential – and not simply 
as one possible ontic way of being – Mitsein defines Dasein all the way down. As intrinsically 
Being-with, Dasein’s degree of ontic gregariousness is entirely irrelevant to the question of 
its ontological constitution. William Blattner articulates Nancy’s central insight here when 
he notes that even “[b]eing a recluse” is just “an anti-social way of understanding oneself 
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and one’s relations to others.” This is “because [b]eing anti-social is a ‘privative’ way of 
being social; it is a stance on the significance of what others pursue.”48 In Nancy’s reading, 
singularity and sociality co-appear in the very meaning of Dasein. Further, there is an 
openness in the ‘Da’ of Dasein that fits it for an authentic relation with the other. As 
opposed to the traditional metaphysical sense of the ‘I’, in Heidegger’s understanding, the 
‘who’ of Dasein is non-isolable, and this is because Being-with is an existential characteristic 
that “lets the Dasein of others be encountered in its world.”49 Charles Taylor couldn’t put 
this point any better when he observes that, in Being-with, “[o]ne is a self only among other 
selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it.”50 
Much more could be said concerning Nancy’s rich and detailed interpretation of Mitsein 
that allows something like the full implications of Heidegger’s account to emerge with a 
radicality not evident in Heidegger’s own texts. However, enough has been sketched to 
enable the argument to come to build upon its central insights. Interestingly, however, 
Nancy is quite reserved in his preparedness to consider ways in which his analysis of 
Mitsein makes possible an interpretation of Heidegger as providing an ontological ground 
for ethics. On one hand, his scattered comments on this theme speak of the way in which 
Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein as singular-plural is already intrinsically ethical: “no ethics,” 
he says, “would be independent from an ontology”, for “[o]nly ontology, in fact, may be 
ethical in a consistent manner.”51 Or again: “[t]here is no difference between the ethical 
and the ontological: the ‘ethical’ exposes what the ‘ontological’ disposes.”52 Yet on the 
other hand, even having made such striking comments, Nancy holds back from developing 
this claim explicitly in terms of Being and Time itself or other early texts, which (he seems 
to imply) fail to recognise the radicality of what was already at work there. His approach is 
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rather to work backwards to interpret the ethical implications of the early Heidegger from 
the point of view of what is opened by his later thought. In this way, Nancy concludes: 
Êthos needs to be thought of as ‘abode’ … The abode is the ‘there’ in that it is the 
open … It is already in this sense that the thinking of Being and Time ‘designated 
itself as a fundamental ontology’ (BW 258), so it becomes clear not only that the 
thinking of Being involves and ethics, but, much more radically … ‘[o]riginal ethics’ 
is the appropriate name for ‘fundamental ontology’. Ethics properly is what is 
fundamental in fundamental ontology.53 
In saying that “Êthos needs to be thought of as ‘abode’,” Nancy suggests alongside 
Heidegger that ethics is in no way understood as something that gives either norms or 
values. Rather, it is that which makes sense of the truth of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In 
a sense, for Nancy, the being of Dasein is not to be characterised and determined. Dasein 
must be perceived not with any reference to foundation or ground but as a ‘thrown-being- 
in-the world. Dasein’s self is irredeemably ‘with’ others in a world where it cannot be 
captured but always withdraws. In his work, Abandoned Being, Nancy understands this 
movement of withdrawal as a form of “abandonment.”54 As such, he remarks that Dasein’s 
failure of foundation or absence of an absolute ground shows that its fundamental 
disclosure is in reference to nothingness — the abyss which leaves Dasein with “nothing to 
keep hold of” but rather banishes it from all metaphysical determinations and 
unitariness.55 It is this sense of abandonment to the abyss that inspires Nancy’s rereading 
of Heidegger’s ontology of being-with. For him, ‘to be’ is to be abandoned; it is to be 
without reference to any foundation; it is to be thrown into the world, outside its self- 
enclosure in order to be exposed to the ethics of Being-with, the ethics of an inoperative 
relation to others. 
I will return to this theme later. Suffice to say, however, that I am much more optimistic 
about the prospects for developing this theme quite explicitly right out of the heart of the 
early Heideggerian texts themselves. In this I stand opposed to Critchley’s assessment 
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(directed against Nancy) that challenges the possibility of developing an ontological ground 
of ethics in Mitsein on the grounds that Heidegger’s “work is [solely] devoted to the 
question of the singular plurality of being.”56 Critchley argues that notwithstanding how 
ground-breaking Heidegger’s work is, its “prioritization of the ontological over the ontic, 
however subtly this ontological difference is nuanced, subordinates the relation to the 
other to the relation to Being.”57 For him, “although Heidegger acknowledges that Dasein 
is Mitsein, this question is only a moment of an existential analytic whose ambition is the 
elaboration of the question of the meaning of Being” and as such has little or nothing to 
do with a genuine ontological ground for ethics.58 
Of course, Critchley is far from alone in making such a claim. As will be discussed later, 
similar assessments were made long ago by such prominent thinkers such as Martin Buber, 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. According to these thinkers, despite Heidegger’s 
explicit rejection of the Cartesian view of the self, there is basically no evidence to suggest 
an interpersonal relation between Dasein and others in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. 
In their view, the closest Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein could demonstrate, is the portrayal 
of Dasein as a being, who in Levinas words, “tends to identify with the other, by swallowing 
it up in a collective representation, or a common ideal.”59 For these scholars, the 
ontological framework of Dasein is carved in such a way that its purpose is to reduce the 
other to Dasein’s self, a move Georg Lukac refers to as the “gnosiological solipsism of 
subjective idealism”60 and Levinas calls the “domination of an ontological imperialism.”61 
Such interpretations will be countered later in this chapter. First, though, it is necessary to 
turn more explicitly to Heidegger’s own texts, in the light that has been shed by Nancy’s 
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4.2 THE CENTRALITY OF MITSEIN IN EARLY HEIDEGGERIAN THOUGHT 
 
This section will examine in detail the notion of Mitsein as Heidegger thematizes it in Being 
and Time and other early works, in the light of Nancy’s appropriation of Mitsein as a 
singular-plural. To the end of ultimately exploring Mitsein’s very significant ethical 
resonances, the aim of the first part (4.2.1) is to examine how Heidegger reveals Mitsein as 
a fundamental phenomenon, which not only represents the primary ’source’ of all possible 
relations but also a phenomenon that conveys Dasein’s experience of encountering the 
world that arises out of its authentic disclosedness. In this context, Heidegger’s retrieval of 
the Aristotelian sense of ‘Being-in-the πόλις’ will be explored, highlighting Mitsein as an 
attendant mode of Being-in-the-world through which Dasein has a natural familiarity with 
others through its non-objectifying, everyday concerns. In this sense, Dasein has the 
possibility of understanding others as one of its existential characteristics. This will lead 
into an analysis of the relationship between Mitsein and Rede (4.2.2), for ‘discourse’ has a 
strong place within the account Heidegger gives of the intrinsic connection between Dasein 
and others; and then between Mitsein and Fürsorge (4.2.3), for ‘solicitude’ (to use the 
Macquarrie and Robinson translation of this key term) is presented by Heidegger as the 
specific modality of care appropriate to Dasein’s relations with other Dasein. Finally, I will 
make some brief remarks about the connections between Heidegger’s discussion of these 
matters and this comments about ἦθος itself (4.2.4), thus paving the way for much of the 
application to come. 
4.2.1 : The Equiprimordiality of Mitsein and Being-in-the-World 
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that the analysis of Mitsein and Mitdasein enables us 
“to provide an answer to the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein.”62 Thus, before examining 
more explicitly the ethical implications of Heidegger’s account of the way in which Dasein 
is constituted by Mitsein, it will be helpful first to put the phenomenon of Mitsein in proper 
perspective by briefly discussing its connection to this ‘whoness’ question, and specifically 
to the question of the worldhood of Dasein. This is critical for two reasons. First, it will 
examine how Being-with and Being-in-the-world are deeply intertwined and mutually 
reinforcing. Second, it will show how the existential environment of Dasein (Being-in-the- 
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world) provides a ‘pre-ethical’ analysis that will orientate the discussion to come on Mitsein 
as contributing to Heidegger’s implicit existential ground of ethics 
 
An absolutely key aspect of Heidegger’s account of Mitsein is that it must be understood 
as an ontological claim at the heart of the existential analytic (a term with ‘existential- 
ontological meaning’), and not an ontic claim that may or may not apply to a particular 
being at any particular time. Others are not a potential ‘add on’ to an already egoistically 
constituted Dasein-self. Rather, Dasein is to be understood as with others in its Being. 
Heidegger is absolutely clear on this point: “So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one- 
another as its kind of Being;”63 or elsewhere, “Dasein is essentially Being-with”.64 
Consequently, it is irrelevant whether or not Dasein is currently with others or alone, and 
indeed this sense Being-with-others is entirely consistent with Dasein’s ontic isolation. 
Again, Heidegger is quite explicit on this: “Being-with is an existential characteristic of 
Dasein even when factically no other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being- 
alone is Being-with in the world.”65 Thus, as Dan Zahavi suggests, for Heidegger, “one can 
ultimately only speak of others as lacking, precisely because Dasein is fundamentally 
characterised by its being-with.”66 
As noted in chapter two, above, Dasein’s reticent hearing of the call of conscience is 
methodologically inadequate to fully capture the authentic truth it discloses. This is 
because the analysis of conscience alone prescinds from a fuller account of the context of 
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world which must include a recognition that Dasein’s everyday world 
is a shared world. As such, worldliness and Mitsein are “equiprimordial,” 67 or (to use 
Nancy’s turn of phrase), “co-originary.” This cuts both ways. On one hand, world, for 
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Heidegger, is the very milieu within which Dasein’s relations with the other are possible. 
But on the other hand, Mitsein is at the heart of the manner of this Being-in-the-world: the 
existential “form” of the factical possibility upon which Dasein projects itself in disclosing 
its shared world.68 Heidegger is absolutely clear on this intrinsic togetherness of Mitsein 
with In-der-Welt-Sein: 
[I]n characterizing the encountering of Others, one is again still oriented by that 
Dasein which is in each case one's own. But even in this characterization does one 
not start by marking out and isolating the 'I' so that one must then seek some way 
of getting over to the Others from this isolated subject? To avoid this 
misunderstanding, we must notice in what sense we are talking about 'the Others'. 
By 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the 
‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not 
distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too. This Being-there-too [Auch- 
dasein] with them does not have the ontological character of a Being-present-at- 
hand-along-'with' them within a world. This 'with' is something of the character of 
Dasein; the 'too' means a sameness of Being as circumspectively concernful Being- 
in-the-world. 'With' and 'too' are to be understood existentially, not categorially. By 
reason of this with-like [mithaften] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one 
that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being- in is 
Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with 
[Mitdasein].69 
If, as Heidegger puts it here, Being-in is Being-with others, and if Dasein’s world is a “with- 
world,” then Mitsein – far from being a philosophical oddity or ‘after thought’ within the 
existential analytic – is at the very centre of its concerns. Here is the very balance that 
Nancy is so concerned to preserve (and develop) in Heidegger’s account: Dasein is singular 
(in the sense of Heidegger’s “Jemeinigkeit”), even in the very act of being plural (Mitdasein 
in a radical sense).70 Accordingly, Dasein is understood to be in an intrinsically ontological 
relation involving not a face-to-face encounter with isolated entities over and against an 
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isolated self, but rather an encounter in which Dasein is always already with others in the 
way that it has its everyday Being. Or as Heidegger puts it: “Dasein itself—and this means 
also its Being-in-the-world—gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance 
from those entities which it itself is not but which it encounters ‘within’ its world, and from 
the Being which they possess.”71 Dasein is a being that has a special relation to entities by 
virtue of being always already situated within a contextual world of relations. 
This always already “situatedness” or attunedness (Befindlichkeit) within a world imbued 
with contextual relations underscores its thrown-being-in-the-world. Further, its path to 
its self-understanding must be primarily grasped through its relation or openness to other 
Daseins, as well as the nonhuman entities it encounters in its Being-in-the-world. 
Consequently, “Being-in” and “Being-with” are two constitutive ways of signifying Dasein’s 
preoccupation with its world; in short, of its being as care.72 
The intermeshed nature of Being-in and Being-with is also seen in the way in which 
Heidegger’s account of Being-in underscores the sense of Being-with as an always situated 
and attuned with-ness, and not a with-ness that contingently applies to two or more 
independent entities. Since the world, for Heidegger, is not simply “the sum total of extant 
entities,”73 others are always encountered in their “withness” within a thrown context. The 
‘who’ of the other Dasein is not encountered in an empty space. Instead, finding the other 
“even in the most everyday of activities, passing by and avoiding one another on the street, 
already involves this environmental encounter, based on this street common to us.”74 
Further, when we encounter others with whom we co-exist and share our world, “this 
being of the others is not that of the ‘subject’ of the ‘person’ in the sense in which this is 
taken conceptually in philosophy.” Others are not encountered as an afterthought. Rather, 
“I meet the other in the field, at work, on the street while on the way to work or strolling 
along with nothing to do.”75 In this encounter, as Heidegger says, Dasein presents itself as 
a being of “concernful solicitude,” where “what it resolves upon in resoluteness” is 
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presented to it as existential form of “disclosive projection and determination of what is 
factically possible at the time.”76 
If Mitsein is the primordial way of Being of Dasein, then this means that it is only when we 
understand ourselves as beings who are encountered environmentally in the world that 
we can consider ourselves as isolatable autonomous beings whose care is for our own sake. 
Xioaling Sun observes that “Being-with-others characterizes Dasein’s factical ‘that it is,’ 
which is constantly disclosed to Dasein through its Befindlichkeit.”77 In a primordial sense, 
Dasein is affectively open to the reality of others, and so can never be indifferent to them.78 
Mitsein is thus a key locus of the possibility of the authentic self. It is also the horizon upon 
the silent call of conscience, as a concrete movement of φρόνησις, proceeds, for the call 
cuts through the clutter of the idle-chatter and calls Dasein in its own-most self to be-with. 
It is ‘I,’ as a responsible (response-able) individual Dasein, that is called to be-with. This ‘I 
myself,’ the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein, as Heidegger says, is not ‘I myself.’ Rather, it is a self 
that is immersed in a “referential totality of significance”79 which gives it the a priori 
capacity to always already find itself situated with others in a world. 
4.2.2 : Mitsein and Rede 
 
One of the key ways in which the dimensions of Mitsein are traced in Heidegger’s early 
thinking, concerns his analysis of discourse (Rede), for discourse between Dasein and its 
others is a primordial consequence of its essential Being-with these others. As always, the 
Aristotelian context is never far from his thinking. In his summer 1924 lecture course on 
Aristotle, Heidegger argues that, following Aristotle, our way of Being-in-the-world is also 
fundamentally marked by speech (λογος). Accordingly, he seeks to demonstrate how the 
belonging-together-of-Dasein-in-the-world is not an abstract or theoretical venture but a 
concrete – indeed phronētic– mode of dwelling in which Dasein and others speak about 
the world. Thus, retrieving an Aristotelian understanding of definition (ορισμός) as “the 
basic possibility of the speaking of human beings,”80 Heidegger indicates that speaking 
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reveals Being-in-the-world as the “thing-giving basic experience,” the ground or the nexus 
which determines Dasein’s being itself. Because Dasein is a being in a speaking relationship 
with others, what is at issue with the speaking Dasein is how to become “intimately 
acquainted with a being in its Being.”81 The distinctiveness of speaking lies in the fact that 
concrete speaking with others about the world constitutes the condition for the possibility 
of any investigation into the question of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger articulates this 
point strikingly when he writes that: 
The Being-in-the-world of the human being is basically determined through 
speaking. To speak with the world, about it, from it is the fundamental way of life 
of the human being in his world. Thus, the human being is determined precisely 
through λογος, and so you see, if definition is a λογος, this matter of definition has 
its ground.82 
However, in something of an anticipation of the distinction he would make in Being and 
Time between authentic speech and idle talk (Gerede), Heidegger notes that λογος is not 
to be understood “in the sense of uttering a sound but speaking about something in a way 
that exhibits the about-which of speaking by showing that which is spoken about.”83 This is 
distinguished from a mode of speaking as “a given common intelligibility of the world,” one 
that does not have “the character of belonging to an individual” but rather involves “a 
peculiar character of averageness” because it is “worn out” and “used up.”84 Yet even here, 
the very possibility of inauthentic modes of speech – idle chatter – is itself only possible on 
the basis of the primordial ‘singular-plural’ nature of Dasein, as co-originarily both ‘mine’ 
and ‘with’. In this sense, the primordiality of Mitsein makes it essentially antecedent to the 
authenticity-inauthenticity axis. Dasein engages in authentic or inauthentic modes of 
speech only on the basis that it is always already Mitdasein. Nonetheless, in Being and 
Time, this sense of λογος becomes "Rede," an “equiprimordial element of disclosedness” 
that articulates intelligibility.85 Speaking with others (discourse) is thus the mode in which 
Dasein expresses its authentic understanding of Being-in-the- 
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world, an understanding that is not so much epistemic as ontological, in that it is contingent 
upon all the different existentialia that comprise the existential analytic. Thus, in Dasein 
“lies the basic possibility of Being-in-the-πόλις”86 wherein many live together. The πόλις 
itself is based on the possibility of reciprocal hearing and speaking, be it idle chatter or the 
authentic articulation of understanding. 
Heidegger reaffirms this position in Being and Time when he writes that the everydayness 
of Dasein locates the temporality of Dasein’s being in a world which keeps Dasein open to 
the meaningfulness of its world and to others with whom it shares its worldly 
everydayness. Thus, “as something factical, Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly is 
in each case already alongside a world that has been discovered. From this world it takes 
its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the way things have been interpreted 
by the “they.”87 Heidegger makes this point even more compellingly in his Aristotle lectures 
of 1924 when he tells his students that the world is: 
… the genuine how of everydayness of average, concrete being-with-one-another, 
and the genuine bearer of this world is language … The [world] maintains itself, has 
its genuine domination in language. With a more precise apprehension of the 
[world], you can see that it is at the same time the possibility from which a genuine 
being-with-another in determinate modes arises … The basic determination of the 
being of human beings …[concerns] looking out, θεωρειν, on the world … as one 
customarily sees it.88 
Heidegger’s portrayal of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world through language is critical for any 
understanding of an ontological ground of ethics arising from his early work. From his 
analysis of Dasein’s meaningful openness to the world, Heidegger presents Dasein as a 
being of worldly involvement who, in Lawrence Hatab’s words, is “first introduced to values 
by way of training, habits, and institutional influences, i.e., by way of a tradition already in 
place that gives [it] ethical orientation in a pre-reflective immersion and transmission.”89 
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is what Bradley Warfield refers to as the foundation upon 
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“which the intelligibility of our social relations, values, beliefs, goals, possibilities, etc. 
rests;”90 a place where, as François Raffoul observes, the question “will not be an issue of 
ethics as an applied discipline or even as normative, but rather as an originary 
phenomenon.”91 In other words, while ethical exigencies obtrude upon Dasein and its 
others as they live in the world, a workable sociality is contingent upon the ability of human 
beings to live together-in-the-world in order to deliberate on possible outcomes. Hatab 
drives home this point when he observes: 
Everything from mutual dependence to child rearing to education to the 
phenomenon of recognition lends support to the idea that we become individuals 
only in and out of social relations. This is the sense in which Heidegger describes 
Mitsein as a world-phenomenon, as something in which we find our being.92 
Heidegger’s discussion of discourse in the context of Being-in-the-world exemplifies how 
human beings dwell in a conversational community where the identity of each member is 
formed only by the virtue of common practices, values and articulations of social 
interchange or reciprocation. This is a world that William Blattner pithily refers to as a form 
of “ontological communitarianism,”93 a notion that sits rather well with Charles Taylor’s 
account of the kind of shared community that provides the individual with a “common 
reference point and meaning.”94 Given that Dasein and others live in a πόλις that is full of 
speech deceptions, the truth of their Being would depend on their ability to uncover those 
deceptions through a sharing in what Taylor calls a “web of interlocution”95 that leads to a 
deliberative discernment. In this social interchange, the world constitutes a context of 
involvement that “lets our enactment of our “existentiell” possibilities have the meaning 
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4.2.3 : Mitsein and Fürsorge 
 
Another key element of Heidegger’s account of Mitsein, and one which again has very 
significant characteristics that make it well suited as a preparatory ground for ethics, is his 
development of the theme of solicitude (Fürsorge). In Being and Time, Heidegger is careful 
to distinguish the kind of care (Sorge) that relates to zuhanden equipment (Besorgen, 
translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as ‘concern’) from the care that relates to other 
Dasein (Fürsorge, translated as ‘solicitude’). Clearly, it is the latter that brings with it the 
substantial ontological context for thinking seriously about human relationships. 
Of course, these two forms of care (Besorgen and Fürsorge) are hardly water-tight 
categories, since there is often a strong element of solicitous Being-with at play in Dasein’s 
discovery of worldly entities. Heidegger writes, for example of how “the work-world of the 
craftsman,” like an article of clothing, requires “an essential assignment or reference to 
possible wearers;” or the “decently kept up” field that belongs “to such-and-such a 
person;” or the book that was “bought at so-and-so’s shop and given by such-and-such a 
person.”97 So “along with the equipment to be found when one is at work, those others for 
whom the ‘work’ is destined are ‘encountered too,’”98 for all such equipment is “indicative 
of Others.”99 Dasein shares the world in advance with other things and other Daseins, and 
in this sense Mitsein is the a priori condition for Dasein to encounter others who are also 
beings whose ontological constitution is Being-in-the-world. 
Heidegger articulates what he calls “two extreme possibilities”100 of Fürsorge. The first is 
an inauthentic form where Dasein “leaps in [für ihn einspringen]” to usurp the other’s 
“position in concern.” He claims that in this “dominating” mode of solicitude, Dasein 
restrainedly “takes over [übernimmt] for the other that with which he is to concern 
himself.”101 This kind of inauthentic solicitude “takes away ‘care’ [and] is to a large extent 
determinative for Being with one another and pertains for the most part to our concern 
with the ready-to-hand.”102 Leaping in, Heidegger says, does not only “dominate” the other 
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but takes away its care so that the other will be “dependent” on it. Here, others are 
understood as ready-to-hand entities or rather a means to an end – a description that 
reflects the domineering influence of the ‘they’ on the individual Dasein when “it absolves 
Dasein” so much so that it loses its potentiality for owning itself.103 This inauthentic mode 
of solicitude is the usual mode of operation for Dasein: 
Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient modes of 
solicitude. Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not 
‘mattering’ to one another – these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely 
these last-named deficient and Indifferent modes that characterize every day, 
average Being-with-one-another. These modes of Being show again the 
characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness which belong just as much to 
the everyday Dasein-with of Others within-the-world as to the readiness-to-hand 
of the equipment with which one is daily concerned.104 
Of course, it is such an account of the common and deficient mode of solicitude that leads 
directly into Heidegger’s account of das Man. As a general rule, the ‘Who’ of Dasein is not 
the authentic self that is capable of authentic forms of solicitude (about which more to 
come), but rather this “Theyself” which is ‘lived by’ the dictates of others, and which – in 
its “absor[ption] in the world of its concern”105 – treats others more like zuhanden 
equipment than like fellow Dasein. 
Interestingly, Heidegger’s account of deficient modes of solicitude comes with a reference 
to deficient modes of self-knowing. Of course, while psychologically sagacious, Heidegger 
intends this as an existential-ontological claim: that the other Dasein cannot be known and 
encountered with any fullness if one’s own Dasein is known only obscurely. In effect, the 
transparency of the other requires a self-transparency: 
But because solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at 
least the Indifferent modes (in the indifference of passing one another by), the kind 
of knowing-oneself which is essential and closest, demands that one become 
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acquainted with oneself. And when, indeed, one's knowing-oneself gets lost in such 
ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a disguise, Being-with-one- 
another must follow special routes of its own in order to come close to Others, or 
even to ‘see through them.’106 
At the other extreme, however, is the kind of Fürsorge that involves a ‘caring-for;’ that 
‘leaps ahead’ of the other in its existentiell potentiality-for-being, and which discloses the 
authentic possibilities of the other and enables “the other to become transparent to 
himself in his care and to become free for it.”107 As an “extreme” mode of authentic 
solicitude, “leaping ahead” is possible because Dasein through its authentic resoluteness 
“experiences” the full transparency of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and grasps itself 
fundamentally as Being-with. Given that authentic solicitude is only made possible when 
Dasein is resolute, it is the silent call of conscience in authentic resoluteness (examined 
above) that makes possible the “sharing” of its transparency.108 Heidegger compellingly 
claims that as a sort of care that comes from the existence of one being ‘allowing’ the 
existence of another, “leaping ahead” “pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to 
the existence of the other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the other 
to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.”109 
Heidegger’s account of such authentic solicitude – Fürsorge taken literally as Für-sorge, to 
‘care for’ the other – is as brief as it is striking. “Just as circumspection belongs to concern 
as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand,” Heidegger writes, “solicitude is guided by 
considerateness [Rücksicht] and forbearance [Nachsicht].”110 This is an extraordinary 
observation. The suffix of both terms [-sicht] speaks of a way of seeing the other. To ‘see’ 
in the way of Rücksicht is to be attuned (Befindlichkeit) to the other in a thoughtful way, 
with consideration and due regard, even respect. To see with the ‘eyes’ of Nachsicht is to 
go even further: to indulge the other, to show leniency, to see the best in the other. It goes 
without saying that these are not just ethically loaded, but ethically rich terms. If there is 
not yet any sense of genuine moral normativity implied here, there is at least a compelling 
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vision being offered of the difference between two very different ways of seeing the other: 
the ordinary expedient mode of viewing the other as a means to an end, and the much 
rarer mode of seeing the other as another self whose Being-in-the-world with me calls me 
into a relationship marked by Rücksicht and Nachsicht. Of course, there is no neat binary 
pairing being suggested here, but rather a spectrum of considerateness and forbearance 
that “can range through their respective deficient and Indifferent modes up to the point of 
inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for which indifference leads the way.”111 
However, Heidegger goes on to make the extraordinary claim that “as Being-with, Dasein 
‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others,” and he is absolutely clear that “[t]his must be 
understood as an existential statement as to its essence.”112 This is extraordinary not just 
for the apparently lofty ethical tone (one might even inappropriately suggest a frankly 
normative sense of ‘supererogatory obligation’ here), but more particularly for the way 
that it sharply rebalances the tacitly Dasein self-centred discourse of Eigentlichkeit that 
dominates Being and Time and its cognate works. Of course, as seen earlier, subjectivist or 
solipsistic readings of Being and Time fail the test of close reading, but Heidegger’s focus 
here on Dasein’s Being as “for the sake of Others” requires a careful reading that pushes 
back from something like the opposite extreme. Yet Heidegger is adamant about the 
outward-looking nature of Dasein’s nature, not as an existentiell possibility, but as a 
fundamental existential feature of Dasein: 
Even if the particular factical Dasein does not turn to Others and supposes that it 
has no need of them or manages to get along without them, it is in the way of Being- 
with. In Being-with, as the existential ‘for the-sake-of’ of Others, these have already 
been disclosed in their Dasein.113 
Clearly, these two “extreme possibilities” of Fürsorge contain the seeds for much further 
development concerning the ontological grounds for ethics in terms of both ordinary forms 
of human interaction, marked by a functionalist and perfunctory sense, and more authentic 
forms of interaction that resist the tendency to effectively collapse the thing-person 
distinction. Again, such a development is well beyond the scope of Heideggerian thought, 
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but (as I have argued throughout this essay, and will return to later), such developments 
may be fruitfully made on the basis of the ontological ground Heidegger provides. At one 
point in Being and Time, Heidegger seems to gesture in the direction of the detailed 
application that this section of the existential analytic invites but does not in itself contain. 
He says: 
Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of 
positive solicitude – that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth 
and liberates [der einspringend-beherrschenden und der vorspringend- 
befreienden]. It brings numerous mixed forms to maturity; to describe these and 
classify them would take us beyond the limits of this investigation.114 
In terms of the case for the extreme of “leaping ahead” – the authentic ‘positive mode’ of 
solicitude – there is a clear case for further elaboration concerning its links with two 
phenomena that are generally taken as at the heart of any ethical scheme: i.e., freedom 
and responsibility, and also empathy. It is to this application that I turn in the following 
section, after a brief interlude in which I tie the current discussion back to Heidegger’s 
thinking of ἦθος. 
4.2.4 : Mitsein and ἦθος 
 
It is upon the basis of the forgoing account of the equiprimordiality of Being-in and Being- 
with that it is possible now to return more explicitly to the matter of Heidegger’s implicit 
ground of ethics per se. For there is a clear sense in which the ethical must be seen to 
emerge as the ontic unfolding of Mitdasein. In this light, it might be suggested that the 
ethical relates to a kind of posture (Haltung); to know how to carry oneself in the world, 
how to be with others. Indeed, in his 1924 Aristotle lectures, Heidegger suggests that ἦθος 
means the “comportment of human beings, how the human being is there, how he offers 
himself as a human being, how he appears in being-with-another.”115 For example, the 
ethical is seen in the words of an orator not in the way he/she “superficially holds 
him/herself to [certain universal] words,”116  but in the “way that the orator speaks,” by 
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which he means the “comportment in the way he[/she] stands with respect to the matters 
about which he[/she] speaks.”117 
Scott Campbell has called this manner or comportment of speaking which Heidegger says 
is determinative of the world, an “authentic speaking with others.” According to him, it is 
a speech that modifies “how the ‘they’ live together in average everydayness and involve[s] 
attentive listening as well as an insight into the particularity of life, its here and now … in 
order to draw ontological conclusions about the good of the human being.”118 For 
Campbell, in Heidegger’s view, authentic speaking with others modifies and develops the 
inauthentic way of Being-with others by speaking in the way of taking care of that which is 
there in the world. Heidegger himself says that in taking care, Being-in-the-world listens to 
“hear” (ακρόαση), for hearing “is the fundamental mode of ’perceiving,’ the genuine 
possibility of αισθησις.” He adds: “In hearing, I am in communication with other human 
beings in so far as being human means speaking.”119 Through speaking with one another, 
we announce “what is pleasing and … what is distressing … what supports and upsets being-
there.”120 When we consider how Heidegger speaks of Being-in-the world as determinative 
of language, “everything becomes a question of listening,” as Jean-François Courtine once 
argued.121 By implication, as Heidegger puts it in his summer 1920 lectures on intuition and 
expression, no authentic understanding is possible without the “speech” that “announces” 
or “lets out” Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, the “silence call” that reveals Dasein 
and the other as beings who collectively “achieve, create and experience life—life as 
manifoldness of lived experience.”122 
If, accordingly, ἦθος is approached in terms of the comportment of human beings, this 
early Heideggerian insight is not so far from his insistence in his famous 1946 letter to Jean 
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Beaufret that the possibility of every ethics should be directed to the truth of Being, which 
relates to how a historical people dwell (Wohnen) and are at home in their there— the 
configuration of arts, science and political provisions by the virtue of which they live out 
their everyday lives. Heidegger’s explicit claim is that ethics cannot adequately articulate 
practical directives unless it is grounded in the concrete situation of dwelling. As he puts it: 
Only so far as man, ek-sisting into the truth of Being, belongs to Being can there 
come from Being itself the assignment of those directions that must become law 
and rule for man. . .. Νόμος is not only law but more originally the assignment 
contained in the dispensation of Being. Only the assignment is capable of 
dispatching man into Being. Only such dispatching is capable of supporting and 
obligating. Otherwise all law remains merely something fabricated by human 
reason. More essential than instituting rules is that man find the way to his abode 
in the truth of Being ... The truth of Being offers a hold for all conduct.123 
The implications are clear: ‘ethics’ is only ever possible insofar as it reflects this primal 
ἦθος. Its concern should be with our dwelling and how we comport ourselves as human 
beings. Ethics does not tell people what to do; rather it is about what Hatab calls “an 
engaged responsive openness” where we are “at home in the finitude of [our] Being, in 
[the] mixture of presence and absence, especially in terms of [our] mortality and the limit 
conditions of unconcealment.”124 But crucially, as he points out, any sense of ethics that 
emerges from such an ungrounded ground must also be an abyssal one that “presents a 
deep challenge in that we must exist in a world without foundations, guarantees, or 
ultimate resolution of existential difficulties.”125 
Nonetheless, the theme of comportment provides a compelling insight into the notion of 
living well which perhaps again emerges most clearly in the context of Heidegger’s reading 
of Aristotle. Accordingly, being ethical lies in “learning the know-how about the Being of 
human being in his authenticity.”126 As such, the ethical is fulfilled when the φρόνιμος 
understands the ἔργον and ἀρετή of human beings, through which it heeds the call which 
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summons it (‘conscience’ like) to live with excellence in the πόλις: to “take up that knowing- 
the-way-around that is appropriate to the being of human beings … [that which] makes this 
being-with-one-another explicit as this concrete way of being in its πόλις.”127 Heidegger 
affirms this when he writes that, “[t]his standing-out of the human being, this “comporting-
oneself” in the world, this “comportment,” is [indeed] το ἦθος.”128 
Of course, given what we have said so far, it is easy to conclude that if the ground of ethics 
in Heidegger is equated with Dasein’s dwelling-self-‘comportment’ in the world, then what 
this “know how” represents could either be interpreted as ”seizing the moment” as 
Theodore Kisiel has suggested129 or having a sense of “deconstructive repetition” as John 
van Buren has observed.130 However, the argument well might be made that this is not yet 
sufficient for a sense of practical morality; that what Heidegger has thus far provided is 
only sufficient for the most formal sense of the possibility of action in general, devoid of 
any directionality of moral tenor. What is to say whether the “moment” that Dasein seizes 
(to use Kisiel’s phrase), or that which is repeated (to use van Buren’s), should have any 
particular ‘ought’ structure? In what way can anything like moral normativity ever get 
something like a foothold on the basis of such an approach? This is a question to which I 
will turn later in the chapter via a consideration of a series of classic critiques of Heidegger 
on this score. However, for now, I turn to consider a series of terms that can help to partly 




4.3: LEAPING AHEAD [VORAUSSPRINGT] AS ETHICAL GROUND 
 
When Heidegger introduces the positive sense of Fürsorge in Being and Time, he says that 
it “pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a 
‘what’ with which he is concerned.”131 Fürsorge, then, involves Dasein interacting with 
other people as Dasein with whom it shares a world, and not as something zuhanden or 
vorhanden within its world. In this section, I will examine some ways in which Heidegger’s 
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analysis of Fürsorge as authentic “leaping ahead” suggests that Dasein’s authentic 
resoluteness directs it towards a respect for its own existence and equally toward others’ 
freedom for their own possibilities, and how the notion of empathy continues to play a 
part in Heidegger’s account of the same even if its straight-forwardly psychological versions 
are rejected. As such, it will focus not on the ordinary mode of “leaping in” that 
characterises the way Dasein generally relates to others, in the process disfiguring the 
promise of the ἦθος, but rather the potential for authentic relations and discourse by which 
Dasein exists as a properly singular-plural being. It is in this way that the primordial 
existential-ontological unity of In-Sein and Mit-Sein can be attested in existentiell terms. 
What emerges here is an embryonic account of ethical relations with the other that 
specifically forecloses upon acts of subjugation or violence, and induces instead a sense of 
care: not just for one’s own Dasein, but also for others. For if Being-in is at the same time 
Being-with, this with-Being carries with it a sense of empathetic responsibility that is 
surplus to any neutral dwelling-alongside the other, and which is essentially inconsistent 
with domination of this other. 
4.3.1 : Leaping Ahead: Attesting to the Ethics of Freedom and Responsibility 
 
In previous chapters of this thesis, I have examined the early Heideggerian focus on a 
phronētic sense of authenticity and conscience, and in this section, I close the circle by 
demonstrating the continuity of this trajectory with the positive sense of Fürsorge, as 
discussed in the present chapter. 
Central to the notion of Fürsorge as “authentic care” – which includes both “Being towards 
the world of its concern, and … authentic Being towards itself” – is the claim that such a 
relation “helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free 
for it.”132 This theme of freedom is central to Heidegger’s account of authentic Fürsorge. In 
a strikingly concrete description of what might be called ‘mutually solicitous collaboration’, 
Heidegger describes a situation in which two individuals “devote themselves to the same 
affair in common,” in which “their doing so is determined by the manner in which their 
Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of.” In such a situation, they thus “become 
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authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity 
[Sachlichkeit], which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.”133 
Yet such an account of positive authentic ‘inter-subjectivity’ needs to be read alongside 
other prominent threads in Heidegger’s early work that seem to take a far more 
individualistic approach to the task of becoming ‘eigentlich’ (own-most.) For example, the 
notion of positive solicitude just considered needs to be juxtaposed with Heidegger’s 
account of conscience later in Being and Time, according to which “understanding the call 
of conscience, Dasein lets the ownmost Self take action in itself out of the chosen capacity- 
to-be.”134 In what sense, then, can “leaping ahead,” as Dasein’s ability to share 
“transparency” and “freedom” with the other, be reconciled with such a conception? One 
might, with Nancy, lament Heidegger’s comparative lack of elaboration on this theme. 
However, a close analysis of Heidegger’s account of conscience and resoluteness (as 
carried out in previous chapters), can show how these seemly disparate pieces can be 
understood to fit together in a quite compelling whole. 
First, Heidegger is clear when giving his account of the call of conscience that the call is to 
be understood in the context of Dasein as “concernful Being-in-the-world and Being with 
others.”135 While “leaping in” constitutes the inauthentic “who” of the “theyself,” “leaping 
ahead” is rather associated with conscience and resoluteness. Heidegger suggests that in 
resoluteness, Dasein is revealed as a being that is free for its ownmost possibility of Being, 
but whose silent call frees it also for the possibility of letting others “listen” and “hear” 
their own call of conscience in like manner: 
Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what 
is ready-to-hand and pushes it into solicitous Being with others. In the light of the 
‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of one’s self-chosen potentiality for-Being, resolute Dasein 
frees itself for its world. Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it 
possible to let the others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for- 
Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and 
liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others. [Das 
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erschlossene Dasein kann zum Gewissen der Anderen warden [Only by authentically 
Being their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another 
[eigentliche Miteinander]—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative 
fraternizing in the “they” and in what “they” want to undertake.136 
In the above remarks, Heidegger supplies us with insight into the question as to how 
authentic solicitude “helps the other to become transparent and free in his care.” Gewissen 
and Mitsein are inseparable; the voice of conscience is not fully understood unless the 
solicitous power of leaping ahead is integrated into the account. Heidegger thus insists that 
in order to resolutely come into one’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being,” Dasein must 
adopt the “primary and authentic way” of Being-with that involves “hearing” which 
requires the reciprocal “calling” of conscience: the calling of “the voice of the friend whom 
every Dasein carries with it.”137 What this implies is that when Dasein assumes itself in its 
authenticity, what is discovered is not solely a being with an appropriate ability to be itself, 
but the primordial ‘truth’ that there is always another with it, speaking to it. In other words, 
authentic solicitude is possible if and only if Dasein is resolute. In this dynamic interplay, 
Dasein’s call to authentic resoluteness is what makes possible for the “sharing” of its 
transparency by solicitously “[leaping] ahead of [the other] in his existentiell potentiality- 
for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically 
as such for the first time.”138 
Accordingly, when Dasein authentically understands itself in resoluteness, it takes up the 
issue of how it will “summon itself to its ownmost Self to its potentiality-for-Being,”139 in 
the world, and at the same time takes up the issue of how it will care for others with whom 
it shares the world. As Donovan Miyasaki appositely puts it, here, “[t]here is no question 
of whether Dasein will or will not, ought or ought not, care for others and be concerned 
about its world.”140 Also, here, Heidegger does not explicitly say that this responsibility is 
by a stringent premise a call for others to see themselves as ends in themselves. In its stead, 
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what he insinuates is that when the call of conscience summons Dasein to “return” to 
caring for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, this caring for is by extension, a ground to 
“help others” recognise how they can acknowledge their own being as care. But how 
exactly does leaping ahead attest to the ethics of freedom? 
As previously discussed, when the call of conscience summons Dasein to return to where 
it becomes “transparent to itself,” this authentic “experience” of resoluteness testifies that 
the only “certainty” Dasein has is the anticipation of itself as its own end. The mere fact 
that conscience calls it to care about its “comportment” in the world demands that it be 
free to cultivate its Dasein according to its projective understandings in the world. Dasein’s 
understanding and openness points to the freedom that is integral to its Being. It is on the 
basis of its call to authentic care, that Dasein understands how it can make possible what 
Heidegger calls “authentic care for others.” To say that Dasein “cares for or is the 
conscience of another,” simply means that the world of Dasein is no less mine because it 
is also yours. Dasein and the other remain always irreducible. Yet their respective authentic 
self-understanding enables them to be free for their respective ownmost Being-guilty; it 
“pushes [them] into solicitous Being with [each] other.”141 Frederick Olafson speaks to this 
Heideggerian sense of responsibility/freedom for self and other as follows: 
[A] fully authentic choice … will unavoidably express the interests, however 
construed, of the human being who makes it. These interests, in turn, will stand in 
some relation to the interest of others; and any meaningful form of responsibility 
will have to take those into account. This means that a responsible person must 
offer some reason to himself and these same others for the priority that has been 
assigned to his own interests over theirs, if that is what his choice involves. My 
being responsible thus means that my choice must be such that it can be presented 
as being at least compatible with some wider form of life in which there is a place 
for others that is arguably consistent with their interests. But at the same time, each 
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in principle capable of determining whether the claim it makes – namely, that their 
interest is served by the action in question – is true or not.142 
Lawrence Vogel offers a complementary reading of Heidegger’s text. For him, “[w]hat 
reveals itself in conscience is the character of oneself as care.”143 Further: 
When I play the role of conscience for another, this must mean that I call the other 
to face his own anxious self-responsibility – I do not, in fact I steadfastly refuse, to 
take over for the other and thereby rob-him of his task of choosing who he is to be 
without recourse to a neutral standard. As his conscience, I must help to heighten 
his awareness that his possibilities are ultimately for him to resolve upon alone.144 
In this way authentic Fürsorge amounts to a ground of reciprocal freedom. Just as Dasein 
recognises its Being as one that modifies the possibilities provided by the ‘they,’ at the 
same time it acknowledges that the other also possesses existentiell possibilities-for-Being 
that are by no means identical to its own possibilities or capable of being reduced to the 
inauthentic interpretations of the ‘they.’ As a ground for reciprocal freedom, leaping ahead 
requires Dasein’s care for the other to be an appropriate care-for qua Being-ahead-of- 
itself. In other words, given that Dasein’s call of conscience recognises Dasein’s propriety 
regarding itself, the call also requires the other to have a conscience and be willing to open 
itself up to its ownmost possibilities too. Miyasaki observes that generally speaking, 
Dasein’s care for other constitutes a ground of reciprocal freedom] in two ways: 
First, we are obligated to maintain our authentic understanding of Dasein (our own 
and the other’s) qua potentiality-for-Being-its-self—i.e., to continue wanting to 
have a conscience. Second, we are obligated to care for the other in a way 
appropriate to this understanding—i.e., to care for the other qua its-Self, qua its 
own potentiality-for-Being rather than caring for the other qua identical to 
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human). So, the ground of ethical responsibility for the other is, in effect, to care 
for the other qua other, or in its otherness.145 
There is here a very clear ontological ground for the possibility of moral normativity, 
without any such normative content being framed as such. Of course, the freedom that is 
being sketched here is not a neutral form of liberum arbitrium. Rather, authentic Dasein is 
responsible, taking on its own basis, in its “forward running resolve.” But Dasein does not 
take on this basis as an isolated individual. Rather, it is in its transparent understanding of 
itself as Being-with-towards-death that Dasein “become[s] the ‘conscience’ of Others” and 
“co-disclose[s] this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates.”146 
Because Dasein’s chooses out of its “most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of 
disclosure” as a Being-with,147 freedom becomes a sine qua non for ethics, where, as Hatab 
remarks, “the latter can exert its authority only through the former's historical emergence 
in Dasein.”148 When Dasein and the other participate in the respective retrieval of their 
inherited past, their authentic freedom for their groundless fate becomes a shared 
struggle, one that enables them to foster an open-ended heritage defined by a broad 
culture and multiplicity of voices. 
Further, as a ground for reciprocal freedom, “leaping ahead” as a call for the other to 
become “transparent to himself in his care,” also implies a self-respecting independence 
between Dasein and the other. Leaping ahead is thus not so much the “imposing way of 
the propagandist”149 (as Martin Buber put it) as much as the “unfolding” way of the 
therapist that uncovers potential. Insofar as others are beings whose Being is shared with 
Dasein, a person who leaps ahead cares for the other’s becoming. When Dasein ‘meets’ 
the other in its own conscience, it unfolds a particularised concreteness, in the sense that 
while listening to the other’s call of conscience, it expresses the willingness to approach 
the other, to accept her, to confirm her for who she is, and ultimately, who she is called to 
become. Lawrence Vogel elaborates on this feature of leaping ahead using examples of a 
relation between a good teacher and a student, and a therapist and patient: 
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The teacher’s success lies not only in transmitting a certain subject matter but also 
in encouraging the student to think and question for himself and to disagree with 
the teacher if disagreement seems warranted. These traits will allow the student to 
eventually become a teacher in his own right. A mark of a good teacher is that he 
wants his students to be not obsequious disciples but independent partners in the 
search for truth. But the student might never develop his curiosity were it not for 
the provocations of the teacher whose own curiosity sets an example that his 
students admire. Or we think of the relationship between therapist and patient. … 
[The] success of therapy lies not so much in whether the patient’s problems are 
solved – as if they are puzzles – but in whether the patient is able to work through 
the problems life inevitably creates on his own or with significant others in his life 
rather than with a paid professional. Still were it not for the therapeutic 
relationship, the patient may never have been able to develop the self-respecting 
independence that is the mark of mental health.150 
If Vogel’s example of Heidegger’s analysis of leaping ahead is anything to go by, such an 
experience is a profound one. It is only when Dasein sees others realistically through 
authentic resolve, that it can affirm them in their integrity. Of note though is Martin Buber’s 
warning (of which more below) that “an empty claim for confirmation [of the other], 
without devotion for [their] being and becoming, again and again [will] mar the truth of 
the life of the other.”151 To mitigate this possibility, Vogel proposes that because leaping 
ahead allows the other to “think for himself,” it is imperative that “[t]he one who leaps 
ahead must refuse to leap in.” Vogel’s interpretation of what is involved here is salient: 
[This is not] because, though he knows what is best for the other, it is up to the 
other to find and pursue this for himself, but rather because nothing is objectively 
best for the other and so it is up to the other to face this and resolve upon his life 
for himself. The authentic individual does not possess a third-person, neutral 
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his ’otherness’: that is, in his singular responsibility for taking hold of his 
possibilities.152 
 
In this way, Dasein’s authentic freedom orchestrated by its silent call of conscience 
possesses, for Heidegger, an inherent ‘emancipatory’ character which frees the other as 
other. Authentic Dasein does not impose itself on others in any kind of ethical paternalism, 
for as Frank Schalow notes, any such approach “can never appreciate the reverence 
towards the other as disclosed in solicitude.”153 This is because, in Schalow’s words, leaping 
ahead, as “emancipatory solicitude or care giving, restores to the other the power to 
choose, and promotes a loyalty to existence.”154 In this way, Dasein and other “co- 
historicize as participants in the decision-making process,”155 by questioning and reflecting 
together upon the facets of meanings and axiomatic powers that shape their lives together 
in the world. 
In authentic solicitude, Dasein appropriates the care with which it is endowed and 
entrusted. Because it is predicated on freedom and authentic dialogue, such solicitude 
moves beyond the orbit of the ‘they,’ honouring differences between and among people. 
Beyond the taken-for-granted or “closed off” opinions espoused in the idle talk of the day, 
authentic solicitude involves a commitment to responsibility, following the discourse of 
conscience, in order to cultivate an alternative vision of what is good. 
Of course, such an account of Dasein’s authentic solicitous leaping ahead is not oriented 
towards any determinate ethical course of action to be realised. It does not suggest the 
provision of specific universal solutions or outcomes concerning right conduct. In fact, 
Dasein is bereft of any such determination. After all, as a thrown being defined by its 
temporally, whose essence lies in its ‘to-be,’ who is “not itself the basis of its Being,”156 
Dasein is itself an Ab-grund. As such, any ground of ethics that emerges from such a way 
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possibility of several ways forward based on the assumption that Being itself is an ongoing 
process of presencing. 
As a proto-ethics of care, leaping ahead involves a responsibility for the other that is not at 
variance with Dasein’s own self-obligation. Rather, it is the fundamental form of obligation 
Dasein owes others, for it springs from its own call to care for its own potentiality-for-Being. 
In this context, Donovan Miyasaki has helpfully observed that a double movement is 
needed for leaping ahead to fulfil the role of grounding an open-ended but reciprocal 
freedom. It is first necessary to see “the space for receiving [the Other Dasein] as an 
indeterminate interpretive space for the ‘ahead’ of being-ahead-of-itself.”157 In Miyasaki’s 
reading, given that “the Other qua Other is as yet unknown,” it makes no sense to 
predetermine the interpretive space of the other. Rather, leaping ahead will be solicitously 
authentic when it views “our referential-totality, our ‘world,’ as open-ended, as 
permanently possessing the possibility for transformation.”158 But second, given that “the 
Other qua Other is unknown,” Miyasaki insists that “[w]hen and how we must change our 
understanding of ourselves and our world must be determined entirely by the [meaningful 
potentialities of the] Other.”159 Thus, it is not enough to “passively let Others be in their 
own potentiality for Being, [insofar as] … the Other can be itself only if we transform our 
understanding of ourselves as well.” For “if the Other’s possibilities and self-interpretation 
determine our ethical obligations, then … whatever the Other says goes.”160 Consequently, 
what is needed is a genuinely open dialogue that both remains faithful to my own 
projective understandings, while also resisting the imperialism of enforcing them on 
others. It is through such authentic solicitation that Dasein and the other learn how to ask 
questions together in order to be alert to the hidden or forgotten aspects of their history 
and also to spawn new meanings that might have been drowned out by the idle talk of the 
day. 
In an attempt to broadly articulate this shared project of open and ‘respectful’ freedom, 
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Being and Time) calls this a “Seinlassen” (letting-be). Such a sense of freedom is one that 
“lets beings be the beings they are”. Heidegger explains: 
 
Ordinarily, we speak of letting be …in the negative sense of leaving something 
alone, of renouncing it, of indifference and even neglect … However, the phrase 
required now – to let beings be – does not refer to neglect and indifference but 
rather the opposite. To let be is to engage oneself with beings [Sein-lassen ist das 
Sicheinlassen auf das Seiende]. On the other hand, to be sure, this is not to be 
understood only as the mere management, preservation, tending, and planning of 
the beings in each case encountered or sought out. To let be … means to engage 
oneself with the Open and its openness into which every being comes to stand, 
bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself.161 
Paul Ricoeur makes a strikingly similar point in a way that illuminates key issues at stake in 
Heidegger’s presentation of this open and authentic sense of Fürsorge: 
 
The recognition of another freedom, the position of the Other as having as much 
value as I have, are primitive acts which can be derived from nothing … To have a 
value and not a price, that is to have dignity, according to Kant … Ethical freedom is 
not a claim which proceeds from me and is opposed to any control; it is rather a 
demand which is addressed to me and proceeds from the other: allow me to exist 
in front of you as your equal. Dignity is the demand of freedom at the second person 
level. There would be no question of treating the person in myself as an end in itself, 
if I did not meet this requirement with reference to the Other. In that sense, I am 
my own neighbour, because I am the neighbour of my neighbours. Therefore, 
freedom is no longer an extension of my attempt to escape control or avoid 
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This open space of solicitous Being-with others is further accentuated in Being and Time in 
the account of discourse. Here Heidegger is examining the place of listening as an authentic 
expression of Mitsein in action: 
Listening to . . . is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. 
Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open 
for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom 
every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands. As a Being in- 
the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein- 
with and to itself; and in this thraldom it ‘belongs’ to these. Being-with develops in 
listening to one another.163 
Here all the key themes of authentic Fürsorge come together in a vision of open dialogue 
in freedom and resoluteness that is the very condition of possibility for an ethical 
encounter between and among individuals. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein “belongs” to 
Mitsein, and is “in thrall to” Dasein-with. What remains is to account for the affective 
dimension of this relation more fully via Heidegger’s qualified openness to a properly 
existential sense of empathy. 
4.3.2 : Leaping Ahead: Attesting to the Ethics of Empathy 
 
Heidegger’s engagement with the notion of empathy (Einfühlung) in Being and Time is 
somewhat complicated. On one hand, there is a clear critique of what might be called the 
metaphysical psychology of empathy as a phenomenon of ‘feeling the feelings of others.’ 
Yet when this disavowal is fully taken on board, Heidegger nonetheless offers a qualified 
openness to the concept taken within an ontological-existential frame of reference. Seen 
in this light, empathy names a key aspect of authentic Fürsorge. 
Heidegger’s critique of the idea might best be situated in terms of its Husserlian heritage, 
that involves the notion of the inner life of other beings becoming elements of my being, 
or the self of other people. In his theory of intersubjective relations, Husserl had argued 
that there is a sense of an emphatic transference that constitutes every relationality that 
is spoken of in terms of empathy. He writes: “In the communicative society, each member 
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sees what I see and hears what I hear or at least, he can do so. We experience the same 
things and events, we experience the animal and people there facing us, and we see in 
them the same inner life etc.” 164 Heidegger was keen to sharply distinguish Mitsein from 
any connection with such an approach. 
Heidegger’s opposition to Husserlian ‘empathy’ (or other kindred approaches, presumably 
including Edith Stein’s) is conducted not on the level of empirical evidence, but rather in 
terms of the implicit metaphysical assumptions that it involves. Such a theory of 
intersubjectivity, he suggests, presumes that Dasein is a companionless solitary and self- 
contained being whose understanding of others is only possible when the putatively asocial 
subject requires something to fill the void created by the absence of the other. In this way, 
Heidegger is keen to insist that the analysis of Mitsein has nothing to do with what he calls 
“the theoretical problematic of understanding the 'psychical life of Others' [fremden 
Seelenlebens].” He explains: “This phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as 
'empathy' [Einfuhlung], is … supposed, as it were, to provide the first ontological bridge 
from one's own subject, which is given proximally as alone, to the other subject, which is 
proximally quite closed off.” The reason why this is so unacceptable for him is that “Being 
towards Others is ontologically different from Being towards Things which are present-at- 
hand [vorhanden].165 So Heidegger’s challenge to a Husserlian approach to empathy (and 
intersubjectivity more generally), is that it fails to elucidate the ontological dimension of 
relationality. 
The key issue here is that the relation of Dasein to the Other (empathetic or otherwise), is 
not something that has to be ‘achieved’ through any kind of psychological connection. 
Being-with-others, is rather a primordial feature of Dasein’s way of Being that is entirely 
antecedent to the existentiell possibility of any connection with others. Heidegger 
emphasises this point in Being and Time: “Not only is Being towards Others an 
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autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, is one 
which, with Dasein's Being, already is.”166 He is just as insistent on this in his summer 1925 
lectures on the “History of the Concept Time” where he suggests that “[i]f the constitution 
of what is Dasein is instead regarded without presuppositions as in-being and being-with 
in the pre-suppositionless immediacy of everydayness, it then becomes clear that the 
problem of empathy is just as absurd as the question of the reality of the existential 
world.”167 
A second problem with this idea for Heidegger is the way that it “problematically 
presupposes,” as Lauren Freeman has noted, that “the relation with the other is a kind of 
doubling of the self in the other, which renders one’s relation with another to be just one’s 
relation to oneself.”168 As Heidegger puts it, “[t]he relationship-of Being which one has 
towards Others would then become a Projection [Projektion] of one's own Being-towards- 
oneself ‘into something else’. The Other would be a duplicate of the Self.”169 But if Mitsein 
requires an understanding of Dasein as singular-plural, to use Nancy’s expression, this 
mysterious psychological notion of Dasein’s doubling of the self in the other would (as 
Christopher Fynsk has independently observed) certainly imply the loss of Dasein’s 
singularity.170 But further still, to this one must also add the very significant associated 
ethical problems that would arise from any notion of the self being effectively ‘doubled’ in 
the other. Any such notion would not only vindicate a Levinasian critique (and indeed many 
other kindred critiques) of the colonisation of the irreducible alterity of the Other (about 
which more to come later), but it would surely trigger all many of very ordinary 
psychological (and psychodynamic) concerns about illegitimate presumption about the 
self’s ability to fully understand others. Heidegger’s use of the usual psychological term, 
“Projektion” (as distinct from his more usual “Entwurf”) perhaps indicates his awareness of 
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These significant caveats aside, it is nonetheless clear that an important basis for a more 
helpful ontological account of empathy as something that is made possible by the 
existentiale Mitsein is evident in Being and Time, one that can be understood as fitting 
legitimately within the frame of authentic Försorge. Heidegger does not suggest that 
Dasein lacks the capacity for empathy; he does not reject the “problem of [our] shared 
feelings,” as Hatab puts it.171 Rather, his basic claim is that empathy understood as a 
thematic encounter with a concrete other must be understood as something that can only 
occur on the basis of Dasein’s ontological constitution as Being-with. 
If authentic Dasein leaps ahead, sharing its world with others and letting others be or be 
free to dwell in the openness of their own possibilities, inauthentic Dasein, by contrast, can 
simply ‘pass by’ the other, apathetically missing the other’s presence in the world. 
Heidegger writes of such a deficient mode of freedom as follows: 
Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" 
to one another-these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last- 
named deficient and Indifferent modes that characterize everyday, average Being- 
with-one-another. These modes of Being show again the characteristics of 
inconspicuousness and obviousness which belong just as much to the everyday 
Dasein-with of Others within-the-world as to the readiness-to-hand of the 
equipment with which one is daily concerned.172 
But further, as indicated earlier, Fürsorge can also be expressed as a “leaping in” Dasein 
can interrupt or silence the other’s freedom. In such a situation, the other remains utterly 
foreign to Dasein, beyond any possibility of authentic solicitous engagement. In the case of 
either indifference or leaping in, authentic expressions of freedom that affirms the other in 
his/her freedom – i.e., the letting be (Seinlassen) Heidegger refers to in Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit – are foregone. In leaping in, for example, Dasein is focused only on an 
affirmation of its own freedom over and above (or against) that of others. When this 
happens, ‘my’ existence is prioritised over the Other. 
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It is in the context of such a possibility that the promise of a carefully understood 
Heideggerian sense of empathy can be helpful. Such careful understanding is required in 
order to take due note of the ‘founded’ nature of empathy: i.e., not as something 
primordial (effectively an existentiale of its own), but as something that “becomes 
possible” “only on the basis of Being-with.”173 Tellingly, however, Heidegger says very little 
in Being and Time about empathy as such – or about what he describes as “[t]he special 
hermeneutic of empathy” – as distinct from how it can fail to flourish insofar as it is “led 
astray and obstructed.”174 Nonetheless, despite their extreme brevity, his comments on 
this possibility are intriguing in what they suggest: 
But the fact that empathy is not a primordial existential phenomenon, any more 
than is knowing in general does not mean that there is nothing problematic about 
it. The special hermeneutic of empathy will have to show how being-with-one- 
another [Miteinandersein] and Dasein’s knowing of itself are led astray and 
obstructed by the various possibilities of being which human being himself 
possesses, so that a genuine “understanding” gets suppressed, and human being 
takes refuge in substitutes; the possibility of understanding the stranger correctly 
presupposes such a hermeneutic as its positive existential condition.175 
Following this remark, Heidegger turns to consider inauthentic modes of comportment 
towards others – the everyday ‘who’ of Dasein - via his analysis of the ‘They.’ However, 
rather than rushing on with him on such a trajectory, it will be helpful to linger a while on 
what he may have had in mind by this “genuine ‘understanding’” that can be so easily 
suppressed when Dasein “takes refuge in substitutes,” and just what this authentic 
“possibility of understanding the stranger correctly” might look like. If both of these 
“presuppose” a “special hermeneutic of empathy … as its positive existential condition,” 
how should such a hermeneutic be constituted, or even construed? My suggestion is that 
– building on Jean-luc Nancy’s existing work on Dasein as singular-plural (as surveyed 
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provides us with many clues, especially by way of his account of Befindlichkeit 
(‘affectedness’).176 
 
Central to Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit is the idea that Dasein finds itself always 
already in the midst of an existing affective atunement, or ‘affectedness,’ to the world. 
“Dasein, in so far as it is, has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which shows up 
for it, and this submission belongs essentially to its Being."177 For Heidegger, far from being 
mere psychological states, moods constitute our fundamental mode of existence which 
discloses the mode or way in which one finds oneself [sich befinden] in the world. As 
Eugene Gendlin helpfully notes, Befindlichkeit conveys the three overlapping senses: of 
"the reflexivity of finding oneself; feeling and being situated, [and] denoting how we sense 
ourselves in situations."178 In other words, affectedness is a state of attunement in which, 
as Freeman writes, “Dasein is attuned to itself, to others, and to the world.”179 As a basic 
mode of Being-with, affectedness mitigates a subjectivist ontology in which Dasein 
understands itself as self-sufficient, by serving as a lens through which the other as other 
is made present affectively to us. Dreyfus reminds us that the sense Befindlichkeit conveys, 
as expressed in Dasein’s moods, “cannot be properly described as fleeting private feeling 
projected upon the world but must be understood as specifications of a dimension of 
existence, i.e. of affectedness as a way of being in the world.”180 This is, of course, central 
to Heidegger’s own account: 
Moods are not accompanying phenomena; rather, they are the sort of thing that 
determines being-with-one-another in advance. It seems as if, so to speak, a mood 
is in each case already there, like an atmosphere, in which we are steeped and by 
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and in light of these facts, it is necessary to dispense with the psychology of feelings 
and experiences and consciousness.181 
Heidegger’s point here is also nicely summed up by Lauren Freeman when she notes that 
for Heidegger, “our affective state [is] not the end product … of a causal relationship that 
holds between Dasein and [the other]; rather, the very fact that [I] can be affected by the 
[other] is indicative of our ontological constitution and our prior embeddedness in [the 
world of the other].”182 
It is in this context that I wish to suggest that empathy should be seen – in a way that is 
completely consistent with, if not explicitly expressed as such in Heidegger’s own texts – 
as constituting the formal way of realising the authentic possibility of Fürsorge, and hence 
of Being-with-one another more generally. In line with a suggestion made some time ago 
by Werner Marx, I maintain that as an act of affectedness, empathy is what facilitates an 
individual becoming open and receptive to the situational life of the other, their sensations 
and passions, pleasures and pains, and moods.183 Through empathy, Dasein shares the fate 
of others because an empathetic experience entails an openness to what is occurring, 
letting the other ‘be’ in his/her own integrity as other. The experience of empathy does not 
project a definitive way of living because as Freeman writes, “how we exist or are faring in 
the world is not first revealed to us by an inference or judgment.”184 Instead, empathy is a 
precondition that informs our ethical relation with the other. When empathy occurs as an 
openness to the mortal temporality of the other, it helps the other to exist with the 
awareness that s/he is not isolated in his/her Being-in, but are always an open Being-in- 
with-others. Further, it might be ventured (to build on Marx’s thesis) that Dasein’s resolute 
Being-towards-death provides an impetus for the transformation of Dasein’s basic 
attunement to the world as a whole, and its Being-with-others in particular, from 
indifference to authentic solicitude. 
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Another scholar who has written helpfully on this theme is John D. Caputo. Caputo has 
argued that to the extent that Dasein’s authentic resoluteness provides grounds for 
reciprocal freedom, where Dasein “keeps as many options as possible” because of the limit 
conditions that come with its finitude,” authentic solicitude as leaping ahead can also 
provoke empathy for others who are “siblings of the same flux, brothers and sisters in the 
same dark night.”185 If “authenticity means owning up to our short comings” and believing 
that none of us has access to any absolute foundations,” he suggests, then this admission 
will “deflect pretension” and make possible the insight that we all share same “midnight of 
fears,” a common fate that “we are a community of mortals.”186 In Caputo’s reading, 
empathy “arises precisely from the sense of a common fate, from suffering (passio) a 
common (com) comfortlessness.” It is a “sense of togetherness which mortals share [when 
they] understand the finitude of the cut they make into things.”187 
It is on the basis of such a reconstruction of Heidegger’s texts that gestures in such a 
direction without really showing us the way, that empathy can be seen, very legitimately, 
as an authentic fulfilment of what is most deeply at stake in the primordial ontological 
condition of Mitsein. Empathy, properly understood, is a fulfilment of the promise of 
Dasein’s Being-in-as Being-with. As Hatab has suggested, empathy thus plays the role of an 
existential condition of ethics when it provides us with a “basic ethical disposition 
(Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung) that attunes us to the moral life in a way that mere 
knowledge, theories, or rules cannot.”188 Being an ethical disposition, empathy attunes us 
not to axioms of behaviour as such, but for attention to our shared finitude. It is in this 
sense that a Heideggerian reading of empathy might even be able to embrace the 
suggestion of Edith Stein that empathy allows the self to live in the other’s experience on 
the grounds that the experience is analogous or correlational to my own.189 Ultimately, 
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when my own experiences become the basis for the understanding of other’s frailties and 
limit conditions, one acknowledges, in line with Caputo that the way forward is to be 
cautious and empathetic.190 In other words, central to the spirit of empathy is the 
recognition that we all belong to the same “mortal community” with “different narrative 
fluxes.” When we recognise and affirm this authentic truth of our Being, then as Caputo 
says: 
Our own concern [will be] to keep the conversation moving, mobile, and to trust 
the dynamics of the agora. We do everything we can to see to it that the debate is 
fair, that no one’s voice is excluded or demeaned, and that the vested interests of 
the powerful who usually end up having their way are restrained as much as 
possible.191 
As an existential condition for the possibility of ethics, empathy mitigates the indifference 
of the Theyself, and the subjective egoism of ‘leaping in’ that betrays Dasein’s intrinsic 
Being-with-others. As a mood, it unveils or discloses a mutual sensitivity, where conscious 
of my frailties and limit conditions, “I appreciate others not only for their sovereignty but 
also for the fragility of their efforts to make something of their own lives.”192 Empathy 
grounds ethics not by providing a moral code for action, but by creating the conditions 
whereby Dasein is atuned to the ἦθος, that is completely of a piece with the ontological 
condition of Being-in-the-world-with-others. Despite the pull of ‘the They,’ by which Dasein 
looks to escape its Being-with-the-other, authentic resoluteness involves facing the other 
with (to borrow Heidegger’s characterisation of the result of anticipatory resoluteness), 
“sober understanding.”193 It is only when Dasein is attuned through empathy, that it can 
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4.4: MITSEIN AND ITS CRITICS 
 
It is on the basis of the preceding exploration and interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of 
Mitsein and its rich layers of possibility for further development, that I turn now to consider 
three prominent early critiques of Heidegger. Focusing the discussion on the critical 
readings of Martin Buber, Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas in particular will allow a 
substantial coming to terms with the ubiquitous textually-based claim that Heideggerian 
thought can only distort the possibility of ethics because it involves an absolutisation of 
Dasein’s authentic existence over the other, thus producing what Jacques Taminiaux calls 
“a circle [always] leading back to it itself.”194 It will also thereby be able to address the 
similarly widely attested claim that Heideggerian Mitsein is a heavy-handed ontological 
principle unable to do justice to the elemental intimacy of concrete human relationships. 
While it is clear that such critiques are not without a degree of basis in Heidegger’s early 
writings, in my assessment, they fail to do justice to the full scope of Heidegger’s thinking 
on this theme. In very brief terms, the following will outline the basic thrust of these two 
claims made by these three important scholars, while also showing how the foregoing 
discussion has highlighted dimensions of Heidegger’s work that substantially addresses 
their concerns. 
4.4.1 : Martin Buber 
 
The Buber-Heidegger relationship is a rich and fascinating one on so many levels,195 but in 
this brief consideration the focus must remain narrowly on Buber’s critique of 
Heideggerian Mitsein and Fürsorge, and a potential Heideggerian response. In Buber’s 
view, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is completely unsuited to the task of dealing 
seriously with concrete human experiences, especially interpersonal relations. There are, 
of course, some crucially important ethico-theological reasons why he thinks that this must 
be the case, though I place these to one side since they amount to a clearly irreducible 
difference in their basic starting points that cannot be addressed here.196 However, his 
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critique can also be approached on more phenomenological grounds. Accordingly, whilst 
Buber acknowledges Mitsein as Heidegger’s attempt at staging an account of inter- 
personal relations in his work, he sees this as inherently bereft of any means to seriously 
engage the I-Thou relationship in its primordiality. 
For Buber, the entire focus for Heidegger’s account of Dasein understands it in relation not 
to the other, but in relation to itself. In Buber’s view, what Heidegger understands as 
Mitsein is nothing but the position of a subjectivity that emerges from the impersonal 
"there is," a position that would ultimately be overcome by the interruption of the other. 
In David Novak’s words, Buber’s Heidegger characterises Mitsein as a “Beistand, literally 
‘standing next to one’, that is, each individual is on a finite journey culminating in the non- 
relational event, death.” Accordingly, “[t]he journey is conducted alongside other Daseins, 
but their horizontal presence is secondary to the vertical end/terminus which each one 
faces alone.”197 Heidegger’s Mitsein is thus an impediment to any serious understanding of 
human existence which is rather outward facing in relationship to others as its principle 
characteristic. In order for us to understand our respective human existence, Buber argued, 
“we are not to isolate a part of life where the existence is related to itself and to its own 
being, but by becoming aware of the whole life without reduction.”198 For Buber, it is only 
in the concrete person to person relationship that we are able to make sense of what it 
really means ‘to be,’ because human relations are pivotal to our understanding of human 
existence. 
Further, for Buber, Heidegger’s account of Fürsorge fails to help in this regard since as a 
component mode of Mitsein, it “cannot as such be an essential relation, since it does not 
set a man’s life in direct relation with the life of another.”199 Fürsorge “can share in 
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essential life only when it derives its significance from being the effect of a relation which 
is essential in itself.”200 The mere fact of existing with others insufficiently addresses the 
primal nature of the I-Thou relationship as a defining feature of human existence.. Buber 
writes: 
In its essence solicitude (Fursorge) does not come from mere co-existence (Mitsein) 
with others, as Heidegger thinks, but from essential (wesent- lichen), direct, whole 
relations (Beziehungen) between man and man (Mensch zu Mensch) .... In mere 
solicitude man remains essentially with himself, even if he is moved with extreme 
pity; in action and help he inclines towards the other, but the barriers of his own 
being are not thereby breached.201 
For Buber, a philosophy of the face-to-face relation must do justice not only to the 
mineness (Jemeinigkeit) of the ‘I’, but also to the ‘you-ness’ of the ‘Thou,’ and in an 
equiprimordial sense. But he claims Heidegger’s Daseinanalysis insists on the former to the 
considerable detriment of the latter. 
Needless to say, I would suggest that Buber’s account of the early Heidegger’s approach to 
these matters involves a vast under-estimation of the significance of Heideggerian Mitsein. 
As discussed earlier in terms of Nancy’s interpretation of Dasein as singular-plural, 
Heidegger’s account of Mitdasein goes ‘all the way down’ in the sense that the very idea 
of Dasein makes no sense outside the context of its relations with others. Far from being 
an index of its superficiality, Heidegger’s insistence that Mitsein applies even in cases 
where Dasein’s is in an ontic state of solitude speaks rather to the ontologically primordial 
nature of Dasein’s relation to human otherness. Further, as seen in the previous section, 
there is nothing ‘merely solicitous’ about authentic modes of Fürsorge, for they involve the 
very “essential … direct, whole relations” between Dasein and the other upon which Buber 
rightly insists. In this context, it is not surprising to read Haim Gordon’s rather damning 
assessment of the quality of Buber’s Heidegger interpretation in his detailed book-length 
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Buber’s presentation of certain ideas from Being and Time and his one-track 
critique of these ideas is quite often wrong. I find it sad, but true, to state that Buber 
comprehended and accepted very few of Heidegger’s valuable insights and 
thoughtful ideas.202 
It should be mentioned in passing, however, that if Buber’s reading of Heidegger on Mitsein 
leaves much to be desired, Heidegger’s own reading of Buber’s account of the I-Thou 
relationship is at least as poorly considered, and in this there seems to be a thoroughly 
mutual misunderstanding between the two concerning their respective accounts of the 
ontology of human relationships. One just needs to consider Heidegger’s dismissive 
allusion to Buber’s work in in Grundprobleme, composed just shortly after Being and Time: 
Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but 
self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the 
structure of being-in-the-world. Only because the “subject” is determined by being- 
in-the-world can it become as this self a thou for another.203 
Heidegger’s presentation here of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ as being functionally equivalent to the two 
sides of a subject-object relationship is, of course, an equally appalling misreading of 
Buber’s texts. In this way, each seems to be reading the other as conceiving of the 
relationship between two human individuals as being incidental and contingent rather than 
ontological and primordial. Suffice to say that there is a tellingly missed opportunity here 





4.4.2 : Jean-Paul Sartre 
 
Sartre’s critique of Heidegger’s Mitsein is strikingly similar to Buber’s in its essentials. 
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first and fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge,”204 
the major problem with Heidegger’s work is its inability to articulate our natural basic and 
fundamental association with others. Sartre takes issue with Mitsein as an essential, 
intrinsic, and a priori determination of Dasein since, in the words of Abraham Mansbach, 
“the need to explain how the individual can be aware or certain of the existence of other 
individuals vanishes, because being with others is prior to knowing them.”205 
While Sartre agrees with Heidegger that Dasein’s comportment to zuhanden equipment 
can itself engender Dasein-to-Dasein encounter in the world, he argues that it is impossible 
for me to distinguish between an already finished artefact and a product of natural process 
except on the condition that I have had a previous familiarisation of others in my world. 
Further, he notes that “since human reality is act, it can be conceived only as being at its 
core a rupture with the given. It is the being which causes there to be a given by breaking 
with it and illuminating it in the light of the not-yet-existing.”206 
Like Buber, Sartre’s contention is that it is only through my mutual interchange with others 
that I can acquire the skills to manipulate tools that have already been produced in the 
manner that the tools have been designed. Consequently, for Sartre, equipment or tools 
embody a derived reference to the other. Meanwhile, as Buber similarly suggested, Mitsein 
takes for granted the concrete vital and authentic interrelations with the other,207 and in 
this way it misses its radical alterity. The result is therefore the very solipsism that 
Heidegger had sought to overcome. ““The original relation of the Other and my 
consciousness is not the you and me; it is the ‘we’,” Sartre complains. So “Heidegger’s 
being-with is not the clear and distinct position of an individual confronting another 
individual; it is not knowledge. It is … mute existence.”208 
Simply put, the key to Buber and Sartre’s understanding of essential human relation, is the 
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individuals. For both scholars, Heidegger’s Being-with limits social relations to a purely a 
priori stipulation that obscures any real and radical otherness. Thus, Mitsein is not a matter 
of genuine inter-relation, but rather of a self-relation in which “the necessary 
presupposition of a real duality is lacking.”209 Sartre asks: 
Why did Heidegger believe that he was authorised to pass from this empirical and 
ontic establishment of being-with to a position claiming co-existence as the 
ontological structure of my “being-in-the-world?” And what type of being does this 
co-existence have? To what extent is the negation which makes the other an other 
and which constitutes him as non-essential maintained? If we suppress it entirely, 
are we not going to fall into monism? And if we are to preserve it as an essential 
structure of the relation to the other, then what modification must it undergo in 
order to lose the character as a connection which creates solidarity, and which is 
the very structure of being-with? And how shall we be able to pass from there to 
the concrete experience of the other in the world, as when from my window I see 
a man walking in the street?210 
The main lines of a response to Sartre’s critique follows a similar line to that offered to 
Buber. On one hand, Heidegger’s Mitsein is criticised for being too formal a structure, 
lacking the visceral immediacy of the person-to-person encounter. But that very formality 
is precisely a function of Heidegger’s insistence on the ontological primordiality of the 
relation: that Dasein is essentially (or better: existentially) Being-with, and not simply the 
kind of being who might happen to relate to others as inevitably happens in reality. This, 
then, is the specific answer to Sartre’s question about why Heidegger “believe[d] that he 
was authorised to pass from [an] empirical and ontic establishment of being-with to a 
position claiming co-existence as the ontological structure of my ‘being-in-the-world’” 
But on the other hand, nor can Heidegger’s account be rejected on the ground that it lacks 
any robust sense of what this formal ontological relation looks like in more textured terms. 
For this is precisely what Heidegger’s account of authentic Fürsorge provides, as brief and 
admittedly under-developed as it is, as indicated earlier. It is Fürsorge that in turn directly 
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answers Sartre’s other question noted above about “how [we] shall … be able to pass from 
there [“the very structure of being-with”] to the concrete experience of the other in the 
world, as when from my window I see a man walking in the street.” This is precisely the 
passage that is negotiated in the movement from Mitsein to Fürsorge, perhaps taking in 
also the hint Heidegger throws out (as also explored earlier) concerning the need for a 
“hermeneutic of empathy”. Of course, Heidegger’s account will not provide a psychology 
or aesthetics of the relation between others – for it is presented as an existential analytic 
of Dasein – but this does not in any way preclude the development of such approaches 
specifically on the basis it provides. (It is just that “to describe these and classify them 
would take us beyond the limits of [his] investigation”211). Indeed, such is the central 
argument of this thesis concerning the possibility for an ethics to be developed on the 
ground provided by Heidegger’s ontological analytic of Dasein. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that in some ways Sartre’s own thought resembles the very 
problematic features he claims to identify in Heidegger’s work. For if Mitsein is understood 
as being a self-relation rather than one genuinely open to the other in a situation of true 
mutuality, might that not also be seen as a danger in the case of Sartre’s l’être-pour-autrui 
(even if Sartre expends much more space in the latter parts of Being and Nothingness 
exploring the complexities of the self-other encounter than Heidegger expends on Mitsein 
in Being and Time)? After all, any examination of what it is to be for-the-other is eventually 
an examination of the self as that being. The phenomenology of the ‘look’ of the other, to 
take one famous example, ends with shame that involves a recoil back into the self. As 
David Jopling has put it, 
one of the problems with Sartre's description of the phenomenology of the self- 
Other relation is that ... it never leaves the first-person perspective of the self or 
subject. By thinking about the Other from the self outward, the self-Other relation 
begins and ends with the self.212 
In this sense, Heidegger’s Mitdasein, which is a being whose own Being is at issue for it, but 
which is also always already Being-with-others, is hardly any more nascently solipsistic than 
 
211 SZ: 122/159. 
212 David Jopling, "Levinas, Sartre, and Understanding the other," Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology 24, no. 3 (2014): 226. 
223  
Sartre’s l’être-pour-soi-pour-autrui. Admittedly, one might take Jopling’s point and make 
an analogous critique of Heidegger. For example, even when Heidegger states that “as 
Mitsein, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others,” 213 such a claim is in a sense 
ultimately a claim about Dasein. However, the ultimate issue here would appear to be 
something that transcends both of their approaches, for it goes to the phenomenological 
method itself which regards the standpoint of genuine exteriority to be extraordinarily 
difficult to manage in principle. For how is it possible to speak not just about the other but 
as the other, without thereby colonising the other with the same? At this point, we have 
come to the threshold of Levinas’ work. 
4.4.3 : Emmanuel Levinas 
 
Emmanuel Levinas’ response to Heideggerian thought is one of the most virulent and 
profound, and also one of the most prominent, of the early critiques. It is also one of special 
relevance here given the way Levinas relentlessly focuses in on the question of the ethical 
implications of Heidegger’s existential analytic and its consequences for the issue of alterity 
as such. 
Famously, Levinas pays close attention to the absolutisation of ontology in Heideggerian 
thought, from which no alterity is permitted to escape. This, of course, he sees as 
symptomatic of western philosophy which seeks to conquer, master and dominate 
alterity.214 Levinas applauds Heidegger for foreclosing introspection as a way of the 
knowledge of Being. However, he effectively suggests that Heidegger implicates himself in 
the same ideology of western metaphysical tradition by reducing the individual to the Da 
of Sein. In this way, Heidegger, in the worst tradition of western metaphysics, 
… grasps the individual, which alone exists, not in its singularity which does not 
count, but in its generality, of which alone there is science.... The surrender of 
exterior things to human freedom through their generality does not only mean, in 
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domestication, their possession ... Reason, which reduces the other, is 
appropriation and power.215 
However, Levinas goes further. Not only does Heidegger sum up the philosophy of western 
metaphysical tradition, the pre-eminence he gives to Being over beings raises the stakes. 
The Other becomes that which should be comprehended and thus mastered, and in this 
movement shaken out of its genuine alterity in order that it be brought within the economy 
of the same. In his view: 
[C]omprehension, as construed by Heidegger, re-joins the great tradition of 
Western philosophy wherein to comprehend the particular being is already to place 
oneself beyond the particular. It is to relate to the particular, which alone exits, by 
knowledge which is always knowledge of the universals.216 
For Levinas, it is the authority of the Other in the immediacy of the face to face relation 
that fractures the solitary existence of the self and reveals the ethical relation of 
responsibility. There is a rupturing of the self’s sovereignty here that exceeds anything 
proposed in Heidegger’s Mitsein. As Rosalyn Diprose suggests, 
[T]he Other’s alterity … disturbs me, that difference in proximity generated by his 
or her own separation, his or her own sensibility. This alterity implies not only that 
the other cannot be possessed, but that her or his presence contests my possession 
(not just my possession of things and ideas but my self-possession). The other’s 
strangeness, the feeling that he or she cannot be known, puts my autonomy into 
question.217 
According to Levinas, the face of the Other also offers ethical resistance to my freedom to 
possess, not engaging me with its own counter-force, but rather exposing me with its 
vulnerability. As Levinas put it: "The expression the face introduces into the world does not 
defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power [Mon pouvoir de pouvoir]"218 
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Or again: “The being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely by appealing 
to me with its destitution and nudity—its hunger without my being able to be deaf to that 
appeal.”219 The power of the face is “a power that is stronger than murder, [it] is the 
primordial expression [epitomised in the injunction] ‘you shall not commit murder.’”220 In 
this relation, there is an absolute ethical demand where the strange Other calls into 
question the spontaneity of the ‘I.’ It appeals to the self, to “kneel before the Other, 
sacrificing its own liberty to the primordial call of the Other” and helping it to “accept that 
[its] freedom is anteceded by an obligation to the Other.”221 The Other’s appeal “appears 
through its miserable nakedness as a demand and not as a physical or moral coercion.”222 
According to Levinas, given that the ethical relation is fundamentally prior to any 
ontological relation,223 “Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with 
the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains under obedience to the 
anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to 
tyranny.”224 It is the inevitability of this power dynamic which is the target of Levinas’ harsh 
critique of Heideggerian thought. Thus, while developing many of the same themes as 
Buber’s and Sartre’s critiques, Levinas’ angle of attack is perhaps differentiated by his 
powerful insistence on the deconstruction of the self in the face of the radical ethical 
appeal of the Other. It is to a response to this critique that I now turn. 
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First of all, the claim that Heidegger fails to do justice to the irreducible altarity of the Other 
is directly addressed by Heidegger himself in the very heart of his discussion of Mitsein in 
his critique of a psychological sense of empathy. Here he says: 
The presupposition which this argument demands – that Dasein’s Being towards an 
Other is its Being towards itself – fails to hold ... Not only is Being towards Others 
an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, 
is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is. Of course, it is indisputable that a lively 
mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of Being-with, often depends upon how far 
one's own Dasein has understood itself at the time; but this means that it depends 
only upon how far one's essential Being with Others has made itself transparent 
and has not disguised itself. And that is possible only if Dasein, as Being-in-the- 
world, already is with Others.225 
Thus, for Heidegger, the ethical relation is only possible in the first place, if it is grounded 
in care. It is only when Dasein is properly understood in its Being – including in its primordial 
Being-with – that Dasein and the Other can be understood as “authentically bound 
together”. Importantly, says Heidegger, this “makes possible the right kind of objectivity 
[die rechte Sachlichkeit], which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.”226 This point 
can be elaborated somewhat with regard to two senses in which this is the case. 
First, Dasein’s obligation to the Other comes into view when it resolutely recognizes that 
its “authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole” as Being-towards-death227 is an existential 
characteristic that it shares with all possible others. Accordingly, Dasein’s understanding of 
its own indebtedness – that it is not its own basis in any absolute sense – serves as the 
condition for the possibility of its understanding of its indebtedness to others. When Dasein 
is called by its conscience to be responsible for its being, this summoning enables it to be 
morally obligated to the Other, with whom it shares its world. Dasein’s recognition of the 
Other in its own being is not a reflective experience; rather, it is an ontological relation of 
solicitude in which Dasein leaps ahead “to help the other become transparent to himself 
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in his care and to become free for it.”228 In other words, for Dasein to be able to 
appropriately care for the other, it must endeavour to understand the other in its Being 
including its potentiality-for-Being. And in doing so, Dasein lets others be [Seinlassen] in 
their own unique way; it lets the other dwell in the openness provided by its shared world 
without dominating. As Sorial observes, “[w]hile this doesn’t give the other quite the same 
privileged status that Levinas envisages, nevertheless it does save Heidegger’s ontology 
from the charge of perpetuating violence against the other.”229 
Second, Levinas’ refrain concerning the Other’s naked appeal to the self is anticipated to a 
degree by those passages (reviewed earlier) in which Heidegger discusses authentic 
Fürsorge in the context of affective atunement, and in this way leaves a way open to a 
properly ontological sense of empathy. While Heidegger is wary of this notion in its 
problematic psychological sense, he provides a hint of another dimension of empathy in 
the sense of an ontological bridge between Dasein and the other on the basis of each 
other’s fragile finitude. In resolute openness to its ineluctable facticity, Dasein is awoken 
from the slumber of its indifference towards the other, who is now more intensely present 
to it in its mutual dwelling in-the-world. In this way, it is not that the Self, in its domination 
of the other, must be undermined by the infinite exteriority of the other’s appeal, as 
Levinas would have it. Rather, in Heidegger’s view, what can open a genuine space of 
mutuality is nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness itself, by which Dasein and other 
are placed into a relationship of mutual letting-be toward each other. At a certain point, 
the gap between these two alternative visions of care for the other seems far less much 
less profound than it once did. 
However, such a defence of Heideggerian Mitsein is made all the clearer, I would suggest, 
through the lens provided by Jean-Luc Nancy (with which this chapter began). If Dasein is 
understood via Nancy’s conception of the singular plural, then (contra Levinas), the self – 
Dasein in its Jemeinigkeit – need not be obliterated in order to make room for exteriority. 
What is needed, rather, is an even-handed insistence on the equiprimordiality of Being-in 
and Being-with. What this equiprimordiality shows is the co-originarity of Dasein and other. 
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For the other’s existence is always already at the heart of the self; exterior and interior are 
already co-mingled. Being is always Being-with; existence is essentially co-existence. 
Nancy’s clarity on this point casts Heidegger’s approach in stark relief: namely, 
A single being is a contradiction in terms. Such a being, which would be its own 





This chapter has tackled the problem of Mitsein in Heidegger’s early thought through 
several lenses. It opened with Nancy’s account of Dasein as singular plural, and it then 
surveyed Heidegger’s own texts in order to trace the equiprimordiality of Being-in and 
Being-with that is so compellingly discussed by Nancy. It considered Mitsein in the context 
of Rede and Fürsorge, and how this then maps onto an active sense of ἦθος. It then further 
investigated Fürsorge in the context of both its inauthentic (leaping in) and authentic 
(leaping ahead) modes, and with respect to the latter it traced Heidegger’s texts on the 
subject of leaping ahead as freedom and responsibility, and as empathy. Finally, these 
approaches were tested against three important early critiques of the alleged poverty of 
Heidegger’s inter-relational account, and responses were offered on the basis of the 
argument presented in this chapter. 
As Heidegger asserts in Grundprobleme, it is simply a misreading of his account to see 
Dasein as “assert[ing] ontically that the factual purpose of the factical Dasein is to care 
exclusively and primarily for itself and to use others as instruments [Werkzeug] toward this 
end."231 In fact, as an authentic Being-in-the-world, Dasein is "the ontological 
presupposition for the selflessness in which every Dasein comports itself toward the other 
in the existent I-thou relationships."232 For Heidegger, Dasein’s authentic Being-in is only 
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primary aim is not to overcome them, but to let them be in their own freedom for their 
own authenticity. 
Heidegger’s idea that Dasein dwells with and in others opens up a ground for ethical 
relations in his work, built around freedom/responsibility and empathy. As a ground for 
ethical freedom, Heidegger’s Mitsein suggests that just as Dasein is summoned by the call 
of conscience to take responsibility for its own Being, this anxiety in the face of its 
groundless existence also summons it to take responsibility for the Being of the other, to 
let others be according to their fundamental freedom for their own possibilities. Mitsein 
also opens us to the fact that the being of Dasein can never be pinned down to an obligation 
or responsibility for the other because of its mortal limit conditions. Hence, what Dasein 
requires above all is a phronētic sensibility that calls for an empathic relation with the 
other. As the ground of ethical relation, the notions of freedom/responsibility and empathy 
are not abstract principles, but fundamental modes of existence that are disclosive of the 




Having now completed the main argument of this thesis, these concluding remarks will 
proceed in three stages. First, I provide a review of the major lines of argument negotiated 
in the presentation above, and in this way provide an overview of the argument as a whole. 
Second, I return to the vast and controversial backdrop that any contemporary work 
dealing with the question of Heidegger and ethics needs to acknowledge and take 
seriously, and here I refer to the controversy concerning Heidegger’s formal links with 
National Socialism, and his anti-Semitism more generally. Finally, and on the basis of both 
of these matters, I turn to consider some of the implications of the foregoing analyses for 
the field of ethics more generally. 
In this thesis, I have analysed the interconnected concepts of Gewissen and Schuld, 
Eigentlichkeit and Entschlossenheit, and Mitsein and Fürsorge to show how they evoke 
Heidegger’s take on Aristotelian φρόνησις to provide a framework for ethics in early 
Heideggerian thought. I have argued that although references to ethics in Heidegger are 
rare, something that is perplexing in itself given his relationship to anti-Semitism and 
Nazism, it is nevertheless the case that these concepts in the early Heidegger provide us 
with a nascent account of an ontological ground of ethics that is the condition of possibility 
for something like a moral philosophy per se. Of course, I have also insisted that any such 
‘ontological ground’ needs to be carefully understood as abyssal in nature, since the 
ground that Heidegger develops in his early thought is nothing other than Dasein itself, a 
being that, as thrown, “never [has] … power over [its] its ownmost Being from the ground 
up,” but at the same time, is the (ungrounded) ground of its dwelling (ἦθος) in the world. 
Consequently, any ‘ethics’ that is ‘grounded upon’ Heidegger’s early work will need to 
reflect the key insights of the existential analytic. 
The first chapter sought to orient the subsequent examination of Gewissen (chapter two), 
Eigentlichkeit (chapter three) and Mitsein (chapter four) by establishing the great 
importance of Heidegger’s ‘Wiederholung’ of Aristotelian ethics, and φρόνησις in 
particular, for understanding the overall context and unity of these concepts. Accordingly, 
Heidegger’s Daseinanalytik builds on his reading of Aristotelian φρόνησις which (in 
contradistinction to σοφία and τέχνη) involves not intellectual or technical knowledge, but 
the practical skill of discerning the best way of acting on the basis of varied possibilities 
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that are factically available. In this way, the figure of Dasein can be understood as a 
reconfigured version of the Aristotle’s φρόνιμος. This phronetic Dasein’s deliberative 
action is tailored to a desired end (τέλος); that for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνεκα) it acts. 
Consequently, the Daseinanalytik is (to use Heidegger’s later language) an “originary 
ethics” that forecloses on ethics as a ‘science’ (as επιστήμη, or as τέχνη) which determines 
how we should behave, to once again place the thinking of ἦθος within a properly 
phronetic context. Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit, 
and Mitsein are inherently phronetic. In other words, the abyssal ground of ethics he 
develops is hermeneutical through and through because it reveals Dasein as a situated 
being who dwells in a finite world of historical meaning and significance. Ethics is not as a 
phenomenon that “places action in the service of an ideal that stands outside of time and 
history,”1 as Dennis Schmidt has put it, but rather one that is intrinsically factical and 
temporal. It is only when this is fully appreciated that anything like moral normativity can 
be thought within a Heideggerian context. The focus in the succeeding chapters was to 
ascertain in detail how, as an ontologisation of the Aristotelian φρόνησις, Gewissen, 
Eigentlichkeit, and Mitsein each, in their own way, provide a vital piece of what Heidegger 
refers to as “the existential conditions for the possibility of … morality in general and for 
the possible forms which this may take factically.”2 
In the second chapter, I examined the way in which φρόνησις is transformed by Heidegger 
into the movement of conscience that spawns Dasein’s actions and activity in general, by 
which Dasein may become transparent to itself. To illustrate how phronetic insights 
developed into the framework of conscience in Heidegger’s early work, I examined the 
passing references or allusions to conscience in some of his early lecture courses, which in 
a perfunctory and embryonic way point to a progression in his appreciation of the 
importance of conscience as providing what in Being and Time he calls “the ontological 
foundations of … the ordinary way of interpreting conscience.”3 In these early works, 
Heidegger replaces the traditional understanding of conscientia with “the phenomenon of 
willing to have a conscience” perceived as fundamental to Dasein’s “choosing itself” and 
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coming into “absolute resoluteness” in “running forward toward its death,”4 though it was 
only in Being and Time that he announced the focal methodological character of 
conscience in “attesting” to Dasein’s possibility of authentic resoluteness in terms of 
hearing a “call.” Crucially, however, Heidegger is very keen to sharply distinguish his 
existential account of conscience from any ontic account of the same, and thus (building 
on Rebecca Kukla’s account of “transcendental conscience”5 ), I suggest that herein lies 
Heidegger’s distinction between the (abyssal) ontological condition of possibility of 
conscience, and its existentiell actualisation in the experience of moral normativity in 
individual ‘pangs’ of conscience. In terms of the existential analytic, conscience is not a call 
of duty to an absolute norm, but a call to Dasein to shed its identity as “they-self [Man- 
selbst]” and experience the “existentiell modification of the ‘they’” that allows for the 
possibility of “authentic Being-one’s-self.”6 Such a call is both an act of φρόνησις, and the 
condition of possibility for concrete πρᾶξις. 
In chapter three, I extended the analysis to focus on the ethical implications of  
Eigentlichkeit in early Heideggerian thought. In doing so, it is important to counter the 
prima facie impression that authentic Dasein involves, for Heidegger, a turning inward in 
the sense of becoming one’s “ownmost” (eigentlich) self in a way that cuts it off from 
responsibility for and to others. After all, any such cutting off would involve the movement 
of individualism, egoism, voluntarism, Dasein as the “solitary hero” set over against the 
amorphous mass of das Man (of which Heidegger’s account has at times been accused). 
Any such account, far from amounting to an ontological ground for moral normativity, 
would make it all but redundant. In addressing this issue, I surveyed some of the dominant 
metaphors and vocabularies of authenticity Heidegger utilised in his very early work, to 
show something of the longer history of this line of thinking prior to Being and Time which, 
far from reinforcing individualistic (including Cartesian) accounts of the authentic self, 
rather stands opposed to them. Further, in exploring the scholarly debates that have 
attended interpretations of Heidegger’s Eigentlichkeit, I focused on how, when it is grasped 
as emancipatory resoluteness (as opposed to what Benjamin Crowe helpfully discussed as 
‘ontological’ and ‘narrativist’ readings), there is a sharper evocation of the 
 
4 GA 20: 319/440-441. 
5 Kukla, "The ontology and temporality of conscience," pp. 1-34. 
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element of authentic Dasein as φρόνιμος. Finally, I argued that when the fuller scope of 
Heidegger’s treatment of Eigentlichkeit is taken into account, authentic Dasein is presented 
as a deeply engaged Being-in-the-world-with-others. As resolute, Dasein emerges from its 
lostness in the ‘They,’ not in the sense of fleeing from the world of others, but in the sense 
of being “free[d] for its world.”7 Heidegger’s account of authentic historicality 
(Geschichtlichkeit) further deepens the sense in which Eigentlichkeit is always already a 
matter of Dasein’s recognition of its thrownness into a heritage and thus a destiny 
[Geschick] not of its own making, but in which it shares. 
In the final chapter, I turned to consider directly the theme of Dasein’s Being-with others. 
To that effect, I argued against the view that Heidegger’s prioritisation of the ontological 
forecloses on the ethical relation with the Other. I suggested that through the existentiale 
of Mitsein, Heidegger effectively presents perceives Dasein as analogous to Aristotle’s ζωον 
πoλιτικόν: a being whose Being-possibility can only be understood in a πόλις, in a 
κοινότητα, a community. As such, Dasein’s care structure involves not only a responsibility 
for its own Being, but also an obligation to care for others who share the same world with 
Dasein. In order to address the perceived ambiguity around understanding Dasein as both 
individuated and Being-with (an ambiguity exacerbated by Heidegger’s own failure to flesh 
out in equal measure the nature of this equiprimordiality), I employed Jean Luc-Nancy’s 
reading of Mitsein via the paradoxical logic of the singular plural. Since, as Nancy puts it, 
“Being is singularly plural and plurally singular,”8 this requires that we understand Dasein’s 
Being-in and its Being-with as “co-equal” features of Dasein. Accordingly, Eigentlichkeit 
involves individuated resolve, but this does not make it a worldless ego cut off and isolated. 
To the contrary, it is precisely when Dasein is individuated through its anxious Being- 
towards-death that it is most Being-with-others-in-the-world. Rather than obliterating 
ethical relations with the Other, Dasein’s call to authentic resoluteness opens a space for 
ethics, where the question of ethics becomes a matter of how one carries or comports 
oneself in its relations with others. In this way, a posture that enables a solidarity with 
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It was on this basis that, in the second part of this final chapter, I examined Heidegger’s 
account of authentic Fürsorge as a “leaping ahead” (vorausspringen), with its twin 
implications of freedom/responsibility and a reconfigured understanding of empathy. 
Insofar as Fürsorge implies freedom and responsibility, Dasein becomes not only its own 
conscience but “the conscience of another” and helps “the other become transparent to 
himself in his care and to become free for it.”9 When Dasein assumes the role of conscience 
for another, it acknowledges that the Other possesses existentiell possibilities-for-Being 
that are by no means identical to its own possibilities or the inauthentic interpretations of 
the ‘They.’ As a ground of reciprocal freedom, “leaping ahead” does not mean that Dasein 
takes over the ownmost possibilities of the Other, but rather that it frees the Other’s 
awareness of its ownmost possibilities which it must resolve upon in its own Dasein. 
Further, the logic of Heidegger’s account seems to be that this ability to be “the conscience 
of another” is born out of an ontological sense of empathy (not of duty, right or obligation). 
I argued that although Heidegger explicitly rejects the reduction of Mitsein to empathy 
because of its cognitive overreach, empathy can be reconfigured (somewhat like the 
ontological reconfiguration of conscience) to provide a key insight into the way Dasein and 
the Other can relate to each other through affective attunement (Befindlichkeit). Thus, to 
“become the conscience of another” does not only imply assisting the Other to become 
“transparent and to be free for its own care,” it also means a call to be connected to the 
Other’s fragility and limit conditions. It indicates an openness towards the mortal 
temporality of the Other, an openness that is born out of Dasein’s awareness of its own 
limit conditions. 
All of these various threads, I argue, come together to amount to a distinctive – if 
unfortunately, largely only implicit – account of a ground of ethics that is quite different to 
metaphysical notions of ἦθος as traditionally conceived by the western metaphysical 
tradition. Through his analysis, Heidegger indicates that the question of ethics arises not 
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delineates a more primordial ground (“ethics of source”),10 which lays down the “the 





If this is not the place to launch into any substantial engagement with the vast whirlwind 
of “the Heidegger Controversy” (to use Richard Wolin’s concise characterisation) – 
especially in light of the most recent iteration of this controversy that has accompanied the 
publication of Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte (Überlegungen: GA 94-96) from 1931-41 – it is 
nonetheless important to offer a few targeted remarks about the relationship between the 
interpretive account provided here and the philosophical significance of Heidegger’s words 
and actions (especially) in the 1930s. 
First, it is clear that the weight of evidence concerning Heidegger’s activities and attitudes 
(both from Heidegger’s own hand and via historical research) needs to be taken fully into 
account. There is a need to acknowledge the full force of Heidegger’s formal involvement 
with Nazism in the early to mid-1930s, which was not simply a “mistake” (to quote Arendt’s 
famous declaration), but also a catastrophic failure of moral judgement that had very real 
consequences. However, as Jeff Malpas recently put it in an essay published in a collection 
dealing with the Black Notebooks: 
That Heidegger was a Nazi and that he also held anti-Semitic views are simple facts 
… The real question concerns the significance to be attached to these facts12 
 
Any such interpretation concerning this significance will require hermeneutic sensitivity to 
a series of associated matters. It would be necessary, for example, to consider the 
idiosyncratic nature both of Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism, and his 
reasons for stepping back from it while never repudiating it. One would further need to 
consider the ways in which Heidegger’s version of anti-Semitism both echoes, and differs 
from, widespread 19-20th century forms of anti-Semitism that involve deeply ingrained 
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cultural prejudice (as distinct from biologically-rooted theories of racial determinism). Of 
similar importance is the need to think about both the deep corruptibility of early 
Heideggerian thought (in which Heidegger himself participated) whilst also acknowledging 
that it was a fecund inspiration for so much 20th (and 21st) century philosophy, including 
the many Jewish thinkers for whom Heidegger has served as a compelling interlocutor. 
The bottom line here is that there is a pressing need to move well beyond selective proof 
texts and biographical facts if it is Heidegger’s philosophy that is to be assessed, and not 
simply his personal historical culpability. This is a much more difficult task, one that 
requires careful and sustained attention to the texts themselves. This is precisely what this 
thesis has attempted to provide, at least in terms of Heidegger’s texts of the 1920s. I have 
argued there is a compelling set of trajectories knitted through these texts that point 
toward an ethically fecund framework for thinking helpfully about the ground of ethics. 
This, I have suggested, is the case even if the full promise of those trajectories remained 
conspicuously unrealised in those very texts; remaining (at best) in the background of his 
thought in the years to come; and (at worst) showed themselves to be open to gross 
corruption and misuse. 
Having said that, this is not to deny that scholars of significant standing have discerned in 
these early texts elements that anticipate sympathies that were to come to fruition in 
Heidegger’s thinking and activities in the 1930s. No less a scholar of Heidegger’s work than 
Richard Polt, for example, has written that, “[t]here are indeed elements of Being and Time 
that not only allow for a pro-Nazi decision but appear to point in that direction,” and indeed 
that no one “one can avoid a shudder upon encountering the words Volk and Kampf 
(people and struggle) in Heidegger’s discussion of authentic historicity.”13 While I would 
acknowledge that it is possible to discern such threads of continuity, I would maintain that 
it is important not to read the texts of the 1920s simply in the light of what was to come, 
as though there is a dark teleology afoot in those texts that led directly to future calamity. 
Such readings fail to do sufficient justice to the senses in which Heidegger’s actions and the 
directions of his thought in the 1930s can be read as much as a betrayal of his work of the 
1920s as its fulfilment. An obvious example of this concerns the delicate balance (explored 
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in chapter four above) between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ that is built into Heidegger’s account 
of Being-in and Being-with, and the implications that imbalance in either direction can 
have: be it toward, on one hand, forms of voluntaristic individualism in which a sense of 
the ‘we’ is subsumed under the weight of an overwhelming self-insistence, or on the other 
hand, a corporatistic (e.g., nationalistic) sense in which the I is subordinated to a normative 
vision of collective destiny. It is true that Geschichtlichkeit can be read into Heidegger’s 
later ideology of Volk and Kampf, but there is nothing inevitable about such a slanting, and 
indeed I would suggest that it may only be accomplished by doing a violence to Heidegger’s 
own earlier texts. 
Of course, in maintaining as much, I am not suggesting that such a reading of the continuity 
between the Heidegger’s thinking in the 1920s and his Nazi sympathies in the 1930s is 
simply a figment of scholarly misreading, for it is clearly a trajectory that Heidegger seemed 
to have drawn himself. If Karl Löwith’s recollected conversation with Heidegger does not 
settle that matter,14 the text of Heidegger’s Winter 1933-34 seminar on “Natur, Geschichte 
und Staat” (first published in 2009) appears to confirm it. In these extraordinary pages, 
Heidegger leaves little doubt concerning his support for the idea of a Führer-state, and in 
so doing makes a case for the continuity between it and the aforementioned category of 
Geschichtlichkeit in Being and Time.15 However while, as Polt and Fried suggest, 
Heidegger’s sketch here of the National Socialist ideology is “consistent with his views on 
the historicity of Dasein” while also “support[ing] Hitlerian dictatorship and suggest[ing] 
justifications for German expansionism and persecution of the Jews,”16 it is another thing 
entirely to claim that Geschichtlichkeit just is a disguised account of such an ideology. To 
the contrary, it is, I have maintained, a terrible distortion of the category in the earlier 
 
14 Richard Wolin, "My Last Meeting With Heidegger in Rome," in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical 
Reader, ed., Richard Wolin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 140-44. 
15 In a remarkable section, where Heidegger seems to be speaking directly to his students, he writes that 
although it is important to have a political leader who directs the affairs of the state, what is no less 
important is to have a people that have the need of “a tradition that is carried on by a political leader.” In 
distinguishing his view from that of Rousseau (who argues that every government should be constituted by 
individual persons who enter into a social contract with the state,) Heidegger maintains that an ideal state 
cannot be truly constituted by the free will of the people. See, Martin Heidegger, "Über Wesen und Begriff 
von Natur, Geschichte und Staat," in Heidegger-Jahrbuch 4 – Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus I, ed., 
Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2009), pp.53-88. Translated as Martin 
Heidegger, Nature, History, State 1933-1944, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 52. 
16 Heidegger, Nature, History, State 1933-1944, 1. 
238  
work, for it takes one possible ontic application and develops this to the exclusion of other 
equally or more viable modes of development. As such, Heidegger’s later use of this and 
other themes from his earlier work amounts to a significant betrayal of its nascent promise 
as an ‘originary ethics’. 
The point, then, is not to defend Heidegger, but to appreciate the ways in which his early 
work, when read on its own terms, undermines rather than underpins his directions after 
1930, for the fascism that Heidegger comes to defend with apparently normative intent 
has more in common with the politics of das Man than with authentic Fürsorge as it was 
sketched above. But further, beyond all the sound and fury of the ‘Heidegger Controversy,’ 
it is important to bend this issue back upon our own Dasein. In this context it is important 
to recognise that, as Charles Scott rightly observes, “[t]he question for us … is how to raise 






Scott’s question presents a fine segue into the final set of remarks in this conclusion, for it 
is important to offer some sense of the acute relevance of the considerations provided in 
this study for the field of ethics more generally. If Heidegger does indeed provide 
something like an abyssal ground of ethics, an “originary ethics”, what might be seen as 
the implications for the contemporary field of normative ethics? How does what would 
otherwise be seen as an ‘in house’ interpretive debate among scholars of the works of 
Martin Heidegger relate to wider debates concerning philosophical ethics in general? What 
happens when early Heideggerian ‘ontology’ shifts gear into ‘ontic’ talk about what 
authentic resolute Being-in-the-world-with-others looks like in concrete terms? 
Before ending with a concise consideration of this question, it is important to acknowledge 
that some have doubted Heidegger’s account provides sufficient resources for such a task. 
John Caputo, for example, has offered a firm caution against such an endeavour. For him, 
Heidegger’s “originary ethos” is understood more through later Heideggerian thinking that 
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“looks ahead to a new dawn, which is to be an eschatological repetition and renewal of 
what began in the early Greek city state [the πόλις], before metaphysics and all 
metaphysical ethics.”18 Caputo rejects Heidegger’s tendency to locate primordial ethos in 
the Greek city state on the grounds that the Athenian πόλις was full of cruel exclusionary 
rules that silenced the voices of slaves, women and other non-Greeks that inhabited the 
city state.19 Further, he draws a straight line between Heidegger’s early account of Dasein’s 
comportment in the world and the way that Heidegger ‘comported’ himself during the 
Nazis regime and how he interpreted the destiny of the German people. According to 
Mariana Ortega, for all its promise, Heidegger’s account is “not sufficient to guarantee 
morality, to yield the moral truth that so many aspire to, or to accomplish the more modest 
claim of showing our capability of acknowledging a common truth.”20 Ultimately, as human 
beings, “we are a project that we ourselves carry out as we exist”21 Thus, to the extent that 
we live in a world that is always full of inhuman and “countless unmentionable acts,”22 any 
ethics that is contingent upon our inclination to the repetition of these antisocial acts 
would seem not only shocking but fundamentally contradictory.23 
Needless to say, I am far less pessimistic about the possibilities presented by Heidegger’s 
account for developing a practical ethics. If Heidegger’s fundamental ontology carries no 
prescriptive or normative intent on its own account, it is also the case that it is suffused 
 
18 Caputo, Radical Hermenuetics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, 237. 
19 Here, Caputo’s view is not that Heidegger’s truth of Being has no ethical import, but that Heidegger’s 
primordial ethos is “eschatological, and it is eschatology which causes all the trouble.” According to him, 
“the question of post-metaphysical ethics must be approached in connection with the delimitation of 
[Heidegger’s] eschatological metaphysics.” What this delimitation exposes, for Caputo, is the 
“dissemination of the manifold sense of Being.” In Caputo’s “deconstructive rereading” of Heidegger, his 
most uncircumventable thought lies in the Ereignsis, which is not the truth of Being … but that which gives 
Being, gives the manifold meanings or truth of Being. The truth of Being is that there are many truths of 
Being. And, if the truth of Being means the primordial ethos, then in the end there is no primordial ethos 
but only the manifold senses of ethos, the array of historical differences.” See, Caputo, Radical 
Hermenuetics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, 238. My sense is that Caputo’s 
critique of Heidegger’s primordial ethos seems like a superficial charge. Heidegger already alluded to what 
Caputo calls “manifold senses of ethos” in his description of Being-with as leaping-ahead, where he 
suggests that the manner to which different Daseins are “authentically bound together” is “determined by 
the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of.” SZ: 123/159. 
20 Ortega, "When conscience calls, will Dasein answer? Heideggerian authenticity and the possibility of 
ethical life," 28. 
21 Ortega, "When conscience calls, will Dasein answer? Heideggerian authenticity and the possibility of 
ethical life," 28. 
22 Ortega, "When conscience calls, will Dasein answer? Heideggerian authenticity and the possibility of 
ethical life," 28. 
23 Ortega, "When conscience calls, will Dasein answer? Heideggerian authenticity and the possibility of 
ethical life," pp. 28-29. 
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with ethical language and trajectories that point toward an ancient pedigree, especially in 
its evocation of Aristotelian ethics, albeit in importantly transformed senses. From start to 
finish, Heidegger eschews any idea that the philosopher should be in the business of 
offering rules or tips on how to live ethically, or accounts of binding values to which we 
should adhere. Yet, his analysis of Dasein’s ontological structure as thrown Being-in-the- 
world, does provide a substantial account of the very existential context within which 
ethical dwelling in the world is possible. The ungrounded or “null” ground of Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world is thus the fundamental context of all moral norms. All forms of ethical 
force depend on it. Lawrence Hatab rightly puts it as follows: 
If we attend in a Heideggerian manner to th[is] existential environment (being-in- 
the-world) in which and out of which the ethical life arises, such a ’pre-ethical’ 
analysis should give us clues for a more adequate ethics [that] can be [grasped] as 
a finite, existential, ungrounded world dynamic, a configuration that … can 
significantly improve upon traditional models in moral philosophy.24 
If Heidegger conceives the ground of ethics in terms of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, or later 
as human dwelling, his claim is that any ethics must therefore be highly hermeneutically 
attuned. From my reading of Heidegger, such an ethics is one that, as Dennis Schmidt put 
it, “starts from an invitation to our mortality” and not from “the assumption of our human 
subjectivity.”25 Such an invitation must play out on the basis of an understanding of human 
Being as primordially a Being-with-others, and not on the basis of imposed obligation on 
an autonomous subject. That, I contend, changes things greatly. When ethics attends to 
our Being-in-the-world, as Hatab notes, it gives us a better insight into “how values function 
in our experience to open up the ethical life, its conditions, demands, and difficulties.”26 
What, in general, makes for the good in the context of the shared sociality that Heidegger’s 
ground of ethics provides? It is crucial that we first attend to the grounded context for moral 
normativity, the ἦθος in a broad sense, before we get carried away with assertions about 
this or that particular moral obligation. Among other things, Charles Taylor expresses this 
point beautifully when he observes: 
 
 
24 Hatab, "Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contribution to Moral Philosophy," 405. 
25 Schmidt, Hermeneutics as Original Ethics, 42. 
26 Hatab, "Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contribution to Moral Philosophy," 405. 
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[Contemporary] moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do 
rather than on what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather 
than the nature of the good life.27 
How, then, might such a (null) grounding for ethics point forward in a practical way to a 
revisioned approach to moral normativity? How is it possible to move from the ‘is’ of the 
ethical Abgrund to the ‘ought’ of a practical ethics, and indeed, what is the nature of what 
I would see as the necessarily organic relationship between ground and norm? Frederick 
Olafson’s extraordinary Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein was a 
concerted attempt to address just this question. In ways that point well beyond the scope 
of this thesis, Olafson looked to “build on” and “amplify” Heidegger’s account in order to 
suggest perspectives through which Heidegger’s undeveloped ethical ground might be 
unpacked in a practical sense, and to that end, his book moves through and well beyond 
Heidegger’s own texts.28 The account presented here stays essentially within those texts 
rather than reaching beyond them, and it does so in order to provide first a robust account 
of Heidegger’s own ground of ethics. Nevertheless, it is clear that such an account then 
needs to be fleshed out, and Olafson’s work provides one model for how this might be 
achieved. In the space remaining, I wish to make a few remarks of my own as to what I see 
as flowing most clearly from Heidegger’s own account. 
One of the benefits of Heidegger’s approach to the ethical, I would suggest, is that it 
enables us to see fairly quickly how various dominant forms of normative ethics that look 
to provide clean-cut schemes for moral decision-making fall well short. Obviously, any 
notion of ethical egoism is ruled out by Heidegger’s withering attack on the very notion of 
autonomous subjectivity, even before his account of Mitsein is brought into view. But other 
more mainstream frameworks fare little better. Given Heidegger’s emphasis on the 
phronetic and thus hermeneutic context for human action in his early thought (as surveyed 
above), I would suggest that this makes deontological approaches to ethics difficult to 
square with a Heideggerian ethical ground, insofar as they bear little heed to the context 
of human action. The Kantian notion of a categorical imperative, for example, would 
appear to place abstract universal law above and independent of the factical situation of 
 
27 Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 3. 
28 Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, 6. 
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the ethical subject. Indeed, one might even go as far as to say that in the eclipse of the ‘Da’ 
of Dasein, Being itself is forgotten in such a scheme. Similar claims might be made about 
metaphysically-rooted theological accounts of normative ethics. However, equally, I would 
suggest that Heidegger’s originary ethics stands also opposed to consequentialist 
(especially utilitarian) approaches to ethics that in their narrow calculative sense of the 
ethical situation similarly (if differently) loses sight of the hermeneutic nuances of the 
situations into which factical Dasein is thrown. Indeed, a case could be made that the very 
focus on utility is itself a form of calculative understanding of the human that is marked by 
“enframing [Ge-stell],” through which human beings are effectively rendered as “standing 
reserve” for utilitarian calculation. 29 
If such approaches would seem to be clearly incompatible with the primordial ground of 
ethics as Heidegger has sketched it, other approaches retain a level of viability. Clearly – 
and unsurprisingly so, given Heidegger’s embrace of the Aristotelian category of φρoνησις 
– a virtues-based approach to ethics would retain some level of appeal, if more for its 
understanding of human action than for its focus on human virtues as such. However, more 
contemporary approaches might also be taken into account that would appear to chime in 
well with the theme of Fürsorge: e.g., “care” focused approaches such as those advocated 
by Carol Gilligan,30 Annette Baier,31 and Nel Noddings32, or even the “situation ethics” of 
Joseph Fletcher.33 There are significant differences, strengths and weaknesses among all 
such approaches. However, what they generally share is a focus on, and an insistence on 
the need for, a highly nuanced appreciation of the multiple sources of value that any ethical 
situation involves. In this way, ethics is unavoidably a matter for the careful weighing of 
priorities that are rooted in the intimacy of the ethical situation, or in short: practical 





29 See, Martin Heidegger’s Die Technik und die Kehre, Holzwege, and Vortrage und Aufsatze. Translated as 
Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: 
Garland Publishers, 1977). 
30 See, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982/1993). 
31 See, Annette Baier, Reflections on How We Live (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
32 See, Nel Noddings, Caring, A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). 
33 See, Joseph F. Fletcher, Situation ethics : the new morality (Philadelphia: Philadelphia : Westminster 
Press, 1966). 
243  
Beyond such approaches, however, it might also be wondered whether Heidegger’s 
opposition to dogmatic theological approaches to ethics would rule out non-metaphysical 
exhortative approaches that make direct appeal to the individual on the basis of revealed 
truth. After all, if (as noted earlier) his claim is that issues of ethics are “matters better left 
to the preacher,”34 perhaps a case might be made that a Heideggerian ethics would be 
rooted not in moral reasoning at all, but in moral exhortation. While much more needs to 
be considered on this issue (a task that lies far beyond this thesis), suffice to say that I find 
such a claim far from convincing. After all, the context in which this comment is made 
concerns the legitimacy of philosophical thinking making absolute claims concerning 
values. Seen in this light, it is more a matter of such absolute claims belonging to the 
domain of preaching. Meanwhile, Heidegger’s intellectually demanding account of the 
ontological ground of ethics can hardly be understood as a call away from thought towards 
exhortation pure and simple; it is rather a call toward a heightened level of attentiveness 
to the whole context of the ethical situation. 
Perhaps the most basic demand on any sense of moral normativity that can be seen as 
flowing from Heidegger’s entire account of Dasein as Being-in-the-world-with-others – i.e., 
from his “originary ethics” – is its coherence with the care structure as a whole. Dasein 
dwells authentically in the ἦθος insofar as it recognises itself as a thrown projection that is 
called toward authentic understanding in the midst of the levelled off counter-call of the 
‘They.’ The call back to authentic Being-with others is thus not a call to transcend one’s 
facticity (an impossible and ludicrous requirement of course), but to properly enter into it. 
Only when this is done can a sense of moral normativity begin to emerge from the abyssal 
ground of Dasein’s factical existence. Only then is genuine attunement to the needs of 
others, and care for them, possible. Only then can a philosophy of the ground of ethics 
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